Received: from out-177.mta0.migadu.com (out-177.mta0.migadu.com [91.218.175.177]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 6E0962CCC9 for ; Wed, 21 May 2025 15:19:41 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=91.218.175.177 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1747840786; cv=none; b=GrcBclpdYGsmlzvDxjcl6KztMly0I5TYqiYw8p7f2xJ5AVJSH/3q4gAX8M1PblitrhbWHAdgzX/vtIfKIdQPfovDMME7LmFFZQ0+jSNjXytF36m/cY3cd5JKXzVOstgNSnjmnoHNF7JWCWlQGG9gj1Do4M6frYlbu/Y/+JY2qJk= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1747840786; c=relaxed/simple; bh=oCfVWgdWRCeCE4//r4fcKcIyFvjroLNqhpDhykdXSjM=; h=Message-ID:Date:MIME-Version:Subject:To:Cc:References:From: In-Reply-To:Content-Type; b=eLMZHE372JOpRUMml73BXmdMxhyuBA2+DPypl+9f1c0HV6l/AWMG/nFJFfTNmoL93eyf15ZLgdlkCh6wBlwyutMrBZhcrGbXRlL/hltHsYb/Trv3JTbHU8BcqzdXsomuCv+GPocZj2/oEoqwo3WMRThQj/T0TMcIAeWka2+dFws= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.dev; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.dev; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.dev header.i=@linux.dev header.b=gHDfyP2m; arc=none smtp.client-ip=91.218.175.177 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.dev Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.dev Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.dev header.i=@linux.dev header.b="gHDfyP2m" Message-ID: <2d012b6b-9c6b-4542-8521-b2d3bd822c72@linux.dev> DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.dev; s=key1; t=1747840779; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=S6tlw4Ytm8MhVtp96IozRkB9YB+qwDfSogLdnUPAGV4=; b=gHDfyP2mGXANBfZsB1fgHXeoEEUqdaG6sq75fbPcmNXTyzYJJumv5YJ+P6fDdd/LQFQMRj hYd1a4gJAeFvtYYqcRqVf06thpSyFrsoGMYKooR1XlJh5yC0KeiPV6E7wmS7F3yDT/o97R QAzppx3YdMGzEXJ+ptCIvNGgzADa0bM= Date: Wed, 21 May 2025 08:19:32 -0700 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: bpf@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Subject: Re: [PATCH bpf-next v2 1/2] bpf: Do not include r10 in precision backtracking bookkeeping Content-Language: en-GB To: Andrii Nakryiko Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, Alexei Starovoitov , Andrii Nakryiko , Daniel Borkmann , kernel-team@fb.com, Martin KaFai Lau References: <20250516161029.962760-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev> X-Report-Abuse: Please report any abuse attempt to abuse@migadu.com and include these headers. From: Yonghong Song In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Migadu-Flow: FLOW_OUT On 5/20/25 7:16 AM, Andrii Nakryiko wrote: > On Fri, May 16, 2025 at 9:10 AM Yonghong Song wrote: >> Yi Lai reported an issue ([1]) where the following warning appears >> in kernel dmesg: >> [ 60.643604] verifier backtracking bug >> [ 60.643635] WARNING: CPU: 10 PID: 2315 at kernel/bpf/verifier.c:4302 __mark_chain_precision+0x3a6c/0x3e10 >> [ 60.648428] Modules linked in: bpf_testmod(OE) >> [ 60.650471] CPU: 10 UID: 0 PID: 2315 Comm: test_progs Tainted: G OE 6.15.0-rc4-gef11287f8289-dirty #327 PREEMPT(full) >> [ 60.654385] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE >> [ 60.656682] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 >> [ 60.660475] RIP: 0010:__mark_chain_precision+0x3a6c/0x3e10 >> [ 60.662814] Code: 5a 30 84 89 ea e8 c4 d9 01 00 80 3d 3e 7d d8 04 00 0f 85 60 fa ff ff c6 05 31 7d d8 04 >> 01 48 c7 c7 00 58 30 84 e8 c4 06 a5 ff <0f> 0b e9 46 fa ff ff 48 ... >> [ 60.668720] RSP: 0018:ffff888116cc7298 EFLAGS: 00010246 >> [ 60.671075] RAX: 54d70e82dfd31900 RBX: ffff888115b65e20 RCX: 0000000000000000 >> [ 60.673659] RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000004 RDI: 00000000ffffffff >> [ 60.676241] RBP: 0000000000000400 R08: ffff8881f6f23bd3 R09: 1ffff1103ede477a >> [ 60.678787] R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffed103ede477b R12: ffff888115b60ae8 >> [ 60.681420] R13: 1ffff11022b6cbc4 R14: 00000000fffffff2 R15: 0000000000000001 >> [ 60.684030] FS: 00007fc2aedd80c0(0000) GS:ffff88826fa8a000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 >> [ 60.686837] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 >> [ 60.689027] CR2: 000056325369e000 CR3: 000000011088b002 CR4: 0000000000370ef0 >> [ 60.691623] Call Trace: >> [ 60.692821] >> [ 60.693960] ? __pfx_verbose+0x10/0x10 >> [ 60.695656] ? __pfx_disasm_kfunc_name+0x10/0x10 >> [ 