Message-ID: <47B34DD3.2070608@tycho.nsa.gov> Date: Wed, 13 Feb 2008 15:06:43 -0500 From: Eamon Walsh MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Ted X Toth CC: Glenn Faden , SELinux List , Stephen Smalley Subject: Re: [PATCH] libselinux: add "poly_property" type to X contexts backend References: <47A8D586.7080202@tycho.nsa.gov> <47A9047D.1000501@tycho.nsa.gov> <47A9DA5D.2030109@sun.com> <47AA0A2C.6090009@tycho.nsa.gov> <47ACF626.7090004@gmail.com> In-Reply-To: <47ACF626.7090004@gmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Sender: owner-selinux@tycho.nsa.gov List-Id: selinux@tycho.nsa.gov Ted X Toth wrote: > Eamon Walsh wrote: > >> Glenn Faden wrote: >> >>> Eamon Walsh wrote: >>> >>> >>>> Xavier Toth wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>>> I'm curious as to why you chose the route of specifying which >>>>> properties are polyinstantiated instead of which are not bearing in >>>>> mind what Glenn said in a previous post? >>>>> >>>>> >>>> The server will check the "property" lines first and if it doesn't >>>> find a match it will check the "poly_property" lines. So, as long >>>> as the wildcard entry in the x_contexts file is changed from >>>> property to poly_property, the default will be to polyinstantiate. >>>> >>>> However I wasn't planning on treating the root window any >>>> differently from other windows, so this behavior would apply to all >>>> windows. >>>> >>>> >>> I've never seen a requirement for polyinstantiation of properties on >>> per-client windows. I've seen requirements for relabeling properties, >>> however. For example, the trusted selection manager needs to create >>> properties that are readable by the client who requests a >>> ConvertSelection. We do this by calling a new X protocol extension. >>> >> SELinux protocol extension allows clients to create windows and >> properties with different security contexts. >> >> >>> How do you plan to have trusted clients act on behalf of other >>> clients with different security contexts? >>> >> I haven't done the polyinstantiation for selections yet, but my >> current plan is to implement a trusted clipboard manager that will >> display the various clipboard contents and allow users to upgrade or >> downgrade, which means that the clipboard manager will take ownership >> of the selection at the target level and just pipe the data through. >> This scheme shouldn't require tweaking properties on the fly. However >> this would not be point-to-point but would make the selection >> available to all applications at the target level. >> >> > This is extremely high on our list of 'must have's and it is critical > that this be targeted for RHEL6 is this your goal too? > Yes, for the server side. However I have no timeline for the trusted clipboard manager application. Something like Glipper might be a good place to start. What will be needed is to make it aware that the same selection (e.g. PRIMARY) may be owned by different clients at different levels, and implement the downgrading/upgrading feature. > >>> Similarly, how can a trusted client read/write a polyinstantiated >>> property with a different security context? >>> >>> >> By launching a helper process at the appropriate level. >> >> >> > > > -- > This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. > If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with > the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message. > > -- Eamon Walsh National Security Agency -- This message was distributed to subscribers of the selinux mailing list. If you no longer wish to subscribe, send mail to majordomo@tycho.nsa.gov with the words "unsubscribe selinux" without quotes as the message.