Return-Path: Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=pass (sender SPF authorized) smtp.mailfrom=gmail.com (client-ip=2607:f8b0:4864:20::22e; helo=mail-oi1-x22e.google.com; envelope-from=geissonator@gmail.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=gmail.com Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key; unprotected) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=20161025 header.b=lXUmBB6l; dkim-atps=neutral Received: from mail-oi1-x22e.google.com (mail-oi1-x22e.google.com [IPv6:2607:f8b0:4864:20::22e]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (2048 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 49MmjX3bY2zDqZW for ; Thu, 14 May 2020 06:38:55 +1000 (AEST) Received: by mail-oi1-x22e.google.com with SMTP id v128so5811400oia.7 for ; Wed, 13 May 2020 13:38:55 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references:to; bh=H/0PbLp0PCmOlm24Pq3sM187oq2XZfykdUWkDqhp0ZU=; b=lXUmBB6l77CTndV9uEbeVHVfyDE5Fy7W9g77dossXQUhWp+IfVkt8PoNedauMPO0r5 48foALWrOUX+rpyxit9uzrsQP3IqSjIERQcoXlJjglrsxrPq/e2hLkESFMBlOymKEjTH 7/TyNMUo6bJmFQekWIGSw6ILU2YgZ0U78JzTd4mCxW1wvbO6euV/Ya6SXvNGk6fudO0e 1EobxmDRg1MFegqnOuCKKtNjK4Ezl/3udID1EWHFVpIQ62xe1qUxYYuBOOqSowjfo7QS 3frw+3T8zCUQzF1tRC8JPLWyNblJ5jc7gsKI6XqRBTPYluDUdSis/LH7AGukm8og5JDf yL6g== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:mime-version:subject:from:in-reply-to:date:cc :content-transfer-encoding:message-id:references:to; bh=H/0PbLp0PCmOlm24Pq3sM187oq2XZfykdUWkDqhp0ZU=; b=bbqnOHuNWF3vup2Ygkz8tUAoPNLAFGOGmDeKza+y4dK0KOI5rthqu3Y2u/8o2V8gm1 TRDwnE1qwhFtKpDCtmtfU3Z6L2g0fRbzz0Ztj6WVrvWV+8y6up9AXhB0aSsLlDxhcA2D xIcIEtneA9rLaMC40w4G5VSjj84UmUZJERAWXFNETA09+mcRQzebKAwo23tT4Ckf2fTn q8q0Ehz0W5MCmfTDqkru79FAu8QocCGu9+1TRMcyNDFjN1BXvSanrjtE9WbdQst1ZtXw VFaE1X9Repb0aENHLlHeYfYnpUa+PNoX9yYQ7/W5Lkz90dA08Tu5GxcKD1XaYv6bfz5T zHCw== X-Gm-Message-State: AOAM530t9d+pHEXtVIl0A/RLUtv2MBiqMyvbfqjsGUeNA9kCZgssLLcp rLeiSaGaPSerVc/t3Y46nD1i2xt20Hc= X-Google-Smtp-Source: ABdhPJwgxYL88lt2zRWAct2cCBQeaTKkPuBcynyWAW+PcyW+drUWxgnYaDwb0UUPwBFAaFivHdqQVg== X-Received: by 2002:aca:4c56:: with SMTP id z83mr3997943oia.159.1589402332519; Wed, 13 May 2020 13:38:52 -0700 (PDT) Received: from andrews-mbp-2.attlocal.net ([2600:1700:19e0:3310:7f:8894:240f:4da1]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id r11sm6169489oib.47.2020.05.13.13.38.51 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Wed, 13 May 2020 13:38:51 -0700 (PDT) Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Mime-Version: 1.0 (Mac OS X Mail 13.4 \(3608.80.23.2.2\)) Subject: Re: Requirements for security audit logs? From: Andrew Geissler In-Reply-To: <87f78066-22d5-6f15-56a2-134388844a66@linux.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 13 May 2020 15:38:51 -0500 Cc: openbmc Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <4DD0C271-0081-4E9D-9733-F9DA101D7CF8@gmail.com> References: <87f78066-22d5-6f15-56a2-134388844a66@linux.ibm.com> To: Joseph Reynolds X-Mailer: Apple Mail (2.3608.80.23.2.2) X-BeenThere: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Development list for OpenBMC List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 13 May 2020 20:38:57 -0000 > On May 13, 2020, at 11:56 AM, Joseph Reynolds = wrote: >=20 > What are our requirements for Security Audit Logs? The main idea is = to add a new BMC logging service to hold security-relevant events. >=20 Def hoping we can work this into our audit design: https://github.com/openbmc/docs/blob/master/designs/phosphor-audit.md=20 I=E2=80=99m not sure how much progress has been made with implementation = but we spent a good chunk of time reviewing/discussing it and it seems to hit a lot of the items below. > Considerations: > - The log holds *only* security-relevant entries (and no irrelevant = entries). > - Consumed by a security auditor (currently the Administrator Role). = The log is likely to contain sensitive and possibly personal information = (such as IP addresses), so it must be protected from reading. Perhaps = only the admin can read this. > - Entries must be available, so the admin should not be able to delete = the log or any entries. > - Log can be held on BMC persistent storage (like flash) or streamed = off the BMC, just like any other log. > - Low-level design: any BMC service can write a security log entry = when it encounters a security-relevant event. (In addition to its = regular logging.) > + Note that security holes exist. I would like to keep these outside = the scope of this initial discussion except to note that examples shown = below ought to generate a security log entry. Examples: > +A: root SSH access can do whatever it wants to the security log > +B: factory reset clears the logs >=20 > Examples of security-relevant events: > Network: > - New connections via HTTPS (se BMCWeb below), SSH, use of the serial = line to access the BMC's shell, etc. > BMCWeb: > - All authentication attempts (login, basic auth, etc.) > - When accounts are locked out or reset > - Attempts to use REST APIs that require Administrator access. NOTE: = This covers a large number of functions and may overlap with services = provided by D-Bus daemons. Example: LDAP config, local user config. = Example: when an admin uses their authority to change a user account = password. > Services: > - Password changes (in phosphor-user-manager) > - BMC rebooting or power on > - Host state transitions > - Firmware update (BMC or host) > - BMC Factory reset >=20 > We can consider a more formal set of requirements given by NIST SP = 800-92: > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/NIST_Special_Publication_800-92 > with additional controls as specified by NIST SP 800-53. >=20 > - Joseph >=20 > This topic was previously discussed as agenda item 3 in the 2020-04-29 = Security Working Group results > = https://docs.google.com/document/d/1b7x9BaxsfcukQDqbvZsU2ehMq4xoJRQvLxxsDU= WmAOI >> 3. Requirements for security audit logs. Access, deleting, APIs. > There was general support for the ideas that the BMC should have = dedicated security audit log that could not be deleted or cleared. This = log would have only security-relevant events. >=20