Message-ID: <45D4A6BD.2090006@tycho.nsa.gov> Date: Thu, 15 Feb 2007 13:30:21 -0500 From: Eamon Walsh MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Joshua Brindle CC: Eric Paris , Stephen Smalley , selinux@tycho.nsa.gov Subject: Re: [RFC] Ability to allow undefined permissions and classes -v2 References: <1171309430.10871.2.camel@localhost.localdomain> <1171369673.3242.16.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> <1171387714.10871.22.camel@localhost.localdomain> <1171388407.3242.87.camel@moss-spartans.epoch.ncsc.mil> <1171395416.10871.37.camel@localhost.localdomain> <45D35110.10608@tresys.com> In-Reply-To: <45D35110.10608@tresys.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Sender: owner-selinux@tycho.nsa.gov List-Id: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov Joshua Brindle wrote: > What happens when we start using a userspace security server and the > kernel policy doesn't have any userspace object classes? If the avc > routing gets changed the policy suddenly turns to default allow, not > good. We have to be careful here, chances are we'll remove user object > classes from kernel headers and that would make the result acceptable > but in the mean time this puts the policy in a bad state. It would be nice if there were string-to-number or number-to-number lookup functions for the class and permission values so that userspace object managers didn't have to hardcode the values from the header files. -- Eamon Walsh National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.