From: Stephan Mueller Date: Mon, 18 Sep 2017 10:49:56 +0200 Message-ID: <2681038.03lnYPhpsa@tauon.chronox.de> In-Reply-To: <20170916130034.17706-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> References: <20170916130034.17706-1-Jason@zx2c4.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7Bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v4] security/keys: rewrite all of big_key crypto To: "Jason A. Donenfeld" Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, keyrings@vger.kernel.org, kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, dhowells@redhat.com, ebiggers3@gmail.com, Herbert Xu , Kirill Marinushkin , Ard Biesheuvel , Ilhan Gurel , security@kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org List-ID: Am Samstag, 16. September 2017, 15:00:34 CEST schrieb Jason A. Donenfeld: Hi Jason, > This started out as just replacing the use of crypto/rng with > get_random_bytes_wait, This change is a challenge. The use of the kernel crypto API's DRNG has been made to allow FIPS 140-2 compliance. Otherwise, the entire key generation logic will not be using the right(TM) DRNG. Thus, I would not suggest to replace that for a stable tree. Note, I am currently working on a pluggable DRNG apporach for /dev/random and /dev/urandom to be able to get rid of the use of the kernel crypto API's DRNG API. It is ready and I will air that solution shortly. Yet, it needs work to be integrated upstream (and approval from Ted Tso). Ciao Stephan