From: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.org>,
	Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5.10.y] smb: client: fix next_buffer UAF and NextCommand bounds in compound PDUs
Date: Tue, 22 Sep 2026 21:40:21 -0400
Message-ID: <20260923014021.880327-1-sashal@kernel.org>
In-Reply-To: <2026092210-mango-cacti-413b@gregkh>
References: <2026092210-mango-cacti-413b@gregkh>
Precedence: bulk
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit

From: Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>

[ Upstream commit 05762c5bc1cfdcac36747994fde2c04387a457f1 ]

Fix several related bounds checking and pointer lifecycle issues in
receive_encrypted_standard()'s handling of compound encrypted frames:

- Clear next_buffer after assigning it to server->bigbuf. A stale
  next_buffer pointer can lead to a use-after-free on subsequent
  error paths.
- Update pdu_length to the decrypted plaintext size (buf_size). Using
  the pre-decryption length allows NextCommand to point into stale
  ciphertext residue.
- Reject next_cmd values smaller than MID_HEADER_SIZE(server).
- Fix an integer overflow in the upper bound check by verifying
  pdu_length - next_cmd < MID_HEADER_SIZE(server), ensuring the
  trailing slice is large enough for a header.

Fixes: b24df3e30cbf ("cifs: update receive_encrypted_standard to handle compounded responses")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Frank Sorenson <sorenson@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Paulo Alcantara <pc@manguebit.org>
[ Replaced unavailable MID_HEADER_SIZE(server) with (HEADER_SIZE(server) - 1). ]
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/cifs/smb2ops.c | 11 ++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c
index 51f8ea0c89065..ff03023b02976 100644
--- a/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c
+++ b/fs/cifs/smb2ops.c
@@ -4967,6 +4967,7 @@ receive_encrypted_standard(struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
 	length = decrypt_raw_data(server, buf, buf_size, NULL, 0, 0, false);
 	if (length)
 		return length;
+	pdu_length = buf_size;
 
 	next_is_large = server->large_buf;
 one_more:
@@ -4979,8 +4980,15 @@ receive_encrypted_standard(struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
 	}
 
 	if (next_cmd) {
-		if (WARN_ON_ONCE(next_cmd > pdu_length))
+		if (next_cmd < (HEADER_SIZE(server) - 1) ||
+		    next_cmd > pdu_length ||
+		    pdu_length - next_cmd < (HEADER_SIZE(server) - 1)) {
+			unsigned int max_next = pdu_length > (unsigned int)(HEADER_SIZE(server) - 1) ?
+					pdu_length - (unsigned int)(HEADER_SIZE(server) - 1) : 0;
+			cifs_server_dbg(VFS, "invalid NextCommand offset %u out of range [%zu, %u]\n",
+					next_cmd, (HEADER_SIZE(server) - 1), max_next);
 			return -1;
+		}
 		if (next_is_large)
 			next_buffer = (char *)cifs_buf_get();
 		else
@@ -5016,6 +5024,7 @@ receive_encrypted_standard(struct TCP_Server_Info *server,
 			server->bigbuf = buf = next_buffer;
 		else
 			server->smallbuf = buf = next_buffer;
+		next_buffer = NULL;
 		goto one_more;
 	} else if (ret != 0) {
 		/*
-- 
2.53.0