Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id CF33CD715E4 for ; Sat, 24 Jan 2026 18:17:49 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1vji9O-0001ke-8C; Sat, 24 Jan 2026 13:14:23 -0500 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]) by lists.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1vji8x-0001de-Ry; Sat, 24 Jan 2026 13:13:58 -0500 Received: from mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com ([148.163.158.5]) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1vji8u-00086p-FR; Sat, 24 Jan 2026 13:13:55 -0500 Received: from pps.filterd (m0353725.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.18.1.2/8.18.1.2) with ESMTP id 60O4H1Md012953; Sat, 24 Jan 2026 18:13:49 GMT DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=ibm.com; h=cc :content-transfer-encoding:content-type:date:from:in-reply-to :message-id:mime-version:references:subject:to; s=pp1; bh=WHyDyB 6sTUSN7yTL/8c5X8Q5+Ch6F7NhipM4IW/dB/s=; b=c2G0nWsbTgRnu0enGNAJgn 9nWOoh/1nzzgdcfNCCAD1f5WsBYMZPRxMIBbYa11qcc+pyBCs/VmC8dUCP2m3M+5 PNXwv2hvdT2tBgO/d8S/4Pf6c19k1o2a3PlqKKfTh+5hLjT5RlEtr5MChztTuPCz iwpIb7x7iTUSYay7QEy+HKK9cCWB/cXk2ezYLpM2WqZf251uUi026pORwWTxwJBD Mx1RoQJkVaLgHhHgDpBmBAVZT1XGLcGEitjTfVwZr4vdVRIuaH7TpzlcB/4sPmP7 aZC95ynO8e8HifkznoFF4Ny8krbIxWNRioo9T/Wr/JT3j++6ST13mg7dhIkcik2w == Received: from ppma13.dal12v.mail.ibm.com (dd.9e.1632.ip4.static.sl-reverse.com [50.22.158.221]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (PPS) with ESMTPS id 4bvmgfj0n9-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Sat, 24 Jan 2026 18:13:49 +0000 (GMT) Received: from pps.filterd (ppma13.dal12v.mail.ibm.com [127.0.0.1]) by ppma13.dal12v.mail.ibm.com (8.18.1.2/8.18.1.2) with ESMTP id 60OFXHTP001441; Sat, 24 Jan 2026 18:13:48 GMT Received: from smtprelay03.wdc07v.mail.ibm.com ([172.16.1.70]) by ppma13.dal12v.mail.ibm.com (PPS) with ESMTPS id 4brpyke7gh-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT); Sat, 24 Jan 2026 18:13:48 +0000 Received: from smtpav04.wdc07v.mail.ibm.com (smtpav04.wdc07v.mail.ibm.com [10.39.53.231]) by smtprelay03.wdc07v.mail.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id 60OIDRwX20054752 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Sat, 24 Jan 2026 18:13:27 GMT Received: from smtpav04.wdc07v.mail.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 3EA5358050; Sat, 24 Jan 2026 18:13:46 +0000 (GMT) Received: from smtpav04.wdc07v.mail.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7A5A558045; Sat, 24 Jan 2026 18:13:44 +0000 (GMT) Received: from [9.67.154.46] (unknown [9.67.154.46]) by smtpav04.wdc07v.mail.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS; Sat, 24 Jan 2026 18:13:44 +0000 (GMT) Message-ID: <48169821-01a4-4e9f-b301-94d430afe8af@linux.ibm.com> Date: Sat, 24 Jan 2026 13:13:43 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird From: Collin Walling Subject: Re: [PATCH v7 19/29] pc-bios/s390-ccw: Add signature verification for secure IPL in audit mode To: Zhuoying Cai , thuth@redhat.com, berrange@redhat.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, david@redhat.com, jrossi@linux.ibm.com, qemu-s390x@nongnu.org, qemu-devel@nongnu.org, brueckner@linux.ibm.com Cc: jjherne@linux.ibm.com, pasic@linux.ibm.com, borntraeger@linux.ibm.com, farman@linux.ibm.com, mjrosato@linux.ibm.com, iii@linux.ibm.com, eblake@redhat.com, armbru@redhat.com, alifm@linux.ibm.com References: <20251208213247.702569-1-zycai@linux.ibm.com> <20251208213247.702569-20-zycai@linux.ibm.com> Content-Language: en-US In-Reply-To: <20251208213247.702569-20-zycai@linux.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Authority-Analysis: v=2.4 cv=Z4vh3XRA c=1 sm=1 tr=0 ts=69750bdd cx=c_pps a=AfN7/Ok6k8XGzOShvHwTGQ==:117 a=AfN7/Ok6k8XGzOShvHwTGQ==:17 a=IkcTkHD0fZMA:10 a=vUbySO9Y5rIA:10 a=VkNPw1HP01LnGYTKEx00:22 a=VnNF1IyMAAAA:8 a=X7h0je6238fb76CTeysA:9 a=QEXdDO2ut3YA:10 X-Proofpoint-GUID: -x6jTH_dHfSACAyVdbY2Vt-523tymZgT X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: -x6jTH_dHfSACAyVdbY2Vt-523tymZgT X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details-Enc: AW1haW4tMjYwMTI0MDE0MyBTYWx0ZWRfX2w2yjbx4SBcZ 0yUi1CvUG26ARUFau4OUn+ptM8FMxP8ueZZLxK6esN1qSnSNXv2/L6IWOs/d9ayVHjUCgm2hvS4 UzXeMbkN1ZyvXiCc28UbUFJ4aU76Z+dfNj5DpFSD/+WxTrgIWC/34MZF4H3vZKMEFr0Hk0+P+Hc tzb6UCiEKn5OSWb0Mg6FICijOmW314omIvATUsSq8/PFv9+AD/VfWs0MP/xzab2Yn5kO93GYdhg fZXXJ+jpEVZDxSIQkCg4QRA2eQnZ5rpteLDWcCwgocwzqPUHLof7C3hgONBOrNzLahfZStQlssw 6t3ksdU9CK62SQDFT5dvmE/rTYJ0nzWiFceWUouWA7/AdTKbLsSZAh3+K5G/OsZdwZ6Hh7agRRt SROsOUrLiNReq/MXa/Jf4ctLTfC5/N0fjEw1a4uvAxEfO3lR40TXNVG1Cq+at7dC3FFv3ASoNw3 +5gSmkpR6/6LT1Yjv1w== X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.293,Aquarius:18.0.1121,Hydra:6.1.20,FMLib:17.12.100.49 definitions=2026-01-24_02,2026-01-22_02,2025-10-01_01 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 suspectscore=0 malwarescore=0 phishscore=0 priorityscore=1501 bulkscore=0 adultscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 spamscore=0 classifier=typeunknown authscore=0 authtc= authcc= route=outbound adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.19.0-2601150000 definitions=main-2601240143 Received-SPF: pass client-ip=148.163.158.5; envelope-from=walling@linux.ibm.com; helo=mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com X-Spam_score_int: -19 X-Spam_score: -2.0 X-Spam_bar: -- X-Spam_report: (-2.0 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE=-0.0001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H4=0.001, RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL=0.001, RCVD_IN_VALIDITY_CERTIFIED_BLOCKED=0.001, RCVD_IN_VALIDITY_RPBL_BLOCKED=0.001, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: qemu development List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org On 12/8/25 16:32, Zhuoying Cai wrote: > Enable secure IPL in audit mode, which performs signature verification, > but any error does not terminate the boot process. Only warnings will be > logged to the console instead. > > Add a comp_len variable to store the length of a segment in > zipl_load_segment. comp_len variable is necessary to store the > calculated segment length and is used during signature verification. > Return the length on success, or a negative return code on failure. > > Secure IPL in audit mode requires at least one certificate provided in > the key store along with necessary facilities (Secure IPL Facility, > Certificate Store Facility and secure IPL extension support). > > Note: Secure IPL in audit mode is implemented for the SCSI scheme of > virtio-blk/virtio-scsi devices. > > Signed-off-by: Zhuoying Cai > --- > docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst | 34 +++ > pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile | 3 +- > pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c | 44 +++- > pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h | 11 + > pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c | 9 + > pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h | 15 ++ > pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c | 44 ++++ > pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h | 6 + > pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c | 383 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h | 94 ++++++++ > 10 files changed, 638 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) > create mode 100644 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c > create mode 100644 pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h > > diff --git a/docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst b/docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst > index 0a02f171b4..8958a51f0b 100644 > --- a/docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst > +++ b/docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst > @@ -18,3 +18,37 @@ Note: certificate files must have a .pem extension. > .. code-block:: shell > > qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs,boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem ... > + > + > +IPL Modes > +========= > +Multiple IPL modes are available to differentiate between the various IPL > +configurations. These modes are mutually exclusive and enabled based on the > +``boot-certs`` option on the QEMU command line. > + > +Normal Mode > +----------- > + > +The absence of certificates will attempt to IPL a guest without secure IPL > +operations. No checks are performed, and no warnings/errors are reported. > +This is the default mode. > + > +Configuration: > + > +.. code-block:: shell > + > + qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio ... > + > +Audit Mode > +---------- > + > +With *only* the presence of certificates in the store, it is assumed that secure > +boot operations should be performed with errors reported as warnings. As such, > +the secure IPL operations will be performed, and any errors that stem from these > +operations will result in a warning. I think both sentences are saying the same thing. How about: "When the certificate store is populated with at least one certificate and no additional secure IPL parameters are provided on the command line, then secure IPL will proceed in "audit mode". All secure IPL operations will be performed with signature verification errors