Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795060335; b=5CJt+zEsjlyopvGzM1bkOGyBTiL/NZ1TOAdhHyly7+OQWtNxM3GpKXbcjiX8OryonGsk Qpwt7eTE0CZLudEXn4+HtiSKSp2W2uY+gNxFkrlOJw0gx53exaU+AqA/rpd2SBm5swcnS Hq7q8bT6HOnlMLd8aI5Jc8wXb1vMO9QPT/VJ0bw9Eyad07DeGYVE8LUPzj10t8DSez3L7 0YwXAtWTdfyqB99ndUDjtZFjQT5o+THjOsp7PyugM36aLlsBeQ752vxVxMSY+Bz4lB4SG xmQG/VXSUb13TmGVWPv74VkqGQfVc28qMRlBmegtJ+ODtF6SxZCVWEV4AjWFc25a4LQ== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795060335; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:X-Mailer: In-Reply-To:References:User-Agent:X-stable:X-Patchwork-Hint: MIME-Version:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=M6pnBHmSuAOK79RgF/+tVYCysnMyzZxCewFdmSzTH00=; b=tqO95/ugCmiq2HprlAOAJ+QiRbrPpE0FkLys14whc8TtzevxA9Vkmoc+XSxKER2SiBmZ gv5LotH572fQiavE03TnKip6XeG3r/bFsQQO1hPLbTkNG4RR1x1yUZwVDnC1z6eNjLBNj tVOwM3HfJSXwXwaqc3jU22Ps+U27r4zuhnLuxowQUZkLeCvYTgEtoxqs+G+uUCpxb0G96 UPYpNfffbs0mBotyZmf9AMb5Jt4NCMRwezyQtysM7m2Kv18qKefb0c5JJtv+jntJ5IhWp kX6dSsyL3fVHeqKXYGdJEiCmwPndYrS1HOQ9oWOV2sTs1eALvp56Fwwu4F+o0A9uwMg== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=rGOAsksF; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 91644606A32A; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 03:52:15 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=rGOAsksF Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 8BFB31F000C4; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 03:52:14 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1795060335; bh=M6pnBHmSuAOK79RgF/+tVYCysnMyzZxCewFdmSzTH00=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=rGOAsksFX7RxsxnTdgVA7k2xYA1oUaVF8v2Yol0T/EgwH7wurYkaJcC82Yz4WNlCy sXhVXvgB76K7bIl9xfK5Byuj9TJZte1VX8dQ5fMaNVHpOJVAOR8zj+KgKQ9g7Q9SEq UhKt7n583/ULA0f8+gvWdc/uICpPiVD5yZ9sQ7G0= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Fabrice Derepas , Herbert Xu , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.10 1163/1848] crypto: asymmetric_keys - fix OOB read in pefile_parse_binary Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:53:21 +0100 Message-ID: <20261118150008.366031160@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.56.0 In-Reply-To: <20261118145911.150052362@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20261118145911.150052362@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Fabrice Derepas [ Upstream commit 37d550172c2d3cdb3a5ace3e6cb0625967d86349 ] pefile_parse_binary() reads the size field of the certificate table's data-directory entry, which sits at fixed index 4 of the PE optional header's data directory: ctx->certs_size = ddir->certs.size; but nothing ensures index 4 is present. n_data_dirents (the untrusted NumberOfRvaAndSizes) is only upper-bounded against header_size and may be 0, and header_size need only satisfy cursor < header_size < datalen. A crafted PE with n_data_dirents = 0 and a tiny header_size therefore causes the ddir->certs.size read to land past the end of the image (CWE-125). The chkaddr() that bounds the certificate blob runs only after this read. verify_pefile_signature() is reached from kexec_file_load() (the lockdown/secure-boot enforced PE-image signature path), and the image is parsed before its signature is checked. The trigger needs CAP_SYS_BOOT and the access is out-of-bounds read only (no write). Require the certificate table's data-directory entry (index 4) to be present; the existing upper-bound check then keeps ddir->certs within [cursor, header_size). Fixes: 26d1164be37f ("pefile: Parse a PE binary to find a key and a signature contained therein") Assisted-by: copilot-cli:claude-opus-4-6 frama-c Signed-off-by: Fabrice Derepas Signed-off-by: Herbert Xu Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c | 5 +++++ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+) diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c index 7e5b392dcac79..320397f78b40e 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/verify_pefile.c @@ -87,6 +87,11 @@ static int pefile_parse_binary(const void *pebuf, unsigned int pelen, if (ctx->n_data_dirents > (ctx->header_size - cursor) / sizeof(*dde)) return -ELIBBAD; + /* the certificate table entry must be present in the data directory */ + if (ctx->n_data_dirents <= + offsetof(struct data_directory, certs) / sizeof(*dde)) + return -ELIBBAD; + ddir = pebuf + cursor; cursor += sizeof(*dde) * ctx->n_data_dirents; -- 2.53.0