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spf=tempfail smtp.mailfrom=dm-devel-bounces@redhat.com Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-541-Q-hByUXoM62OwbNb8_3B-A-1; Thu, 10 Dec 2020 22:27:18 -0500 X-MC-Unique: Q-hByUXoM62OwbNb8_3B-A-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx07.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.22]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BE9AD1926DA0; Fri, 11 Dec 2020 03:27:11 +0000 (UTC) Received: from colo-mx.corp.redhat.com (colo-mx01.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.20]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B2AD010016F5; Fri, 11 Dec 2020 03:27:10 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists01.pubmisc.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com (lists01.pubmisc.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.19.33]) by colo-mx.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id A0F17180954D; Fri, 11 Dec 2020 03:27:08 +0000 (UTC) Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx05.intmail.prod.int.rdu2.redhat.com [10.11.54.5]) by lists01.pubmisc.prod.ext.phx2.redhat.com (8.13.8/8.13.8) with ESMTP id 0BB3R5TY025271 for ; Thu, 10 Dec 2020 22:27:05 -0500 Received: by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) id 617A4E7792; Fri, 11 Dec 2020 03:27:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: from mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (mimecast05.extmail.prod.ext.rdu2.redhat.com [10.11.55.21]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5BCEFE778F for ; Fri, 11 Dec 2020 03:27:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: from us-smtp-1.mimecast.com (us-smtp-delivery-1.mimecast.com [205.139.110.120]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx02.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0F9E4800889 for ; Fri, 11 Dec 2020 03:27:03 +0000 (UTC) Received: from linux.microsoft.com (linux.microsoft.com [13.77.154.182]) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-474-fo0yWMCoOZO3X0HK6K-4_Q-1; Thu, 10 Dec 2020 22:26:58 -0500 X-MC-Unique: fo0yWMCoOZO3X0HK6K-4_Q-1 Received: from [192.168.86.31] (c-71-197-163-6.hsd1.wa.comcast.net [71.197.163.6]) by linux.microsoft.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id AA7E420B717A; Thu, 10 Dec 2020 19:26:56 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Filter: OpenDKIM Filter v2.11.0 linux.microsoft.com AA7E420B717A To: Tyler Hicks References: <20201209194212.5131-1-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> <20201209194212.5131-4-tusharsu@linux.microsoft.com> <20201210230218.GH489768@sequoia> From: Tushar Sugandhi Message-ID: <492dd4a8-1edd-211f-42d5-59c24731ddbb@linux.microsoft.com> Date: Thu, 10 Dec 2020 19:26:56 -0800 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.10.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20201210230218.GH489768@sequoia> X-Mimecast-Impersonation-Protect: Policy=CLT - Impersonation Protection Definition; Similar Internal Domain=false; Similar Monitored External Domain=false; Custom External Domain=false; Mimecast External Domain=false; Newly Observed Domain=false; Internal User Name=false; Custom Display Name List=false; Reply-to Address Mismatch=false; Targeted Threat Dictionary=false; Mimecast Threat Dictionary=false; Custom Threat Dictionary=false X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.11.54.5 X-loop: dm-devel@redhat.com Cc: sashal@kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com, snitzer@redhat.com, selinux@vger.kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, jmorris@namei.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com, gmazyland@gmail.com, agk@redhat.com Subject: Re: [dm-devel] [PATCH v7 3/8] IMA: define a hook to measure kernel integrity critical data X-BeenThere: dm-devel@redhat.com X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: junk List-Id: device-mapper development List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: dm-devel-bounces@redhat.com Errors-To: dm-devel-bounces@redhat.com X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.84 on 10.5.11.22 Authentication-Results: relay.mimecast.com; auth=pass smtp.auth=CUSA124A263 smtp.mailfrom=dm-devel-bounces@redhat.com X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; Format="flowed" On 2020-12-10 3:02 p.m., Tyler Hicks wrote: > On 2020-12-09 11:42:07, Tushar Sugandhi wrote: >> IMA provides capabilities to measure file data, and in-memory buffer >> data. However, various data structures, policies, and states >> stored in kernel memory also impact the integrity of the system. >> Several kernel subsystems contain such integrity critical data. These >> kernel subsystems help protect the integrity of a device. Currently, >> IMA does not provide a generic function for kernel subsystems to measure >> their integrity critical data. >> >> Define a new IMA hook - ima_measure_critical_data to measure kernel >> integrity critical data. >> >> Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi >> --- >> Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy | 2 +- >> include/linux/ima.h | 6 +++++ >> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 1 + >> security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 2 +- >> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 2 ++ >> 6 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy >> index e35263f97fc1..6ec7daa87cba 