reported as non-disruptive warnings." > + > +Configuration: > + > +.. code-block:: shell > + > + qemu-system-s390x -machine s390-ccw-virtio,boot-certs.0.path=/.../qemu/certs,boot-certs.1.path=/another/path/cert.pem ... > diff --git a/pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile b/pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile > index a0f24c94a8..603761a857 100644 > --- a/pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile > +++ b/pc-bios/s390-ccw/Makefile > @@ -34,7 +34,8 @@ QEMU_DGFLAGS = -MMD -MP -MT $@ -MF $(@D)/$(*F).d > .PHONY : all clean build-all distclean > > OBJECTS = start.o main.o bootmap.o jump2ipl.o sclp.o menu.o netmain.o \ > - virtio.o virtio-net.o virtio-scsi.o virtio-blkdev.o cio.o dasd-ipl.o > + virtio.o virtio-net.o virtio-scsi.o virtio-blkdev.o cio.o dasd-ipl.o \ > + secure-ipl.o > > SLOF_DIR := $(SRC_PATH)/../../roms/SLOF > > diff --git a/pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c b/pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c > index 9a03eab6ed..342772860b 100644 > --- a/pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c > +++ b/pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.c > @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ > #include "bootmap.h" > #include "virtio.h" > #include "bswap.h" > +#include "secure-ipl.h" > > #ifdef DEBUG > /* #define DEBUG_FALLBACK */ > @@ -617,7 +618,7 @@ static int ipl_eckd(void) > * Returns: length of the segment on success, > * negative value on error. > */ > -static int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) > +int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address) > { > const int max_entries = (MAX_SECTOR_SIZE / sizeof(ScsiBlockPtr)); > ScsiBlockPtr *bprs = (void *)sec; > @@ -736,9 +737,22 @@ static int zipl_run(ScsiBlockPtr *pte) > /* Load image(s) into RAM */ > entry = (ComponentEntry *)(&header[1]); > > - rc = zipl_run_normal(&entry, tmp_sec); > - if (rc) { > - return rc; > + switch (boot_mode) { > + case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT: > + rc = zipl_run_secure(&entry, tmp_sec); > + if (rc) { > + return rc; > + } > + break; > + case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL: > + rc = zipl_run_normal(&entry, tmp_sec); > + if (rc) { > + return rc; > + } > + break; > + default: > + puts("Unknown boot mode"); > + return -1; > } Each case has a common pattern. Move the if (rc) check outside the switch block. > > if (entry->component_type != ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_EXEC) { > @@ -1103,17 +1117,35 @@ static int zipl_load_vscsi(void) > * IPL starts here > */ > > +ZiplBootMode zipl_mode(uint8_t hdr_flags) > +{ > + bool sipl_set = hdr_flags & DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_SIPL; > + bool iplir_set = hdr_flags & DIAG308_IPIB_FLAGS_IPLIR; > + > + if (!sipl_set && iplir_set) { > + return ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT; > + } > + > + return ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL; > +} What about making this a void function `set_boot_mode()` which gets invoked in main just after the iplb is stored. This would also remove the need for the "UNSPECIFIED" mode, since this variable would get resolved early on. Perhaps it makes more sense to default to NORMAL unless the parameters specify otherwise? > + > void zipl_load(void) > { > VDev *vdev = virtio_get_device(); > > if (vdev->is_cdrom) { > + if (boot_mode == ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT) { > + panic("Secure boot from ISO image is not supported!"); > + } > ipl_iso_el_torito(); > puts("Failed to IPL this ISO image!"); > return; > } > > if (virtio_get_device_type() == VIRTIO_ID_NET) { > + if (boot_mode == ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT) { > + panic("Virtio net boot device does not support secure boot!"); > + } > netmain(); > puts("Failed to IPL from this network!"); > return; > @@ -1124,6 +1156,10 @@ void zipl_load(void) > return; > } > > + if (boot_mode == ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT) { > + panic("ECKD boot device does not support secure boot!"); > + } > + For all cases here in zipl_load, an IPL_assert is much cleaner. e.g. IPL_assert(boot_mode == ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL, "message"); Which will also cover the need to check for the other boot modes in a future patch. Additionally, I'm not sure if "ECKD boot device" is correct here. Couldn't the IPL devices after this point actually be virtio-blk, virtio-scsi, etc? Perhaps a generic "Boot device does not support secure IPL" or something is sufficient. > switch (virtio_get_device_type()) { > case