From: David Howells In-Reply-To: References: <20061114200621.12943.18023.stgit@warthog.cambridge.redhat.com> <20061114200647.12943.39802.stgit@warthog.cambridge.redhat.com> <15153.1163593562@redhat.com> To: James Morris Cc: David Howells , Linus Torvalds , Andrew Morton , Stephen Smalley , trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no, selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, aviro@redhat.com, steved@redhat.com Subject: Re: [PATCH 12/19] CacheFiles: Permit a process's create SID to be overridden Date: Wed, 15 Nov 2006 16:23:33 +0000 Message-ID: <26860.1163607813@redhat.com> Sender: owner-selinux@tycho.nsa.gov List-Id: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov James Morris wrote: > Well, the value can be changed at any time, so you could be using a > temporary fscreate value, or your new value could be overwritten > immediately by writing to /proc/$$/attr/fscreate Ah. Hmmm. By whom? In selinux_setprocattr(): if (current != p) { /* SELinux only allows a process to change its own security attributes. */ return -EACCES; } But current busy inside the cache and can't do this. > I think we need to add a separate field for this purpose, which can only > be written to via the in-kernel API and overrides fscreate. So, like my acts-as security ID patch? Would it still need to be controlled by MAC policy in that case? Doing so is a bit of a pain as it means I have a whole bunch of extra failures I still need to check for, and the race in which the rules might change is still a possibility I have to deal with. David -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.