60.697495] check_cond_jmp_op+0x16f7/0x39b0 >> [ 60.699237] do_check+0x58fa/0xab10 >> ... >> >> Further analysis shows the warning is at line 4302 as below: >> >> 4294 /* static subprog call instruction, which >> 4295 * means that we are exiting current subprog, >> 4296 * so only r1-r5 could be still requested as >> 4297 * precise, r0 and r6-r10 or any stack slot in >> 4298 * the current frame should be zero by now >> 4299 */ >> 4300 if (bt_reg_mask(bt) & ~BPF_REGMASK_ARGS) { >> 4301 verbose(env, "BUG regs %x\n", bt_reg_mask(bt)); >> 4302 WARN_ONCE(1, "verifier backtracking bug"); >> 4303 return -EFAULT; >> 4304 } >> >> With the below test (also in the next patch): >> __used __naked static void __bpf_jmp_r10(void) >> { >> asm volatile ( >> "r2 = 2314885393468386424 ll;" >> "goto +0;" >> "if r2 <= r10 goto +3;" >> "if r1 >= -1835016 goto +0;" >> "if r2 <= 8 goto +0;" >> "if r3 <= 0 goto +0;" >> "exit;" >> ::: __clobber_all); >> } >> >> SEC("?raw_tp") >> __naked void bpf_jmp_r10(void) >> { >> asm volatile ( >> "r3 = 0 ll;" >> "call __bpf_jmp_r10;" >> "r0 = 0;" >> "exit;" >> ::: __clobber_all); >> } >> >> The following is the verifier failure log: >> 0: (18) r3 = 0x0 ; R3_w=0 >> 2: (85) call pc+2 >> caller: >> R10=fp0 >> callee: >> frame1: R1=ctx() R3_w=0 R10=fp0 >> 5: frame1: R1=ctx() R3_w=0 R10=fp0 >> ; asm volatile (" \ @ verifier_precision.c:184 >> 5: (18) r2 = 0x20202000256c6c78 ; frame1: R2_w=0x20202000256c6c78 >> 7: (05) goto pc+0 >> 8: (bd) if r2 <= r10 goto pc+3 ; frame1: R2_w=0x20202000256c6c78 R10=fp0 >> 9: (35) if r1 >= 0xffe3fff8 goto pc+0 ; frame1: R1=ctx() >> 10: (b5) if r2 <= 0x8 goto pc+0 >> mark_precise: frame1: last_idx 10 first_idx 0 subseq_idx -1 >> mark_precise: frame1: regs=r2 stack= before 9: (35) if r1 >= 0xffe3fff8 goto pc+0 >> mark_precise: frame1: regs=r2 stack= before 8: (bd) if r2 <= r10 goto pc+3 >> mark_precise: frame1: regs=r2,r10 stack= before 7: (05) goto pc+0 >> mark_precise: frame1: regs=r2,r10 stack= before 5: (18) r2 = 0x20202000256c6c78 >> mark_precise: frame1: regs=r10 stack= before 2: (85) call pc+2 >> BUG regs 400 >> >> The main failure reason is due to r10 in precision backtracking bookkeeping. >> Actually r10 is always precise and there is no need to add it the precision >> backtracking bookkeeping. >> >> One way to fix the issue is to prevent bt_set_reg() if any src/dst reg is >> r10. Andrii suggested to go with push_insn_history() approach to avoid >> explicitly checking r10 in backtrack_insn(). >> >> This patch added push_insn_history() support for cond_jmp like 'rX rY' >> operations. In check_cond_jmp_op(), if any of rX or rY is r10, push_insn_history() >> will not record that register, and later backtrack_insn() will not do >> bt_set_reg() for those registers. >> >> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/Z%2F8q3xzpU59CIYQE@ly-workstation/ >> >> Reported by: Yi Lai >> Fixes: 407958a0e980 ("bpf: encapsulate precision backtracking bookkeeping") >> Signed-off-by: Yonghong Song >> --- >> include/linux/bpf_verifier.h | 7 ++++ >> kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------- >> 2 files changed, 64 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) >> >> Changelogs: >> v1 -> v2: >> - v1: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20250511162758.281071-1-yonghong.song@linux.dev/ >> - In v1, we check r10 register explicitly in backtrack_insn() to decide >> whether we should do bt_set_reg() or not. Andrii suggested to do >> push_insn_history() instead. Whether a particular register (r10 in this case) >> should be available for backtracking or not is in check_cond_jmp_op(), >> and such information is pushed with push_insn_history(). Later in backtrack_insn(), >> such info is retrieved to decide whether precision marking should be >> done or not. This apporach can avoid explicit checking for r10 in backtrack_insn(). >> >> diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h >> index cedd66867ecf..9d3fdabeeaf4 100644 >> --- a/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h >> +++ b/include/linux/bpf_verifier.h >> @@ -357,6 +357,8 @@ enum { >> INSN_F_SPI_SHIFT = 3, /* shifted 3 bits to the left */ >> >> INSN_F_STACK_ACCESS = BIT(9), /* we need 10 bits total */ >> + >> + INSN_F_REG_ACCESS = BIT(4), /* we need 5 bits total */ > hm... you are actually clashing with INSN_F_SPI_MASK