VIRTIO_ID_BLOCK: > zipl_load_vblk(); > diff --git a/pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h b/pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h > index 95943441d3..dc2783faa2 100644 > --- a/pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h > +++ b/pc-bios/s390-ccw/bootmap.h > @@ -88,9 +88,18 @@ typedef struct BootMapTable { > BootMapPointer entry[]; > } __attribute__ ((packed)) BootMapTable; > > +#define DER_SIGNATURE_FORMAT 1 > + > +typedef struct SignatureInformation { > + uint8_t format; > + uint8_t reserved[3]; > + uint32_t sig_len; > +} SignatureInformation; > + > typedef union ComponentEntryData { > uint64_t load_psw; > uint64_t load_addr; > + SignatureInformation sig_info; > } ComponentEntryData; > > typedef struct ComponentEntry { > @@ -113,6 +122,8 @@ typedef struct ScsiMbr { > ScsiBlockPtr pt; /* block pointer to program table */ > } __attribute__ ((packed)) ScsiMbr; > > +int zipl_load_segment(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t address); > + > #define ZIPL_MAGIC "zIPL" > #define ZIPL_MAGIC_EBCDIC "\xa9\xc9\xd7\xd3" > #define IPL1_MAGIC "\xc9\xd7\xd3\xf1" /* == "IPL1" in EBCDIC */ > diff --git a/pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c b/pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c > index c9328f1c51..8aabce115f 100644 > --- a/pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c > +++ b/pc-bios/s390-ccw/main.c > @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ IplParameterBlock *iplb; > bool have_iplb; > static uint16_t cutype; > LowCore *lowcore; /* Yes, this *is* a pointer to address 0 */ > +ZiplBootMode boot_mode; > > #define LOADPARM_PROMPT "PROMPT " > #define LOADPARM_EMPTY " " > @@ -272,9 +273,17 @@ static int virtio_setup(void) > > static void ipl_boot_device(void) > { > + if (boot_mode == ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_UNSPECIFIED) { > + boot_mode = zipl_mode(iplb->hdr_flags); > + } > + > switch (cutype) { > case CU_TYPE_DASD_3990: > case CU_TYPE_DASD_2107: > + if (boot_mode == ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT) { > + panic("Passthrough (vfio) CCW device does not support secure boot!"); > + } > + IPL_assert > dasd_ipl(blk_schid, cutype); > break; > case CU_TYPE_VIRTIO: > diff --git a/pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h b/pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h > index b1dc35cded..c2ba40d067 100644 > --- a/pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h > +++ b/pc-bios/s390-ccw/s390-ccw.h > @@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ typedef unsigned long long u64; > #define MIN_NON_ZERO(a, b) ((a) == 0 ? (b) : \ > ((b) == 0 ? (a) : (MIN(a, b)))) > #endif > +#ifndef ROUND_UP > +#define ROUND_UP(n, d) (((n) + (d) - 1) & -(0 ? (n) : (d))) > +#endif > > #define ARRAY_SIZE(a) (sizeof(a) / sizeof((a)[0])) > > @@ -64,6 +67,8 @@ void sclp_print(const char *string); > void sclp_set_write_mask(uint32_t receive_mask, uint32_t send_mask); > void sclp_setup(void); > void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii(char *loadparm); > +bool sclp_is_diag320_on(void); > +bool sclp_is_sipl_on(void); > int sclp_read(char *str, size_t count); > > /* virtio.c */ > @@ -76,6 +81,16 @@ int virtio_read(unsigned long sector, void *load_addr); > /* bootmap.c */ > void zipl_load(void); > > +typedef enum ZiplBootMode { > + ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_UNSPECIFIED = 0, > + ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_NORMAL = 1, > + ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT = 2, > +} ZiplBootMode; > + > +extern ZiplBootMode boot_mode; > + > +ZiplBootMode zipl_mode(uint8_t hdr_flags); > + > /* jump2ipl.c */ > void write_reset_psw(uint64_t psw); > int jump_to_IPL_code(uint64_t address); > diff --git a/pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c b/pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c > index 4a07de018d..0b03c3164f 100644 > --- a/pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c > +++ b/pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.c > @@ -113,6 +113,50 @@ void sclp_get_loadparm_ascii(char *loadparm) > } > } > > +static void sclp_get_fac134(uint8_t *fac134) > +{ > + Remove extra newline. > + ReadInfo *sccb = (void *)_sccb; > + > + memset((char *)_sccb, 0, sizeof(ReadInfo)); > + sccb->h.length = SCCB_SIZE; > + if (!sclp_service_call(SCLP_CMDW_READ_SCP_INFO, sccb)) { > + *fac134 = sccb->fac134; > + } > +} > + > +bool sclp_is_diag320_on(void) > +{ > + uint8_t fac134 = 0; > + > + sclp_get_fac134(&fac134); > + return fac134 & SCCB_FAC134_DIAG320_BIT; > +} > + > +/* > + * Get fac_ipl (byte 