100644 >> --- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy >> +++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy >> @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ Description: >> func:= [BPRM_CHECK][MMAP_CHECK][CREDS_CHECK][FILE_CHECK]MODULE_CHECK] >> [FIRMWARE_CHECK] >> [KEXEC_KERNEL_CHECK] [KEXEC_INITRAMFS_CHECK] >> - [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] >> + [KEXEC_CMDLINE] [KEY_CHECK] [CRITICAL_DATA] >> mask:= [[^]MAY_READ] [[^]MAY_WRITE] [[^]MAY_APPEND] >> [[^]MAY_EXEC] >> fsmagic:= hex value >> diff --git a/include/linux/ima.h b/include/linux/ima.h >> index ac3d82f962f2..675f54db6264 100644 >> --- a/include/linux/ima.h >> +++ b/include/linux/ima.h >> @@ -30,6 +30,9 @@ extern int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, >> extern void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry); >> extern int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size); >> extern void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size); >> +extern void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name, >> + const void *buf, int buf_len, >> + bool measure_buf_hash); >> >> #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE_BOOTPARAM >> extern void ima_appraise_parse_cmdline(void); >> @@ -122,6 +125,9 @@ static inline int ima_file_hash(struct file *file, char *buf, size_t buf_size) >> } >> >> static inline void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) {} >> +static inline void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name, >> + const void *buf, int buf_len, >> + bool measure_buf_hash) {} >> #endif /* CONFIG_IMA */ >> >> #ifndef CONFIG_IMA_KEXEC >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h >> index fa3044a7539f..7d9deda6a8b3 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h >> @@ -201,6 +201,7 @@ static inline unsigned int ima_hash_key(u8 *digest) >> hook(POLICY_CHECK, policy) \ >> hook(KEXEC_CMDLINE, kexec_cmdline) \ >> hook(KEY_CHECK, key) \ >> + hook(CRITICAL_DATA, critical_data) \ >> hook(MAX_CHECK, none) >> >> #define __ima_hook_enumify(ENUM, str) ENUM, >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c >> index af218babd198..9917e1730cb6 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c >> @@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, >> * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= >> * subj,obj, and type: are LSM specific. >> * func: FILE_CHECK | BPRM_CHECK | CREDS_CHECK | MMAP_CHECK | MODULE_CHECK >> - * | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK >> + * | KEXEC_CMDLINE | KEY_CHECK | CRITICAL_DATA >> * mask: contains the permission mask >> * fsmagic: hex value >> * >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c >> index 03aad13e9e70..ae59f4a4dd70 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c >> @@ -922,6 +922,42 @@ void ima_kexec_cmdline(int kernel_fd, const void *buf, int size) >> fdput(f); >> } >> >> +/** >> + * ima_measure_critical_data - measure kernel integrity critical data >> + * @event_name: event name to be used for the buffer entry >> + * @buf: pointer to buffer containing data to measure >> + * @buf_len: length of buffer(in bytes) >> + * @measure_buf_hash: measure buffer hash >> + * >> + * Measure the kernel subsystem data, critical to the integrity of the kernel, >> + * into the IMA log and extend the @pcr. >> + * >> + * Use @event_name to describe the state/buffer data change. >> + * Examples of critical data (buf) could be kernel in-memory r/o structures, > ^ > @buf > Will do. >> + * hash of the memory structures, or data that represents subsystem state >> + * change. >> + * >> + * If @measure_buf_hash is set to true - measure hash of the buffer data, >> + * else measure the buffer data itself. >> + * measure_buf_hash can be used to save space, if the data being measured > ^ > @measure_buf_hash > >> + * is too large. >> + * >> + * The data (buf) can only be measured, not appraised. > ^ > @buf > Will do. >> + */ >> +void ima_measure_critical_data(const char *event_name, >> + const void *buf, int buf_len, >> + bool measure_buf_hash) >> +{ >> + if (!event_name || !buf || !buf_len) { >> + pr_err("Invalid arguments passed to %s().\n", __func__); > > This is a problem for the developer making use of the > ima_measure_critical_data() API and shouldn't be logged, IMO, because a > user/admin can do nothing about it. I think the error message should be > dropped. > >> + return; >> + } >> + >> + process_buffer_measurement(NULL, buf, buf_len, event_name, >> + CRITICAL_DATA, 0, NULL, >> + measure_buf_hash); >> +} >> + >> static int __init init_ima(void) >> { >> int error; >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c >> index 25419c7ff50b..2a0c0603626e 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c >> @@ -1251,6 +1251,8 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) >> else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) && >> strcmp(args[0].from, "KEY_CHECK") == 0) >> entry->func = KEY_CHECK; >> + else if (strcmp(args[0].from, "CRITICAL_DATA") == 0) >> + entry->func = CRITICAL_DATA; >> else >> result = -EINVAL; >> if (!result) > > This hunk and the above change to Documentation/ABI/testing/ima_policy > need to be moved to the next patch when you introduce the policy > changes. > Will do. ~Tushar > Tyler > >> -- >> 2.17.1 >> -- dm-devel mailing list dm-devel@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel