Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C0C1D2BDC0E; Sat, 12 Sep 2026 11:26:57 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1789212419; cv=none; b=b0fcbUPDp29v8+ZnKzZVOWfyGoGTVvRuOPlws3xWIo6U1Grk48NKANIP0EaH9K2iFZVUD2pXMzjWAktkRd4h4bd47jrj+UDWmiAT/UsLdrE88H06+w8PdDm4KoBllmNULfiTY7Uzx8mMkrB48dtYUyEsTJ0BKn6e8BMyD2NfluA= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1789212419; c=relaxed/simple; bh=AVr0N0aY9b5eYDynArh0uJtfLiLARhjeZ47SsNqowNI=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=e2JgTr8li38I7oL0hx1gULicHCbqnhItoVf30Yqz24axE1z7xRujSxzO4SJGCKW6Ebe3uJvBdw1lVKbcUBWkqKbsFqG5l9L+oCYhuFtnvlF+5OFFEZCHm/ZJ7+YMt6jqaBCe0MiqeqsWvXCSTW9+0O5BF0R83Ggma3qF4ovLAjA= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=ggN1RWUV; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="ggN1RWUV" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 08BB31F000FF; Sat, 12 Sep 2026 11:26:54 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1789212416; bh=iSfZdMGYA6+MWr3YfcKgFvQGGEV4tDwBiBzrf/ZolAM=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=ggN1RWUVPrIwoYtuKuhzJ/ad9Q7YSl3ubLRdKsVHWPiNX8xKqPwA9mZl9unXFP8Sg 5mU4IEaeEiMxA42P9A5AYTXfDwddO/TRne97IP+8WoXdfttdW2P9kzFQAahCN6CKaQ OeOq7xLI++Vv/vgGJSG109Gy0Y7mICX6S1hKMC/s= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, syzbot+87c7c2d63c44e41c77a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com, Aleksandr Nogikh , Alex Markuze , Ilya Dryomov , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 6.18 1433/1518] libceph: validate banner payload length Date: Sat, 12 Sep 2026 09:00:02 +0200 Message-ID: <20260912065655.970197045@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.55.0 In-Reply-To: <20260912065623.398859879@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20260912065623.398859879@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 6.18-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Aleksandr Nogikh [ Upstream commit f374967fcdf04001c9b66df1c19106fa83cd91f7 ] When parsing the Ceph messenger v2 protocol banner, the `payload_len` field is decoded from the banner prefix. If a client sends a banner with a `payload_len` of 0, the kernel sets up a 0-length socket read. This violates an invariant in the state machine, triggering a warning in `populate_in_iter()`: ------------[ cut here ]------------ !iov_iter_count(&con->v2.in_iter) WARNING: net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 at populate_in_iter net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 [inline], CPU#1: kworker/1:3/5070 WARNING: net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3129 at ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x6634/0x6810 net/ceph/messenger_v2.c:3159, CPU#1: kworker/1:3/5070 ... Call Trace: ceph_con_workfn+0x1f5/0x14a0 net/ceph/messenger.c:1575 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3322 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xa8e/0x14e0 kernel/workqueue.c:3405 worker_thread+0xa47/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3486 kthread+0x388/0x470 kernel/kthread.c:436 ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 According to the msgr2 protocol specification, the banner payload is expected to contain at least two 64-bit integers (`server_feat` and `server_req_feat`). Therefore, `payload_len` must be at least 16 bytes. Fix this by adding a check in `process_banner_prefix()` to reject a `payload_len` smaller than 16 bytes. This prevents the 0-length read and correctly aborts the connection with a protocol error. Fixes: cd1a677cad99 ("libceph, ceph: implement msgr2.1 protocol (crc and secure modes)") Assisted-by: Gemini:gemini-3.5-flash Gemini:gemini-3.1-pro-preview syzbot Reported-by: syzbot+87c7c2d63c44e41c77a3@syzkaller.appspotmail.com Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=87c7c2d63c44e41c77a3 Link: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/ai_job?id=c8ca3d63-717a-4933-89ec-f3d761b8690d Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Nogikh Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- net/ceph/messenger_v2.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c b/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c index 5c7435fc6483f..4bb238eb8606e 100644 --- a/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c +++ b/net/ceph/messenger_v2.c @@ -2144,6 +2144,11 @@ static int process_banner_prefix(struct ceph_connection *con) payload_len = ceph_decode_16(&p); dout("%s con %p payload_len %d\n", __func__, con, payload_len); + if (payload_len < sizeof(u64) + sizeof(u64)) { + con->error_msg = "protocol error, bad banner payload len"; + return -EINVAL; + } + return prepare_read_banner_payload(con, payload_len); } -- 2.53.0