136 and byte 137 of the SCLP Read Info block) > + * for IPL device facilities. > + */ > +static void sclp_get_fac_ipl(uint16_t *fac_ipl) > +{ > + > + ReadInfo *sccb = (void *)_sccb; > + > + memset((char *)_sccb, 0, sizeof(ReadInfo)); > + sccb->h.length = SCCB_SIZE; > + if (!sclp_service_call(SCLP_CMDW_READ_SCP_INFO, sccb)) { > + *fac_ipl = sccb->fac_ipl; > + } > +} Hmm. The number of SCLP service calls could be reduced by doing a singular read scp info call early and storing all the fields needed to be accessed later. But maybe that is outside the scope of these patches. > + > +bool sclp_is_sipl_on(void) > +{ > + uint16_t fac_ipl = 0; > + > + sclp_get_fac_ipl(&fac_ipl); > + return fac_ipl & SCCB_FAC_IPL_SIPL_BIT; > +} > + > int sclp_read(char *str, size_t count) > { > ReadEventData *sccb = (void *)_sccb; > diff --git a/pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h b/pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h > index 64b53cad29..cf147f4634 100644 > --- a/pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h > +++ b/pc-bios/s390-ccw/sclp.h > @@ -50,6 +50,8 @@ typedef struct SCCBHeader { > } __attribute__((packed)) SCCBHeader; > > #define SCCB_DATA_LEN (SCCB_SIZE - sizeof(SCCBHeader)) > +#define SCCB_FAC134_DIAG320_BIT 0x4 > +#define SCCB_FAC_IPL_SIPL_BIT 0x4000 > > typedef struct ReadInfo { > SCCBHeader h; > @@ -57,6 +59,10 @@ typedef struct ReadInfo { > uint8_t rnsize; > uint8_t reserved[13]; > uint8_t loadparm[LOADPARM_LEN]; > + uint8_t reserved1[102]; > + uint8_t fac134; > + uint8_t reserved2; > + uint16_t fac_ipl; > } __attribute__((packed)) ReadInfo; > > typedef struct SCCB { > diff --git a/pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c b/pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000000..c1c5bc682a > --- /dev/null > +++ b/pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.c > @@ -0,0 +1,383 @@ > +/* > + * S/390 Secure IPL > + * > + * Functions to support IPL in secure boot mode (DIAG 320, DIAG 508, > + * signature verification, and certificate handling). > + * > + * For secure IPL overview: docs/system/s390x/secure-ipl.rst > + * For secure IPL technical: docs/specs/s390x-secure-ipl.rst > + * > + * Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. > + * Author(s): Zhuoying Cai > + * > + * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later > + */ > + > +#include > +#include > +#include > +#include "bootmap.h" > +#include "s390-ccw.h" > +#include "secure-ipl.h" > + > +uint8_t vcssb_data[VCSSB_MIN_LEN] __attribute__((__aligned__(PAGE_SIZE))); > + > +VCStorageSizeBlock *zipl_secure_get_vcssb(void) > +{ > + VCStorageSizeBlock *vcssb; > + int rc; > + > + if (!sclp_is_diag320_on() || !is_cert_store_facility_supported()) { > + puts("Certificate Store Facility is not supported by the hypervisor!"); > + return NULL; > + } > + > + vcssb = (VCStorageSizeBlock *)vcssb_data; > + /* avoid retrieving vcssb multiple times */ > + if (vcssb->length >= VCSSB_MIN_LEN) { > + return vcssb; > + } Change the order of operations here to check if vcssb has been retrieved before checking diag320 stuff. Otherwise, every time `zipl_secure_get_vcssb()` is invoked, both an sclp service call and a diag320 call is always performed, which is unnecessary if the VCSSB has already been stored. > + > + vcssb->length = VCSSB_MIN_LEN; > + rc = diag320(vcssb, DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI); > + if (rc != DIAG_320_RC_OK) { > + return NULL; > + } Can do if (diag320(vcssb, DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_VCSI) != DIAG_320_RC_OK) and then get rid of rc > + > + return vcssb; > +} > + > +static uint32_t get_certs_length(void) The function name is ambiguous. I had to digest the math below to understand the intention. How about something like... `get_total_certs_length()` ...to help clarify that this function is returning a value to store all certs. > +{ > + VCStorageSizeBlock *vcssb; > + uint32_t len; > + > + vcssb = zipl_secure_get_vcssb(); > + if (vcssb == NULL) { > + return 0; > + } > + > + len = vcssb->total_vcb_len - VCB_HEADER_LEN - vcssb->total_vc_ct * VCE_HEADER_LEN; > + Could return the line above and get rid of len. > + return len; > +} > + > +static uint32_t request_certificate(uint8_t *cert, uint8_t index) > +{ > + VCStorageSizeBlock *vcssb; > + VCBlock *vcb; > + VCEntry *vce; > + uint64_t rc = 0; > + uint32_t cert_len = 0; > + uint32_t max_single_vcb_len; > + > + /* Get Verification Certificate Storage Size block with DIAG320 subcode 1 */ > + vcssb = zipl_secure_get_vcssb(); > + if (vcssb == NULL) { > + return 0; > + } > + > + /* > + * Request single entry > + * Fill input fields of