Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EBB0232A3DA for ; Tue, 22 Sep 2026 15:13:40 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1790090022; cv=none; b=LhDUl2MjiyauIHtK5qZQxLiv4d602ewN8cx6aUoCwmoAZXEJp7JKI8Sr1bdi2rke6b4ZOKkhEv0F0628HQaBkdRW3kMQCUeZOqqHFi9P3OEUPNWOz/PLnW9FalHdp2bq+f2sUCNM26E7a3DJUnagVBU9ZjlC2iqk2ZvYQ+kT5nY= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1790090022; c=relaxed/simple; bh=wGz9seX/jxyG0KEgOBeyA2pUwKkbTufxXIlZwnbfN7g=; h=Subject:To:Cc:From:Date:Message-ID:MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=LFSavQ4c/LpTcFcGUVLtYJaMRxUi6uyEjOHvtp68EIKSAJTVlNRhy5m/DIlpx2wd7Pp9DMOLB6qbTJrUdPlHcyEsFgPNAi7foImJnBuIRDP/RYfg+v5Cv4IcjhpNqsXbQ4b0wo91HDbuAGoqBraJrKhlW7Zd9qIk+VcCP2Qzb4s= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b=Uk2UH2fz; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.b="Uk2UH2fz" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id D2B551F00899; Tue, 22 Sep 2026 15:13:39 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1790090020; bh=0Qz8asjVkP+qpuh3f8sRIzFhqVa8P5j5ACYRD9sDqUM=; h=Subject:To:Cc:From:Date; b=Uk2UH2fz+URKukgjiaYOkm1ZFMSilQnkY5JJLkw0qzDsONy+bzMNX+moSH0KRRlmR SthIdYc2BlKvCtXZQeXpRTgBmUvqLtTqow5EAvIZr+hOt77O01HYhtCV5YbpoVVZeO 0UHY1t3PDEyN4iqfnpYW8MqJldA6gq+dZzJuPdEI= Subject: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] smb: client: fix next_buffer UAF and NextCommand bounds in" failed to apply to 5.15-stable tree To: sorenson@redhat.com,dhowells@redhat.com,pc@manguebit.org Cc: From: Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2026 17:07:09 +0200 Message-ID: <2026092209-entryway-vastly-d821@gregkh> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ANSI_X3.4-1968 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit The patch below does not apply to the 5.15-stable tree. If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit id to . To reproduce the conflict and resubmit, you may use the following commands: git fetch https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git/ linux-5.15.y git checkout FETCH_HEAD git cherry-pick -x 05762c5bc1cfdcac36747994fde2c04387a457f1 # git commit -s git send-email --to '' --in-reply-to '2026092209-entryway-vastly-d821@gregkh' --subject-prefix 'PATCH 5.15.y' 'HEAD^..' Possible dependencies: thanks, greg k-h ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ From 05762c5bc1cfdcac36747994fde2c04387a457f1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Frank Sorenson Date: Wed, 16 Sep 2026 16:33:52 -0500 Subject: [PATCH] smb: client: fix next_buffer UAF and NextCommand bounds in compound PDUs Fix several related bounds checking and pointer lifecycle issues in receive_encrypted_standard()'s handling of compound encrypted frames: - Clear next_buffer after assigning it to server->bigbuf. A stale next_buffer pointer can lead to a use-after-free on subsequent error paths. - Update pdu_length to the decrypted plaintext size (buf_size). Using the pre-decryption length allows NextCommand to point into stale ciphertext residue. - Reject next_cmd values smaller than MID_HEADER_SIZE(server). - Fix an integer overflow in the upper bound check by verifying pdu_length - next_cmd < MID_HEADER_SIZE(server), ensuring the trailing slice is large enough for a header. Fixes: b24df3e30cbf ("cifs: update receive_encrypted_standard to handle compounded responses") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Frank Sorenson Reviewed-by: David Howells Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara diff --git a/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c b/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c index cb4fd09f996e..fcf7033889c7 100644 --- a/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c +++ b/fs/smb/client/smb2ops.c @@ -5365,6 +5365,7 @@ receive_encrypted_standard(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, length = decrypt_raw_data(server, buf, buf_size, NULL, false); if (length) return length; + pdu_length = buf_size; next_is_large = server->large_buf; one_more: @@ -5377,8 +5378,15 @@ receive_encrypted_standard(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, } if (next_cmd) { - if (WARN_ON_ONCE(next_cmd > pdu_length)) + if (next_cmd < MID_HEADER_SIZE(server) || + next_cmd > pdu_length || + pdu_length - next_cmd < MID_HEADER_SIZE(server)) { + unsigned int max_next = pdu_length > (unsigned int)MID_HEADER_SIZE(server) ? + pdu_length - (unsigned int)MID_HEADER_SIZE(server) : 0; + cifs_server_dbg(VFS, "invalid NextCommand offset %u out of range [%zu, %u]\n", + next_cmd, MID_HEADER_SIZE(server), max_next); return -1; + } if (next_is_large) next_buffer = (char *)cifs_buf_get(); else @@ -5414,6 +5422,7 @@ receive_encrypted_standard(struct TCP_Server_Info *server, server->bigbuf = buf = next_buffer; else server->smallbuf = buf = next_buffer; + next_buffer = NULL; goto one_more; } else if (ret != 0) { /*