Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795056755; b=36AKDy9kvINAYs0NG1IuIEdrOUf/MsjuhSQXoaYreAbaH7SK+PkpkQIEZNS+0hNGjkbb N2nGBNOyVVrFKhjRFaLkhhWHqWsLmNPGHeTpqAV84f5Nbd7CM9uyCViuWQ36O8FycXw9H YxtOtmD5xjV+AFMUCEslBsVgJ5mroTW6ZgPzGgm97S73piJGQxlUIsxGWS6Ay75uwHN0f SjIMjcXFTWZYGo8EGrDAl/KurqiML1PSAoY3ZL7NqeinYCppUSwa5j6xhHRd89KvsOpNx ymO7SwRpSX3EZhEy27EHC/cZd7AJxOOFTRyGR588uBQVy8vO61tNbT2OgiuLTJb4MIA== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795056755; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:X-Mailer: In-Reply-To:References:User-Agent:X-stable:X-Patchwork-Hint: MIME-Version:Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=qor1y631QVhLTEexY/+db7dLpO06xqP0BU7s8zPn+Lw=; b=lb/nbuVffPWObhnTmN9O0VdoYdnJWk0rqZx2wZwgy0ujFPxAxSUI1FRYfktFpSuf2+z7 nUVdJd0vRsNd2QcDq2Nr8++I9LZV4sF6dQ8XKqgnFpAMTzGRCd/AWOutiUlyK3WmBMUNt GcI+ot/TFkGq9ZZsoR1kGsatRyC+88ln6j1ArMeb6DXejbMOnTd4Owrb8PcVb8iF2bHNM af7UJNaMcC/AX/m/IVamkktoFJknFpyYwgmOzuqVa28cBulfiEDiDl9WhWqlGtkOdyGov xxt0bMqMnURiqrlN0RvjighwwFhjZ9kM46DcXl0Y+ruFXBu7eOvQRA9TLSB22y+9aYQ== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=kWieqUys; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 34A8A606A325; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 02:52:35 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linuxfoundation.org header.i=@linuxfoundation.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=korg header.b=kWieqUys Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 8E2B71F000C8; Thu, 19 Nov 2026 02:52:34 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linuxfoundation.org; s=korg; t=1795056755; bh=qor1y631QVhLTEexY/+db7dLpO06xqP0BU7s8zPn+Lw=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References; b=kWieqUyslNfjzPa/Q/LZ2/f69fCHtVO9JucyeqxBZuaepa669h/8bca0GfN6cBILU TplPoI3r+NJZdGKyUTPBHmgYSRwHXnFS85K0wTXV5qUZZhFHK8YY2j8M3knxJMjpWv lMV+ZVFKDqxWgUa1+VPDaaeo9kJivbtxQG8EYJsA= From: Greg Kroah-Hartman To: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman , patches@lists.linux.dev, Nickolai Zeldovich , Serge Hallyn , Bradley Morgan , "Christian Brauner (Amutable)" , Sasha Levin Subject: [PATCH 5.15 2101/2214] nsproxy: Fix cred leak in the error path of prepare_nsset() Date: Wed, 18 Nov 2026 16:02:57 +0100 Message-ID: <20261118150134.707605261@linuxfoundation.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.56.0 In-Reply-To: <20261118150009.797899913@linuxfoundation.org> References: <20261118150009.797899913@linuxfoundation.org> User-Agent: quilt/0.69 X-stable: review X-Patchwork-Hint: ignore X-Mailing-List: patches@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit 5.15-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Nickolai Zeldovich [ Upstream commit e08601d3a7b2236f4915497dca353dcf117bab5c ] A task that calls setns() with CLONE_NEWUSER together with CLONE_NEWNS and at least one more namespace flag leaks a struct cred (and the user_namespace, ucounts and group_info references it holds) whenever the call fails at the fs_struct copy. On a kernel with CONFIG_USER_NS the leak is one cred per failed setns(); under memory pressure, or driven by a fault-injecting attacker, it accumulates and pins user namespaces that can then never be freed. prepare_nsset() sets nsset->flags only on the success path: if (flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) nsset->cred = prepare_creds(); ... } else if (flags & CLONE_NEWNS) { nsset->fs = copy_fs_struct(me->fs); if (!nsset->fs) goto out; /* flags still 0 here */ } nsset->flags = flags; return 0; out: put_nsset(nsset); put_nsset() decides what to release from nsset->flags: if (flags & CLONE_NEWUSER) put_cred(nsset_cred(nsset)); On the copy_fs_struct() failure arm prepare_creds() has already allocated the cred, but nsset->flags is still the zero from the caller's "struct nsset nsset = {}", so put_nsset() does not see CLONE_NEWUSER and never drops it. The caller (__do_sys_setns) returns the error without touching nsset, so the cred is lost. Set nsset->flags at the start of prepare_nsset(), before anything can fail, so every error exit through put_nsset() releases what was taken. commit_nsset(), which clears nsset->cred on success, is unaffected. Reproduced on x86_64 under QEMU with failslab aimed at the fs_struct cache and kmemleak enabled: 500 calls of setns(pidfd, CLONE_NEWUSER | CLONE_NEWNS | CLONE_NEWUTS) each fail with -ENOMEM and leave 851 unreferenced cred objects allocated from prepare_creds() via setns() before the fix, and none after (the program is in the notes below). Found by formal verification of kernel/nsproxy.c. Fixes: 303cc571d107 ("nsproxy: attach to namespaces via pidfds") Signed-off-by: Nickolai Zeldovich Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20261017033538.793280-1-nickolai@csail.mit.edu Reviewed-by: Serge Hallyn Reviewed-by: Bradley Morgan Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner (Amutable) Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- kernel/nsproxy.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/kernel/nsproxy.c b/kernel/nsproxy.c index eec72ca962e24..46c5da1a0460e 100644 --- a/kernel/nsproxy.c +++ b/kernel/nsproxy.c @@ -313,6 +313,7 @@ static int prepare_nsset(unsigned flags, struct nsset *nsset) { struct task_struct *me = current; + nsset->flags = flags; nsset->nsproxy = create_new_namespaces(0, me, current_user_ns(), me->fs); if (IS_ERR(nsset->nsproxy)) return PTR_ERR(nsset->nsproxy); @@ -333,7 +334,6 @@ static int prepare_nsset(unsigned flags, struct nsset *nsset) goto out; } - nsset->flags = flags; return 0; out: -- 2.53.0