Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BAAB126FA4E for ; Fri, 8 Aug 2025 18:57:16 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 ARC-Seal:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1754679438; cv=none; b=p7onXanLitf6QrTElFPxAR76gP/CugReW11NNoz1bGiDDONE1b6vQERCpf8mn2MI9TFqHH9rBB9QUKEPiY04F7R2qaFHz7LgdLJpystfuT/L1l9ZsTzu/IBccNbRUG+E7PFw43WdpdJOlcQOwOzD7G/cVTRCEvf/NqGVsPJ2rug= ARC-Message-Signature:i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1754679438; c=relaxed/simple; bh=ZkkXYRiVRG9k0IaW9WKZ5lwukI1XqmXNvzVIobvjBaA=; h=Message-ID:Date:MIME-Version:Subject:To:Cc:References:From: In-Reply-To:Content-Type; b=Uwah37D42tyw/koga9M1Qlb2OxA6ZiR5BjKfPzVOLytlWKu3Npyxy72yYZP53bftj+AQT18+ZeXp9FnWv3qAIepdehITPVrSLT4kVS7KfEe/AiptFXiU202becI1ztfHpp3PCpe0YVhmjRwmcr3ExJigt8lBa3b6ZPrHjWTJQv0= ARC-Authentication-Results:i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b=dGni8Kj5; arc=none smtp.client-ip=13.77.154.182 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linux.microsoft.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (1024-bit key) header.d=linux.microsoft.com header.i=@linux.microsoft.com header.b="dGni8Kj5" Received: from [10.137.198.68] (unknown [131.107.8.68]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B36E02030EAF; Fri, 8 Aug 2025 11:57:15 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com B36E02030EAF DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linux.microsoft.com; s=default; t=1754679435; bh=7cpb5uCxO/BkPWhGZSKgMeJ31AMftBmQyUu4dImNvqA=; h=Date:Subject:To:Cc:References:From:In-Reply-To:From; b=dGni8Kj5AlPuvApZqITSq8yGA3GTShV8Ri6S7gjsc1kAp5iorAA7lmqSXsNaQEjuN eCpAm010L5Vt1KkspsS/Y06dv5Y3lzwQ46GuMISlKgMtZ0/Nv5GYiqDMPPHc3RlW5g c9S3wO5sxP1q8ZgXEouDZaRavZ5HQSWsLdDZikzo= Message-ID: <34426151-7d7b-427b-912e-84174c4d9e92@linux.microsoft.com> Date: Fri, 8 Aug 2025 11:57:14 -0700 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: selinux@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Subject: Re: [PATCH] SELinux: Add support for BPF token access control To: Stephen Smalley , danieldurning.work@gmail.com Cc: selinux@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com References: <20250806180149.1995-1-ericsu@linux.microsoft.com> Content-Language: en-US From: Eric Suen In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit On 8/7/2025 6:46 AM, Stephen Smalley wrote: > On Wed, Aug 6, 2025 at 2:33 PM Stephen Smalley > wrote: >> On Wed, Aug 6, 2025 at 2:07 PM wrote: >>> From: Eric Suen >>> >>> BPF token support was introduced to allow a privileged process to delegate >>> limited BPF functionality—such as map creation and program loading—to an >>> unprivileged process: >>> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/20231130185229.2688956-1-andrii@kernel.org/ >>> >>> This patch adds SELinux support for controlling BPF token access. With >>> this change, SELinux policies can now enforce constraints on BPF token >>> usage based on both the delegating (privileged) process and the recipient >>> (unprivileged) process. >>> >>> Supported operations currently include: >>> - map_create >>> - prog_load >>> >>> High-level workflow: >>> 1. An unprivileged process creates a VFS context via `fsopen()` and >>> obtains a file descriptor. >>> 2. This descriptor is passed to a privileged process, which configures >>> BPF token delegation options and mounts a BPF filesystem. >>> 3. SELinux records the `creator_sid` of the privileged process during >>> mount setup. >>> 4. The unprivileged process then uses this BPF fs mount to create a >>> token and attach it to subsequent BPF syscalls. >>> 5. During verification of `map_create` and `prog_load`, SELinux uses >>> `creator_sid` and the current SID to check policy permissions via: >>> avc_has_perm(creator_sid, current_sid, SECCLASS_BPF, >>> BPF__MAP_CREATE, NULL); >>> >>> To verify the logic introduced by this patch, my fork of the SELinux >>> testsuite with relevant test cases is available here: >>> https://github.com/havefuncoding1/selinux-testsuite >> Interesting approach. Added Daniel to the distribution. Can you please >> also post your testsuite patch to the list for review as per >> https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/wiki/Getting-Started#submitting-a-testsuite-patch > Also, since you are introducing new permissions and a policy > capability, please include instructions in the commit description for > running your testsuite, see > https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/wiki/Getting-Started#add-new-permissions > and > https://github.com/SELinuxProject/selinux-kernel/wiki/Getting-Started#adding-a-new-selinux-policy-capability > for instructions and links to example previous commits. Hi Stephen, just posted patch for user space capability and it's available here https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20250808183506.665-1-ericsu@linux.microsoft.com/ also posted patch for the testsuite https://lore.kernel.org/selinux/20250808184711.291-1-ericsu@linux.microsoft.com/, and yes I ran the tests with policy cap enabled in my