Mime-Version: 1.0 (1.0) From: Marvin Adeff In-Reply-To: <2ec1296a-d633-2ad5-ea1a-ffc3b5668495@...2080...> Date: Sun, 15 Jan 2017 10:59:07 -0800 Message-Id: <451FD5B4-9E9F-451B-8491-AC6D709CC64E@...277...> References: <20170115061718.3218-1-praiskup@...1347...> <8e0e7b9b-3f54-88c4-6880-a3736a3a87ea@...2080...> <10918281.H3KHJINfQl@...2234...> <2ec1296a-d633-2ad5-ea1a-ffc3b5668495@...2080...> Subject: Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH] options: allow setting default --ca argument value List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable To: openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net A User's Perspective: We've been doing just this since ovpn began allowing inline certs. Works gr= eat! Recommend.=20 Marvin Sent from my iPhone > On Jan 15, 2017, at 9:53 AM, David Sommerseth wrote: >=20 >> On 15/01/17 14:52, Pavel Raiskup wrote: >>> On Sunday, January 15, 2017 11:08:38 AM CET David Sommerseth wrote: >>>> On 15/01/17 07:17, Pavel Raiskup wrote: >>>> Adding a new --with-ca-bundle configure option. It's argument is >>>> used as default CA file when no --ca option is specified at >>>> runtime. >>>>=20 >>>> This option is primarily designed for systems where users are >>>> allowed to manage trusted authorities for whole system (in one >>>> consolidated file; usually implemented in 'ca-certificates' >>>> package). >>>>=20 >>>> Signed-off-by: Pavel Raiskup >>>> --- >>>> configure.ac | 5 +++++ >>>> src/openvpn/options.c | 9 +++++++++ >>>> 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+) >>>=20 >>> As this was mentioned on a Red Hat Bugzilla (bz #1413343 [1]) as well, >>> I'm reiterating my argument here for closing that bugzilla as notabug. >>>=20 >>> I completely agree with Steffan, this is a NAK. Such a feature would be >>> a dreamscenario for The Great Firewall of China and similar national >>> routing instances which implements complete network surveillance. It >>> would make it extremely trivial for them to implement a MITM OpenVPN >>> server which would affect users not being aware of this issue. >>>=20 >>> This feature would elude users configuring OpenVPN it is no problem >>> using certificates from public CA issuers. This is a VERY BAD idea! We >>> should help users configure OpenVPN in a secure way by default. Not the >>> opposite. >>=20 >> Ack, I originally thought about this as tool to solve "packaging issue". >> We have corporate-wide authority, and people usually have it stored in >> bundle. But I got the point, and such a shame mistake -- there's too ma= ny >> trusted CAs. >=20 > I would recommend seeing the CA file being part of the configuration > instead of a packaging detail. And you can embedd the CA inside the > configuration file ... just do this in the config: >=20 > > -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE----- > .... > .... > .... > -----END CERTIFICATE----- > >=20 > This replaces the 'ca /path/to/ca.pem' line in the configuration file. >=20 > Otherwise, for enterprises doing their own packaging ... it is also > possible to install the OpenVPN CA file in /etc/pki/.... which is easily > done with RPM files which again can be pushed out through internal > repositories or Satellite. The distributed configurations would then > just need to use 'ca /etc/pki/tls/cert/openvpn-ca.pem'. >=20 > It all depends on how often it is expected to distribute configuration > files vs how often the CA certificate is renewed. >=20 >=20 > --=20 > kind regards, >=20 > David Sommerseth > OpenVPN Technologies, Inc >=20 >=20 > -------------------------------------------------------------------------= ----- > Developer Access Program for Intel Xeon Phi Processors > Access to Intel Xeon Phi processor-based developer platforms. > With one year of Intel Parallel Studio XE. > Training and support from Colfax. > Order your platform today. http://sdm.link/xeonphi > _______________________________________________ > Openvpn-devel mailing list > Openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net > https://lists.sourceforge.net/lists/listinfo/openvpn-devel