From: dhowells@redhat.com (David Howells) Date: Mon, 30 Oct 2017 17:05:38 +0000 Subject: [RFC PATCH] ima: require secure_boot rules in lockdown mode In-Reply-To: <1509382827.3583.143.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <1509382827.3583.143.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <1508774387.3639.128.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <750.1509378910@warthog.procyon.org.uk> Message-ID: <3691.1509383138@warthog.procyon.org.uk> To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org Mimi Zohar wrote: > > Did you mean "true" rather than "TRUE"? > > Yes, of course. ?Commit 9f4b6a254d7a "ima: Fix bool > initialization/comparison" already addresses it. ?Please remove it > from this patch. Is that with James? I don't seem to have a copy, and I don't want to cause a patch collision. > > I guess also that oopsing is okay if the allocation fails. We've run out of > > memory during early boot, after all. > > If the memory allocation fails, the "secure_boot" policy will not be > enabled for custom policies, but how is that "oopsing". Sorry - I overlooked the fact that the variable is not used if it's not zero. > If it fails, there needs to be some indication of the failure, which there > currently isn't. ?Perhaps also prevent loading a custom policy. Does it need to panic (probably fine as a small memory alloc failed)? If it doesn't set this policy what's the effect on things using is_ima_appraise_enabled() - assuming we get that far? David -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html