single-entry VCB > + */ > + max_single_vcb_len = ROUND_UP(vcssb->max_single_vcb_len, PAGE_SIZE); > + vcb = malloc(max_single_vcb_len); > + vcb->in_len = max_single_vcb_len; > + vcb->first_vc_index = index + 1; > + vcb->last_vc_index = index + 1; There needs to be a better way to account for the index origin differences. See my comments below for `verify_signature()`. > + > + rc = diag320(vcb, DIAG_320_SUBC_STORE_VC); > + if (rc != DIAG_320_RC_OK) { > + goto out; > + } if (!diag320(vcb, DIAG_320_SUBC_STORE_VC)) then get rid of rc > + > + if (vcb->out_len == VCB_HEADER_LEN) { > + puts("No certificate entry"); > + goto out; > + } > + if (vcb->remain_ct != 0) { > + puts("Not enough memory to store all requested certificates"); > + goto out; > + } > + > + vce = (VCEntry *)vcb->vce_buf; > + if (!(vce->flags & DIAG_320_VCE_FLAGS_VALID)) { > + puts("Invalid certificate"); > + goto out; > + } > + > + cert_len = vce->cert_len; > + memcpy(cert, (uint8_t *)vce + vce->cert_offset, vce->cert_len); > + > +out: > + free(vcb); > + return cert_len; > +} > + > +static void cert_list_add(IplSignatureCertificateList *certs, int cert_index, > + uint8_t *cert, uint64_t cert_len) s/certs/cert_list s/cert/cert_addr > +{ > + if (cert_index > MAX_CERTIFICATES - 1) { > + printf("Warning: Ignoring cert entry [%d] because it's over %d entires\n", > + cert_index + 1, MAX_CERTIFICATES); > + return; > + } > + > + certs->cert_entries[cert_index].addr = (uint64_t)cert; > + certs->cert_entries[cert_index].len = cert_len; > + certs->ipl_info_header.len += sizeof(certs->cert_entries[cert_index]); > +} > + > +static void comp_list_add(IplDeviceComponentList *comps, int comp_index, > + int cert_index, uint64_t comp_addr, > + uint64_t comp_len, uint8_t flags) s/comps/comp_list > +{ > + if (comp_index > MAX_CERTIFICATES - 1) { > + printf("Warning: Ignoring comp entry [%d] because it's over %d entires\n", > + comp_index + 1, MAX_CERTIFICATES); > + return; > + } > + > + comps->device_entries[comp_index].addr = comp_addr; > + comps->device_entries[comp_index].len = comp_len; > + comps->device_entries[comp_index].flags = flags; > + comps->device_entries[comp_index].cert_index = cert_index; > + comps->ipl_info_header.len += sizeof(comps->device_entries[comp_index]); > +} > + > +static int update_iirb(IplDeviceComponentList *comps, IplSignatureCertificateList *certs) > +{ > + IplInfoReportBlock *iirb; > + IplDeviceComponentList *iirb_comps; > + IplSignatureCertificateList *iirb_certs; > + uint32_t iirb_hdr_len; > + uint32_t comps_len; > + uint32_t certs_len; > + > + if (iplb->len % 8 != 0) { > + panic("IPL parameter block length field value is not multiple of 8 bytes"); > + } > + > + iirb_hdr_len = sizeof(IplInfoReportBlockHeader); > + comps_len = comps->ipl_info_header.len; > + certs_len = certs->ipl_info_header.len; > + if ((comps_len + certs_len + iirb_hdr_len) > sizeof(IplInfoReportBlock)) { > + puts("Not enough space to hold all components and certificates in IIRB"); > + return -1; > + } Shouldn't this also be a panic? If there's not enough space for the IIRB, then that should be more serious than just warning in audit mode. > + > + /* IIRB immediately follows IPLB */ > + iirb = &ipl_data.iirb; > + iirb->hdr.len = iirb_hdr_len; > + > + /* Copy IPL device component list after IIRB Header */ > + iirb_comps = (IplDeviceComponentList *) iirb->info_blks; > + memcpy(iirb_comps, comps, comps_len); > + > + /* Update IIRB length */ > + iirb->hdr.len += comps_len; > + > + /* Copy IPL sig cert list after IPL device component list */ > + iirb_certs = (IplSignatureCertificateList *) (iirb->info_blks + > + iirb_comps->ipl_info_header.len); > + memcpy(iirb_certs, certs, certs_len); > + > + /* Update IIRB length */ > + iirb->hdr.len += certs_len; > + > + return 0; > +} > + > +static bool secure_ipl_supported(void) > +{ > + if (!sclp_is_sipl_on()) { > + puts("Secure IPL Facility is not supported by the hypervisor!"); > + return false; > + } > + > + if (!is_secure_ipl_extension_supported()) { > + puts("Secure IPL extensions are not supported by the hypervisor!"); > + return false; > + } > + > + if (!sclp_is_diag320_on() || !is_cert_store_facility_supported()) { > + puts("Certificate Store Facility is not supported by the hypervisor!"); > + return false; > + } > + > + return true; > +} > + > +static void init_lists(IplDeviceComponentList *comps, IplSignatureCertificateList *certs) > +{ > + comps->ipl_info_header.ibt = IPL_IBT_COMPONENTS; > + comps->ipl_info_header.len = sizeof(comps->ipl_info_header); > + > + certs->ipl_info_header.ibt = IPL_IBT_CERTIFICATES; > + certs->ipl_info_header.len = sizeof(certs->ipl_info_header); > +} > + > +static uint32_t zipl_load_signature(ComponentEntry *entry, uint64_t sig_sec) > +{ Needs to be type int, otherwise returning -1 below doesn't make sense. > + uint32_t sig_len; > + > + if (zipl_load_segment(entry, sig_sec) < 0) { > + return -1; > + } > + > + if (entry->compdat.sig_info.format != DER_SIGNATURE_FORMAT) { > + puts("Signature is not in DER format"); > + return -1; > + } > + sig_len = entry->compdat.sig_info.sig_len; > + > + return sig_len; Could return entry->compdat.sig_info.sig_len, then sig_len goes away. > +} > + > +/* > + * Returns: 1 - New certificate requested and added to cert_table and cert list > + * 0 - Certificate already exists in the cert_table > + * -1 - Error while requesting certificate > + */ > +static int handle_certificate(int *cert_table, uint8_t **cert, > + uint64_t cert_len, uint8_t cert_table_idx, > + IplSignatureCertificateList *certs, int cert_entry_idx) > +{ > + if (cert_table[cert_table_idx] != -1) { > + return 0; > + } > + > + if (!request_certificate(*cert, cert_table_idx)) { > + puts("Could not get certificate"); > + return -1; > + } > + > + cert_list_add(certs, cert_entry_idx, *cert, cert_len); > + cert_table[cert_table_idx] = cert_entry_idx; > + return 1; > +} > + > +int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec) > +{ > + IplDeviceComponentList comps; > + IplSignatureCertificateList certs; It would read a little easier if these were comp_list and cert_list > + ComponentEntry *entry = *entry_ptr; > + uint8_t *cert = NULL; > + uint64_t *sig = NULL; > + int cert_entry_idx = 0; > + int comp_entry_idx = 0; > + uint64_t comp_addr; > + int comp_len; > + uint32_t sig_len = 0; > + uint64_t cert_len = -1; > + uint8_t cert_table_idx = -1; > + bool verified; > + uint32_t certs_len; > + /* > + * Store indices of cert entry that have already used for signature > + * verification to prevent allocating the same certificate multiple times. > + * cert_table index (cert_table_idx): > + * index of certificate from qemu cert store used for verification > + * cert_table value (cert_entry_idx): > + * index of cert entry in cert list that contains the certificate > + */ > + int cert_table[MAX_CERTIFICATES] = { [0 ... MAX_CERTIFICATES - 1] = -1}; If you agree with the suggestion below for verify_signature to adjust the returned index, then the cert_table can be used a bit differently: Make this an array of booleans. Use the index returned by verify_signature. Value true means that the cert has already been added to the IplSignatureCertificateList. False means it has yet to be added to the list. Remove the mention of "qemu cert store", as the BIOS technically does not know anything about the underlying cert store or its implementation. > + int rc; > + int signed_count = 0; > + > + if (!secure_ipl_supported()) { > + return -1; > + } > + > + init_lists(&comps, &certs); > + certs_len = get_certs_length(); > + cert = malloc(certs_len); cert = malloc(get_total_certs_length()); Then get rid of the certs_len variable. > + sig = malloc(MAX_SECTOR_SIZE); > + > + while (entry->component_type != ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_EXEC) { > + switch (entry->component_type) { > + case ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_SIGNATURE: > + if (sig_len) { > + goto out; > + } > + > + sig_len = zipl_load_signature(entry, (uint64_t)sig); > + if (sig_len < 0) { > + goto out; > + } > + break; > + case ZIPL_COMP_ENTRY_LOAD: > + comp_addr = entry->compdat.load_addr; > + comp_len = zipl_load_segment(entry, comp_addr); > + if (comp_len < 0) { > + goto out; > + } > + > + if (!sig_len) { > + break; > + } > + > + verified = verify_signature(comp_len, comp_addr, sig_len, (uint64_t)sig, > + &cert_len, &cert_table_idx); > + > + if (verified) { > + rc = handle_certificate(cert_table, &cert, cert_len, > + cert_table_idx, &certs, cert_entry_idx); Check cert_table here before calling handle_certificate. It would contain all the cert_table logic to zipl_run_secure and make it a little bit easier to understand. Also less variables to pass around. > + if (rc == -1) { > + goto out; > + } > + > + /* increment for the next certificate */ > + if (rc == 1) { > + cert_entry_idx++; > + cert += cert_len; > + } > + > + puts("Verified component"); > + comp_list_add(&comps, comp_entry_idx, cert_table[cert_table_idx], > + comp_addr, comp_len, > + S390_IPL_COMPONENT_FLAG_SC | S390_IPL_COMPONENT_FLAG_CSV); > + } else { > + comp_list_add(&comps, comp_entry_idx, -1, > + comp_addr, comp_len, > + S390_IPL_COMPONENT_FLAG_SC); > + zipl_secure_handle("Could not verify component"); > + } This can be cleaned up a bit. Set cert_index