From: Jarkko Sakkinen Date: Mon, 06 Jan 2020 21:58:18 +0000 Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 5/9] security: keys: trusted: Make sealed key properly interoperable Message-Id: <482ad14deb25b1323c0079fb120fdf0ffd0724b3.camel@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit List-Id: References: <20191230173802.8731-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> <20191230173802.8731-6-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> In-Reply-To: <20191230173802.8731-6-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> To: James Bottomley , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org On Mon, 2019-12-30 at 09:37 -0800, James Bottomley wrote: > The current implementation appends a migratable flag to the end of a > key, meaning the format isn't exactly interoperable because the using > party needs to know to strip this extra byte. However, all other > consumers of TPM sealed blobs expect the unseal to return exactly the > key. Since TPM2 keys have a key property flag that corresponds to > migratable, use that flag instead and make the actual key the only > sealed quantity. This is secure because the key properties are bound > to a hash in the private part, so if they're altered the key won't > load. > > Backwards compatibility is implemented by detecting whether we're > loading a new format key or not and correctly setting migratable from > the last byte of old format keys. > > Signed-off-by: James Bottomley I'll stop review here as I'm now quite confident that in high-level this going to right direction. For remaining patches: - Be more explict with the tools. That will also give a framework to easily test the patches. - Same remarks for the code formatting as I gave to earlier. /Jarkko