From: Claudio Carvalho Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/4] Enabling secure boot on PowerNV systems Date: Tue, 2 Apr 2019 18:11:44 -0300 Message-ID: <4ce5e057-0702-b0d5-7bb2-cea5b22e2efa@linux.ibm.com> References: <20190402181505.25037-1-cclaudio@linux.ibm.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: Content-Language: en-US Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org To: Matthew Garrett Cc: linuxppc-dev@ozlabs.org, linux-efi , linux-integrity , Linux Kernel Mailing List , Michael Ellerman , Paul Mackerras , Benjamin Herrenschmidt , Ard Biesheuvel , Jeremy Kerr , Matthew Garret , Nayna Jain List-Id: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org On 4/2/19 4:36 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote: > On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 11:15 AM Claudio Carvalho wrote: >> 1. Enable efivarfs by selecting CONFIG_EFI in the CONFIG_OPAL_SECVAR >> introduced in this patch set. With CONFIG_EFIVAR_FS, userspace tools can >> be used to manage the secure variables. > efivarfs has some pretty significant behavioural semantics that > directly reflect the EFI specification. Using it to expose non-EFI > variable data feels like it's going to increase fragility - there's a > risk that we'll change things in a way that makes sense for the EFI > spec but breaks your use case. Is the desire to use efivarfs to > maintain consistency with existing userland tooling, or just to avoid > having a separate filesystem? > We want to use the efivarfs for compatibility with existing userspace tools. We will track and match any EFI changes that affect us. Our use case is restricted to secure boot - this is not going to be a general purpose EFI variable implementation. Claudio