Return-Path: Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=pass (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=linux.ibm.com (client-ip=148.163.156.1; helo=mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com; envelope-from=jrey@linux.ibm.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.ibm.com Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.156.1]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 45V5jM001PzDqPW; Fri, 21 Jun 2019 01:44:38 +1000 (AEST) Received: from pps.filterd (m0098394.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x5KFgifr038756; Thu, 20 Jun 2019 11:44:36 -0400 Received: from ppma04dal.us.ibm.com (7a.29.35a9.ip4.static.sl-reverse.com [169.53.41.122]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2t8ccet8ku-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Thu, 20 Jun 2019 11:44:36 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (ppma04dal.us.ibm.com [127.0.0.1]) by ppma04dal.us.ibm.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x5KFUfMa019353; Thu, 20 Jun 2019 15:44:35 GMT Received: from b03cxnp07029.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03cxnp07029.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.16]) by ppma04dal.us.ibm.com with ESMTP id 2t4ra6jg57-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Thu, 20 Jun 2019 15:44:35 +0000 Received: from b03ledav005.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav005.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.236]) by b03cxnp07029.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x5KFiXl457737502 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Thu, 20 Jun 2019 15:44:33 GMT Received: from b03ledav005.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 26A81BE051; Thu, 20 Jun 2019 15:44:33 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b03ledav005.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id E9870BE054; Thu, 20 Jun 2019 15:44:32 +0000 (GMT) Received: from ltc.linux.ibm.com (unknown [9.16.170.189]) by b03ledav005.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Thu, 20 Jun 2019 15:44:32 +0000 (GMT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2019 10:46:12 -0500 From: Joseph Reynolds To: Stewart Smith Cc: Openbmc , openbmc Subject: Re: Move away from default password In-Reply-To: <874l4n6ct4.fsf@linux.vnet.ibm.com> References: <1164a9a82b2b59087059c59391e65d04@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <874l4n6ct4.fsf@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Message-ID: <43de939d764a17c737b0edb31cdfe830@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Sender: jrey@linux.ibm.com User-Agent: Roundcube Webmail/1.0.1 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:, , definitions=2019-06-20_11:, , signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1810050000 definitions=main-1906200114 X-BeenThere: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Development list for OpenBMC List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 20 Jun 2019 15:44:39 -0000 On 2019-06-17 17:56, Stewart Smith wrote: > Joseph Reynolds writes: >> There is some interest in moving OpenBMC away from a default password. >> - email: >> https://lists.ozlabs.org/pipermail/openbmc/2019-June/016515.html >> (which >> references a RestrictionMode design: >> https://gerrit.openbmc-project.xyz/c/openbmc/docs/+/21195) >> >> Having a default password is a security risk. Note that changing to a >> different default password is not a good solution. For example, if a >> bad actor learns the default password from one device, that actor will >> likely know the password for many of them. > > and it makes it pretty easy to use something like Shodan to find all > the > possible OpenBMCs connected to the Internet (hopefully by accident) and > pop a root shell on them. > > Mind you, in a lab environment, it's *really* useful. I imagine for the forseeable future, OpenBMC would continue to have a default userid and password (and I hope each development lab is using a different default password than the well-known password). But I think development labs are subject to attack, so we need to eventually move away from default passwords even in the development labs. At this time, I am looking for options to move away from this model, but do not anticipate changing the default. >> I am exploring two options for OpenBMC, and want your feedback. >> >> 1. Unique password per BMC. >> In this approach, there is a way to change the factory default >> password. >> Example flow: assemble the BMC, test it, factory reset, generate >> unique >> password (such as `pwgen`), then use a new function “save factory >> default settings” which would save the current setting into a new >> “factory settings” flash partition. After that, a factory reset >> would reset to the factory installed password, not to the setting in >> the >> source code. >> Presumably the new factory default would be printed on a sticker, or >> something. >> Are there any other factory settings (settings unique to each device) >> that would benefit from being set like this? >> One downside to this approach is someone who orders 100 systems has to >> enter 100 unique passwords. > > There's also a downside for those of us who often work remotely from > machines, we may have to wait for someone to be awake and be able to > physically go and check what the default password is. > >> 2. Create new account on first access. >> Specifically, default OpenBMC to use a new RestrictionMode=SetupAccess >> which: >> - (A) requires users to set up their credentials (at least: remove >> the >> default password) before they can leave that mode, and >> - (B) does not let the user do anything else, including other >> provisioning or operating the host, while in this mode. >> So we could manufacture the BMC with a default password, but require >> it >> to be changed as the first step to provision the BMC. >> We might want to make network services react to this new mode, for >> example, the phosphor-webui GUI would likely want to handle this >> specially, and most REST APIs would be restricted. >> Note this approach gives an attacker a window of time before the >> credentials are set up. > > In a lab environment though, we'd have to ensure we had a *very* > reliably way to reset the BMC when we switched who was using the > machine. Agreed. Gaining initial access and recovering access the BMC is one of the issues. >> I believe both of these approaches represent reasonable security >> practices which may satisfy laws regarding consumer products. For >> example, CA Law SB-327 >> https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB327 >> >> Are there guidelines we can follow? Can you find additional >> vulnerabilities with these approaches? Can we do better than this >> without requiring additional infrastructure? >> >> I plan to discuss this at the 2019-06-26 Security working group >> meeting: >> https://docs.google.com/document/d/1b7x9BaxsfcukQDqbvZsU2ehMq4xoJRQvLxxsDUWmAOI/ >> and would be happy to see ideas here. > > I had an idea that provides less security, but still may be valuable: > make the default password at manufacturing be linked to the MAC address > of the BMC. This prevents people not on a local network to the machine > from gaining access (e.g. I have no idea what the MAC address of > 8.8.8.8 > is), but if I'm on the same ethernet network, then I can still work it > out. It would also allow someone buying 100 machines to programatically > work out what the password should be. Thanks, I understand this idea. It may satisfy the letter of the law, and perhaps also its intent (disclaimer: not a legal opinion), so it has some merit. But this scheme not as secure as random passwords (specifically, if the attacker learns the MAC addresses). - Joseph