Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 ARC-Seal: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; cv=none; t=1795306384; b=pGuRA8bbILmYO2TjXlV2dhmhHDnFzMYgckd+dJfxS/ppDuG2LsREDuzyTUWgGFxoEybu kBK1lmIegVbjg0ZKhsCVDtT2jB8aSgxwC73h6eo67IGIDw8Md7X0L0NiWW6ylPBVaWbDE 4JDM+dwOqCTwf5ibOB3K/tvx7l1i8dXbTJBorDkVJL4dr0aEzhpbRn9sXb6D1CsXwscGH H/UGtZbJjBajeqOFiQSnT2AMtQry7S01bArVOX6oaZGpxK5CNveBTJH89t8VmFRm4+mMv 0DjJlUiCe56aoscQmsfmJmw23oHjZ62/kPjox/YEi+EbWvOrSUm6I2S6JNruYSwyJJg== ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc20261015; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; t=1795306384; h=Received:DKIM-Signature:Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:Message-ID: In-Reply-To:References:MIME-Version:Content-Type: Content-Transfer-Encoding; bh=Wme/Jw65vekSkLxpWIsP9GgAmvy1/VZB1ZbshkHKAZw=; b=Uu0V896PQtiDXxz1itY2NbFYr78sGZOA68X7v+YonCCWAWXYDkt1Hvp6JfKo5dUFBb9K DWd4ET6meo+e7Vafb2Z1gShl3BkRnmKe3q6o6vhXaSa71P3gJclvlgfzkSZrZS8C/8kT2 z0o69LygWNBkouUb+SE/osMq6uWtT6WEiaLdT1GDpOa8apDmZ3Qg6jV2XOGC48qZ3ORVG NWU8ATlHGn6Sg90yAvz2n8SWQwpJd+SmFmMChf/tlPcNbaVvwrCDizrANP3DW/lzJFB2j RZP89kNeEQ5n7A2g+UXhIiR+9hZGwHF2bK5vW+lZ66mCbaqGxykE1rGwc4a3zfpBloA== ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=X3nYg85n; arc=none smtp.remote-ip=100.103.45.18 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (quasi.space.kernel.org [100.103.45.18]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature ECDSA (prime256v1)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 892D7606A320; Sun, 22 Nov 2026 00:13:04 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=k20260515 header.b=X3nYg85n Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id AF7C71F000C0; Sun, 22 Nov 2026 00:13:03 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=kernel.org; s=k20260515; t=1795306384; bh=Wme/Jw65vekSkLxpWIsP9GgAmvy1/VZB1ZbshkHKAZw=; h=Date:From:To:Cc:Subject:In-Reply-To:References; b=X3nYg85nYhldkdDOD6+IzCzfE+ghiyyrey1IreSL8rUp6l2H08RQeBZGRKYeo9qst Ny3CaPnleLhvnutoO5GS6D+KPDlYLp/1M2Bbz0beGB1rdV+/yNFjtoA/JXlxKfVe9I XEG356y+Ut88rKRHvt5Ff7c3qAClO7cQrW0b8Kcr1Nlao9oD+sN5A2M7u4HVLPY2ed oHilj/rEtoc1tTuPLPjqP/6HU+nTZ7BkqmKFuakpR5FfBPS3l1wMFLwU8pSQvw1qVQ BmHok3z4HQNQDMuygC7xfEIMMYsTs5WiekDFnKTjKTLhzASQOCqGW2va0jGvgIscRo 7flK77N6TyExw== Date: Sat, 21 Nov 2026 16:13:02 -0800 From: Jakub Kicinski To: Chuck Lever Cc: Donald Hunter , "David S. Miller" , Paolo Abeni , Simon Horman , John Fastabend , Sabrina Dubroca , Keith Busch , Jens Axboe , Christoph Hellwig , Sagi Grimberg , Chaitanya Kulkarni , Jeff Layton , NeilBrown , Olga Kornievskaia , Dai Ngo , Tom Talpey , Eric Dumazet , kernel-tls-handshake@lists.linux.dev, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-nvme@lists.infradead.org, linux-nfs@vger.kernel.org, Hannes Reinecke Subject: Re: [PATCH net-next v3 00/10] Deliver TLS session tags to upper-layer consumers (NFSD) Message-ID: <20261121161302.69f202c8@kernel.org> In-Reply-To: <20261113-tls-session-tags-v3-0-91271964cdb0@kernel.org> References: <20261113-tls-session-tags-v3-0-91271964cdb0@kernel.org> X-Mailing-List: kernel-tls-handshake@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: List-Owner: Precedence: list MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit On Fri, 13 Nov 2026 14:21:58 -0500 Chuck Lever wrote: > NFSD controls remote access to its exports today by IP address and > hostname. Neither of these are cryptographically secure. For > instance, a MitM can replace the response to a server's plaintext > DNS query. As a result, a malicious NFS client can pretend to be a > client whose hostname matches one that has access to exports it > would otherwise be denied access to. > > So instead, we want access-control decisions to be based on > cryptographically-vetted objects such as TLS peer-certificates. > In-kernel x.509 parsing would duplicate work mature userspace > libraries already do, so let's make tlshd evaluate peer certificates > in user space. > > The certificates are evaluated against admin-defined policy, such > as whether the certificate's Issuer matches a particular string. > tlshd then marks NFS TLS sessions with those policy matches. Admins > also provide a set of policy names on each NFSD export (allow_tags). > Computing the intersection with these per-export tags is quick and > completely separate from the details of parsing x.509 certificates. > > A yet-to-be-posted patch series introduces tag set support to the > exportfs command in nfs-utils. tlshd 1.5.0, current as of this > writing, already implements TLS session tagging. I submitted this for AI review now, I think due to the problem Simon flagged CI didn't just gobble it up automatically. The AI review will not be emailed to the list automatically but hopefully it will be ready here by the time you read this: https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/20261113-tls-session-tags-v3-3-91271964cdb0@kernel.org The patches look reasonable to me, overall. At a high level tho - I don't have any familiarity with "tag" based policies. Are you confident it's flexible and convenient enough to survive as uAPI? Naively I'd think it creates unnecessarily wide API on both ends (handshake and server). My knee jerk design would be to populate the full policy in the server, and only carry some "policy ID" thru the handshake. Number of policy IDs would equal to the number of tag combinations (which result in different behavior). Any examples of APIs like the one you're adding working well? Anyone willing to review this series, please??