environment. >>> Signed-off-by: Eric Suen >>> --- >>> security/selinux/hooks.c | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++- >>> security/selinux/include/classmap.h | 2 +- >>> security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 4 + >>> security/selinux/include/policycap.h | 1 + >>> security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h | 1 + >>> security/selinux/include/security.h | 6 ++ >>> 6 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) >>> >>> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c >>> index 335fbf76cdd2..ef9771542737 100644 >>> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c >>> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c >>> @@ -733,6 +733,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb, >>> goto out; >>> } >>> >>> + sbsec->creator_sid = current_sid(); >>> + >>> if (strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "proc") == 0) >>> sbsec->flags |= SE_SBPROC | SE_SBGENFS; >>> >>> @@ -7002,9 +7004,13 @@ static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void *ib_sec) >>> static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, >>> unsigned int size, bool kernel) >>> { >>> + bool bpf_token_perms = selinux_policycap_bpf_token_perms(); >>> u32 sid = current_sid(); >>> int ret; >>> >>> + if (bpf_token_perms) >>> + return 0; >>> + >>> switch (cmd) { >>> case BPF_MAP_CREATE: >>> ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE, >>> @@ -7086,10 +7092,34 @@ static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) >>> BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL); >>> } >>> >>> +static int selinux_bpffs_creator_sid(const union bpf_attr *attr) >>> +{ >>> + struct path path; >>> + struct super_block *sb; >>> + struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec; >>> + >>> + CLASS(fd, f)(attr->token_create.bpffs_fd); >>> + >>> + if (!fd_file(f)) >>> + return SECSID_NULL; >>> + >>> + path = fd_file(f)->f_path; >>> + sb = path.dentry->d_sb; >>> + if (!sb) >>> + return SECSID_NULL; >>> + >>> + sbsec = selinux_superblock(sb); >>> + if (!sbsec) >>> + return SECSID_NULL; >>> + >>> + return sbsec->creator_sid; >>> +} >>> + >>> static int selinux_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr, >>> struct bpf_token *token, bool kernel) >>> { >>> struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; >>> + u32 ssid; >>> >>> bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL); >>> if (!bpfsec) >>> @@ -7098,7 +7128,15 @@ static int selinux_bpf_map_create(struct bpf_map *map, union bpf_attr *attr, >>> bpfsec->sid = current_sid(); >>> map->security = bpfsec; >>> >>> - return 0; >>> + if (!token) >>> + ssid = bpfsec->sid; >>> + else { >>> + ssid = selinux_bpffs_creator_sid(attr); >>> + if (ssid == SECSID_NULL) >>> + return -EPERM; >>> + } >>> + >>> + return avc_has_perm(ssid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE, NULL); >>> } >>> >>> static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) >>> @@ -7113,6 +7151,7 @@ static int selinux_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr, >>> struct bpf_token *token, bool kernel) >>> { >>> struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; >>> + u32 ssid; >>> >>> bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL); >>> if (!bpfsec) >>> @@ -7121,7 +7160,15 @@ static int selinux_bpf_prog_load(struct bpf_prog *prog, union bpf_attr *attr, >>> bpfsec->sid = current_sid(); >>> prog->aux->security = bpfsec; >>> >>> - return 0; >>> + if (!token) >>> + ssid = bpfsec->sid; >>> + if (token) { >>> + ssid = selinux_bpffs_creator_sid(attr); >>> + if (ssid == SECSID_NULL) >>> + return -EPERM; >>> + } >>> + >>> + return avc_has_perm(ssid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD, NULL); >>> } >>> >>> static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *prog) >>> @@ -7132,10 +7179,18 @@ static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog *prog) >>> kfree(bpfsec); >>> } >>> >>> +#define bpf_token_cmd(T, C) \ >>> + ((T)->allowed_cmds & (1ULL << (C))) >>> + >>> static int selinux_bpf_token_create(struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *attr, >>> const struct path *path) >>> { >>> struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; >>> + u32 sid = selinux_bpffs_creator_sid(attr); >>> + int err; >>> + >>> + if (sid == SECSID_NULL) >>> + return -EPERM; >>> >>> bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL); >>> if (!bpfsec) >>> @@ -7144,6 +7199,29 @@ static int selinux_bpf_token_create(struct bpf_token *token, union bpf_attr *att >>> bpfsec->sid = current_sid(); >>> token->security = bpfsec; >>> >>> + bpfsec->perms = 0; >>> + >>> + /** >>> + * 'token->allowed_cmds' is a bit mask of allowed commands >>> + * Convert the BPF command enum to a bitmask representing its position in the >>> + * allowed_cmds bitmap. >>> + */ >>> + if (bpf_token_cmd(token, BPF_MAP_CREATE)) { >>> + err = avc_has_perm(bpfsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE_AS, NULL); >>> + if (err) >>> + return err; >>> + >>> + bpfsec->perms |= BPF__MAP_CREATE; >>> + } >>> + >>> + if (bpf_token_cmd(token, BPF_PROG_LOAD)) { >>> + err = avc_has_perm(bpfsec->sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD_AS, NULL); >>> + if (err) >>> + return err; >>> + >>> + bpfsec->perms |= BPF__PROG_LOAD; >>> + } >>> + >>> return 0; >>> } >>> >>> @@ -7154,6 +7232,30 @@ static void selinux_bpf_token_free(struct bpf_token *token) >>> token->security = NULL; >>> kfree(bpfsec); >>> } >>> + >>> +static int selinux_bpf_token_cmd(const struct bpf_token *token, enum bpf_cmd cmd) >>> +{ >>> + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; >>> + >>> + if (!token || !token->security) >>> + return -EINVAL; >>> + >>> + bpfsec = token->security; >>> + switch (cmd) { >>> + case BPF_MAP_CREATE: >>> + if ((bpfsec->perms & BPF__MAP_CREATE) != BPF__MAP_CREATE) >>> + return -EACCES; >>> + break; >>> + case BPF_PROG_LOAD: >>> + if ((bpfsec->perms & BPF__PROG_LOAD) != BPF__PROG_LOAD) >>> + return -EACCES; >>> + break; >>> + default: >>> + break; >>> + } >>> + >>> + return 0; >>> +} >>> #endif >>> >>> struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { >>> @@ -7585,6 +7687,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { >>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_create, selinux_bpf_map_create), >>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_load, selinux_bpf_prog_load), >>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_create, selinux_bpf_token_create), >>> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_token_cmd, selinux_bpf_token_cmd), >>> #endif >>> #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS >>> LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_alloc, selinux_perf_event_alloc), >>> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h >>> index 5665aa5e7853..a6ed864af64c 100644 >>> --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h >>> +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h >>> @@ -171,7 +171,7 @@ const struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { >>> { "infiniband_endport", { "manage_subnet", NULL } }, >>> { "bpf", >>> { "map_create", "map_read", "map_write", "prog_load", "prog_run", >>> - NULL } }, >>> + "map_create_as", "prog_load_as", NULL } }, >>> { "xdp_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, >>> { "mctp_socket", { COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } }, >>> { "perf_event", >>> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h >>> index 1d7ac59015a1..b7e55e5c6d9c 100644 >>> --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h >>> +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h >>> @@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ struct superblock_security_struct { >>> u32 sid; /* SID of file system superblock */ >>> u32 def_sid; /* default SID for labeling */ >>> u32 mntpoint_sid; /* SECURITY_FS_USE_MNTPOINT context for files */ >>> + u32 creator_sid; /* SID of privileged process and is used to */ >>> + /* verify bpf operations */ >>> unsigned short behavior; /* labeling behavior */ >>> unsigned short flags; /* which mount options were specified */ >>> struct mutex lock; >>> @@ -164,6 +166,8 @@ struct pkey_security_struct { >>> >>> struct bpf_security_struct { >>> u32 sid; /* SID of bpf obj creator */ >>> + u32 perms; /* allowed AV permissions, e.g. BPF__MAP_CREATE, */ >>> + /* for requested bpf commands */ >>> }; >>> >>> struct perf_event_security_struct { >>> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h >>> index 7405154e6c42..cde6aaf442cd 100644 >>> --- a/security/selinux/include/policycap.h >>> +++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap.h >>> @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ enum { >>> POLICYDB_CAP_NETLINK_XPERM, >>> POLICYDB_CAP_NETIF_WILDCARD, >>> POLICYDB_CAP_GENFS_SECLABEL_WILDCARD, >>> + POLICYDB_CAP_BPF_TOKEN_PERMS, >>> __POLICYDB_CAP_MAX >>> }; >>> #define POLICYDB_CAP_MAX (__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX - 1) >>> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h >>> index d8962fcf2ff9..cd5e73f992ea 100644 >>> --- a/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h >>> +++ b/security/selinux/include/policycap_names.h >>> @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ const char *const selinux_policycap_names[__POLICYDB_CAP_MAX] = { >>> "netlink_xperm", >>> "netif_wildcard", >>> "genfs_seclabel_wildcard", >>> + "bpf_token_perms", >>> }; >>> /* clang-format on */ >>> >>> diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h >>> index 8201e6a3ac0f..d3832e4ad4fb 100644 >>> --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h >>> +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h >>> @@ -209,6 +209,12 @@ static inline bool selinux_policycap_netif_wildcard(void) >>> selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_NETIF_WILDCARD]); >>> } >>> >>> +static inline bool selinux_policycap_bpf_token_perms(void) >>> +{ >>> + return READ_ONCE( >>> + selinux_state.policycap[POLICYDB_CAP_BPF_TOKEN_PERMS]); >>> +} >>> + >>> struct selinux_policy_convert_data; >>> >>> struct selinux_load_state { >>> -- >>> 2.50.1.windows.1 >>> >>>