Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-alma10-1.taild15c8.ts.net [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 1C33F52E059 for ; Tue, 29 Sep 2026 16:30:02 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1790699404; cv=none; b=kx5hHfKvMF6JYvxKWQCpfuzIJZz/iRVCVq5GNc29s0hVZ7utiezFc7M9e1CSJonSgnuQMq2ipOZTAeXw8cw4/JrGglyeyq2N8jzPtKu7gmr0z61tL7bMohFy/mPsS8sdB78zj712KTpA8EDoTMTLkkk/4DUyNUloWXZF2JheBOk= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1790699404; c=relaxed/simple; bh=VmU6Al+5IQgpfl43vexbRDnGFJpSr6CTk7JXvY6yNWc=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=hSfcSTNE8HAV3m0coHavnVKxBVykbZul5gYF3Hh6ct8xemZzWCtWzewr9INwJ3svvkpTojn3QHnK7XQIyZJwkadBxtZTvcNK3M0p26aehHQN07ek86Y596GDeq0aSQLNX7kX7LyiDXEFvAoOHaVZAMd7GydNHcxMZhHne3yX8Xc= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=SvaFqprH; arc=none smtp.client-ip=100.103.45.18 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="SvaFqprH" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id E5B741F000FF; Tue, 29 Sep 2026 16:30:01 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1790699402; bh=jRYHG8gmACAqFU6RZ9eR13CWiwWPSXgm613xLiflFqs=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=SvaFqprHH8v1CT62kw/hb2zbFLGpgR1/q+YcLPLuXTCg3DjB/87eDs5vKwk1FCELV PNYMDTx+vpxhYXoZC3Ie9ScqK0xMIhhSWc081iy8T8n8S1wxhbr7446OVUvG4gtGX1 Fu7g+YsPGmv24FT2obZ0wnZPdhTHAa7GgLSbILP7QHw4GNcOLKCS1ARZPNfFsP58Hh ZkwI30/yVF6mfcaEmuDI+k5jNHoUQIqHxHd6o1lRzWRCWUs2c1mBU3LCMWPBIfjr+S Fn6SsO3waQSKcttkerf4I8LUtHXIatzOrE54tsstZrby+dY1cGfR9TzfJJl3Fh4IGA aqJGW07r95GGg== From: Sasha Levin To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Willem de Bruijn , Eric Dumazet , Daniel Zahka , Jakub Kicinski , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.15.y] tcp: prevent collapsing skbs across boundary in rtx queue Date: Tue, 29 Sep 2026 12:30:00 -0400 Message-ID: <20260929163000.51802-1-sashal@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.53.0 In-Reply-To: <2026092927-online-drilling-740b@gregkh> References: <2026092927-online-drilling-740b@gregkh> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: stable@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit From: Willem de Bruijn [ Upstream commit fc6d80eb504458d6416b75a94188b268c95c6533 ] tcp_write_collapse_fence() sets TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->eor = 1 on tcp_write_queue_tail(sk) to prevent skbs queued after a switch to device encryption from being collapsed into earlier skbs. The fence is a no-op if all earlier data has already been transmitted when the switch happens: sk->sk_write_queue is empty. The not yet acknowledged earlier skbs wait in sk->tcp_rtx_queue with eor 0. On a subsequent retransmit or SACK shift, tcp_retrans_try_collapse() or tcp_shift_skb_data() can then merge an skb queued after the switch into one queued before it. Both users of the fence are affected: - psp: devices only encrypt skbs with skb->decrypted set. The merged skb keeps decrypted = 0 from the earlier skb, so merged data sent after psp_sock_assoc_set_tx() is retransmitted in cleartext. - tls device offload: the merged skb straddles the start marker set in tls_set_device_offload(). The software fallback (fill_sg_in() returns -EINVAL) and the mlx5, nfp and funeth drivers cannot handle such an skb and drop it. Every retransmit rebuilds the same skb, so the connection stalls. Fix this in two places, for defense in depth: 1. Fall back to tcp_rtx_queue_tail(sk) in tcp_write_collapse_fence() when tcp_write_queue_tail(sk) is NULL. 2. Check !skb_cmp_decrypted(to, from) in tcp_skb_can_collapse(), as tcp_skb_can_collapse_rx() does on receive. skb_shift(), which both collapse paths call, already has a DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE() for this condition. Fixes: e8f69799810c ("net/tls: Add generic NIC offload infrastructure") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Willem de Bruijn Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet Reviewed-by: Daniel Zahka Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260924154427.953800-1-willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski [ inlined logic for missing skb_cmp_decrypted() and tcp_write_collapse_fence() helpers into existing functions. ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- include/net/tcp.h | 4 ++++ net/tls/tls_device.c | 4 ++-- 2 files changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/net/tcp.h b/include/net/tcp.h index a0f3dd3faf60c..0dec2857f5b5d 100644 --- a/include/net/tcp.h +++ b/include/net/tcp.h @@ -974,6 +974,10 @@ static inline bool tcp_skb_can_collapse_to(const struct sk_buff *skb) static inline bool tcp_skb_can_collapse(const struct sk_buff *to, const struct sk_buff *from) { +#ifdef CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE + if (from->decrypted != to->decrypted) + return false; +#endif return likely(tcp_skb_can_collapse_to(to) && mptcp_skb_can_collapse(to, from)); } diff --git a/net/tls/tls_device.c b/net/tls/tls_device.c index 10f7b35673bc6..d47477b39819b 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_device.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_device.c @@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ static void tls_device_resync_tx(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *tls_ctx, int err = 0; u8 *rcd_sn; - skb = tcp_write_queue_tail(sk); + skb = tcp_write_queue_tail(sk) ?: tcp_rtx_queue_tail(sk); if (skb) TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->eor = 1; @@ -1107,7 +1107,7 @@ int tls_set_device_offload(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx) * SKBs where only part of the payload needs to be encrypted. * So mark the last skb in the write queue as end of record. */ - skb = tcp_write_queue_tail(sk); + skb = tcp_write_queue_tail(sk) ?: tcp_rtx_queue_tail(sk); if (skb) TCP_SKB_CB(skb)->eor = 1; -- 2.53.0