and flags within the if/else block. Call `comp_list_add()` once after the block. > + > + comp_entry_idx++; > + signed_count += 1; > + /* After a signature is used another new one can be accepted */ > + sig_len = 0; > + break; > + default: > + puts("Unknown component entry type"); > + return -1; > + } > + > + entry++; > + > + if ((uint8_t *)(&entry[1]) > tmp_sec + MAX_SECTOR_SIZE) { > + puts("Wrong entry value"); > + return -EINVAL; > + } > + } > + > + if (signed_count == 0) { > + zipl_secure_handle("Secure boot is on, but components are not signed"); > + } > + > + if (update_iirb(&comps, &certs)) { > + zipl_secure_handle("Failed to write IPL Information Report Block"); > + } > + > + *entry_ptr = entry; > + free(sig); > + > + return 0; > +out: > + free(cert); > + free(sig); > + > + return -1; > +} > diff --git a/pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h b/pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h > new file mode 100644 > index 0000000000..a6fc1ac8de > --- /dev/null > +++ b/pc-bios/s390-ccw/secure-ipl.h > @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ > +/* > + * S/390 Secure IPL > + * > + * Copyright 2025 IBM Corp. > + * Author(s): Zhuoying Cai > + * > + * SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later > + */ > + > +#ifndef _PC_BIOS_S390_CCW_SECURE_IPL_H > +#define _PC_BIOS_S390_CCW_SECURE_IPL_H > + > +#include > +#include > + > +VCStorageSizeBlock *zipl_secure_get_vcssb(void); > +int zipl_run_secure(ComponentEntry **entry_ptr, uint8_t *tmp_sec); > + > +static inline void zipl_secure_handle(const char *message) This could be implemented like an assert, where the first param is the condition. e.g. `zipl_secure_handle(signed_count > 0, "Secure boot is on, but components are not signed");` Then some if checks / extra indentation goes away. > +{ > + switch (boot_mode) { > + case ZIPL_BOOT_MODE_SECURE_AUDIT: > + IPL_check(false, message); > + break; > + default: > + break; > + } > +} > + > +static inline uint64_t diag320(void *data, unsigned long subcode) > +{ > + register unsigned long addr asm("0") = (unsigned long)data; > + register unsigned long rc asm("1") = 0; > + > + asm volatile ("diag %0,%2,0x320\n" > + : "+d" (addr), "+d" (rc) > + : "d" (subcode) > + : "memory", "cc"); > + return rc; > +} > + > +static inline bool is_cert_store_facility_supported(void) > +{ > + uint32_t d320_ism; > + > + diag320(&d320_ism, DIAG_320_SUBC_QUERY_ISM); > + return (d320_ism & DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_SUBCODES) && > + (d320_ism & DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI) && > + (d320_ism & DIAG_320_ISM_STORE_VC); > +} Don't need to check if DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_SUBCODES is supported (implied if query ISM returns OK). Can clean this up by doing `return d320_ism & (DIAG_320_ISM_QUERY_VCSI | DIAG_320_ISM_STORE_VC);` Merge this function with `sclp_is_diag320_on()`, checking the read scp facility bit first before calling diag320. > + > +static inline uint64_t _diag508(void *data, unsigned long subcode) > +{ > + register unsigned long addr asm("0") = (unsigned long)data; > + register unsigned long rc asm("1") = 0; > + > + asm volatile ("diag %0,%2,0x508\n" > + : "+d" (addr), "+d" (rc) > + : "d" (subcode) > + : "memory", "cc"); > + return rc; > +} > + > +static inline bool is_secure_ipl_extension_supported(void) "is_signature_verif_supported()" or something like that reads better. > +{ > + uint64_t d508_subcodes; > + > + d508_subcodes = _diag508(NULL, DIAG_508_SUBC_QUERY_SUBC); > + return d508_subcodes & DIAG_508_SUBC_SIG_VERIF; > +} > + > +static inline bool verify_signature(uint64_t comp_len, uint64_t comp_addr, > + uint64_t sig_len, uint64_t sig_addr, > + uint64_t *cert_len, uint8_t *cert_idx) > +{ > + Diag508SigVerifBlock svb; > + > + svb.length = sizeof(Diag508SigVerifBlock); > + svb.version = 0; > + svb.comp_len = comp_len; > + svb.comp_addr = comp_addr; > + svb.sig_len = sig_len; > + svb.sig_addr = sig_addr; > + > + if (_diag508(&svb, DIAG_508_SUBC_SIG_VERIF) == DIAG_508_RC_OK) { > + *cert_len = svb.cert_len; > + *cert_idx = svb.cert_store_index; Adjust for different indexing origins here, accounting for what DIAG320 will later need when retrieving certs: ``` /* * DIAG 508 utilizes an index origin of 0 when indexing the cert store. * The cert_idx will be used for DIAG 320 data structures, which expects * an index origin of 1. Account for the offset here so it's easier to * manage later. */ *cert_idx = svb.cert_store_index + 1; ``` > + return true; > + } > + > + return false; > +} > + > +#endif /* _PC_BIOS_S390_CCW_SECURE_IPL_H */ -- Regards, Collin