here, bits 3 > through 8 are used to record stack slot index. The reason I did this is that INSN_F_REG_ACCESS is used for later struct bpf_insn_hist_entry sreg_flag and dreg_flag. But as you mentioned later, there is no need to save register numbers in sreg_flag/dreg_flag as insn already has it ... > > I think we should go with > > INSN_F_DST_REG_STACK = BIT(10), /* dst_reg is PTR_TO_STACK */ > INSN_F_SRC_REG_STACK = BIT(11), /* src_reg is PTR_TO_STACK */ > /* total 12 bits total can used now */ > > also note that all this stuff needs to fit into > bpf_insn_hist_entry.flags, which is currently set to be 10 bits, and > so now we need two extra bits. > > Luckily, prev_idx: 22 doesn't really need 22 bits, so we can steal two > bits there and still be able to express 1 million instructions > indices: > > u32 prev_idx : 20; > u32 flags : 12; The above works since we do not need to save register numbers in bpf_insn_hist_entry. I will rework along this line. > > pw-bot: cr > >> }; >> >> static_assert(INSN_F_FRAMENO_MASK + 1 >= MAX_CALL_FRAMES); >> @@ -372,6 +374,11 @@ struct bpf_insn_hist_entry { >> * jump is backtracked, vector of six 10-bit records >> */ >> u64 linked_regs; >> + /* special flag, e.g., whether reg is used for non-load/store insns >> + * during precision backtracking. >> + */ >> + u8 sreg_flag; >> + u8 dreg_flag; > this is not necessary, src_reg and dst_reg number itself is coming > from the bpf_insn itself? You are correct. sreg_flag/dreg_flag is not needed. INSN_F_{DST,SRC}_REG_STACK should be enough. > > [...] > >> @@ -4414,8 +4425,16 @@ static int backtrack_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int idx, int subseq_idx, >> * before it would be equally necessary to >> * propagate it to dreg. >> */ >> - bt_set_reg(bt, dreg); >> - bt_set_reg(bt, sreg); >> + if (!hist) >> + return 0; >> + dreg_precise = hist->dreg_flag == insn_reg_with_access_flag(dreg); >> + sreg_precise = hist->sreg_flag == insn_reg_with_access_flag(sreg); > As I mentioned above, we don't need to store dst_reg and src_reg > numbers themselves, we are getting them from bpf_insn. We just need > those two flags, INSN_F_DST_REG_STACK and INSN_F_SRC_REG_STACK, to > know which registers were PTR_TO_STACK at the time when we validated > that instruction Ack. > >> + if (!dreg_precise && !sreg_precise) >> + return 0; >> + if (dreg_precise) >> + bt_set_reg(bt, dreg); >> + if (sreg_precise) >> + bt_set_reg(bt, sreg); >> } else if (BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K) { >> /* dreg K >> * Only dreg still needs precision before >> @@ -5115,7 +5134,7 @@ static int check_stack_write_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, >> } >> >> if (insn_flags) >> - return push_insn_history(env, env->cur_state, insn_flags, 0); >> + return push_insn_history(env, env->cur_state, insn_flags, 0, 0, 0); >> return 0; >> } >> >> @@ -5422,7 +5441,7 @@ static int check_stack_read_fixed_off(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, >> insn_flags = 0; /* we are not restoring spilled register */ >> } >> if (insn_flags) >> - return push_insn_history(env, env->cur_state, insn_flags, 0); >> + return push_insn_history(env, env->cur_state, insn_flags, 0, 0, 0); >> return 0; >> } >> >> @@ -16414,6 +16433,27 @@ static void sync_linked_regs(struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate, struct bpf_reg_s >> } >> } >> >> +static int push_cond_jmp_history(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_verifier_state *state, >> + struct bpf_insn *insn, u64 linked_regs) >> +{ >> + int err; >> + >> + if ((BPF_SRC(insn->code) != BPF_X || >> + (insn->src_reg == BPF_REG_FP && insn->dst_reg == BPF_REG_FP)) && > we shouldn't be checking for BPF_REG_FP here either. Look up > bpf_reg_state by insn->src_reg, and check that it's PTR_TO_STACK Correct. Will check reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK instead. > >> + !linked_regs) >> + return 0; >> + >> + err = push_insn_history(env, state, 0, linked_regs, >> + BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && insn->src_reg != BPF_REG_FP >> + ? insn_reg_with_access_flag(insn->src_reg) >> + : 0, >> + BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_X && insn->dst_reg != BPF_REG_FP >> + ? insn_reg_with_access_flag(insn->dst_reg) >> + : 0); >> + >> + return err; >> +} >> + > [...]