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Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.10.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20201210221417.GF489768@sequoia> X-Mimecast-Impersonation-Protect: Policy=CLT - Impersonation Protection Definition; Similar Internal Domain=false; Similar Monitored External Domain=false; Custom External Domain=false; Mimecast External Domain=false; Newly Observed Domain=false; Internal User Name=false; Custom Display Name List=false; Reply-to Address Mismatch=false; Targeted Threat Dictionary=false; Mimecast Threat Dictionary=false; Custom Threat Dictionary=false X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.78 on 10.11.54.4 X-loop: dm-devel@redhat.com Cc: sashal@kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com, snitzer@redhat.com, selinux@vger.kernel.org, stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com, jmorris@namei.org, zohar@linux.ibm.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, casey@schaufler-ca.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, dm-devel@redhat.com, gmazyland@gmail.com, agk@redhat.com Subject: Re: [dm-devel] [PATCH v7 1/8] IMA: generalize keyring specific measurement constructs X-BeenThere: dm-devel@redhat.com X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: junk List-Id: device-mapper development List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: dm-devel-bounces@redhat.com Errors-To: dm-devel-bounces@redhat.com X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.15 Authentication-Results: relay.mimecast.com; auth=pass smtp.auth=CUSA124A263 smtp.mailfrom=dm-devel-bounces@redhat.com X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; Format="flowed" On 2020-12-10 2:14 p.m., Tyler Hicks wrote: > On 2020-12-09 11:42:05, Tushar Sugandhi wrote: >> IMA functions such as ima_match_keyring(), process_buffer_measurement(), >> ima_match_policy() etc. handle data specific to keyrings. Currently, >> these constructs are not generic to handle any func specific data. >> This makes it harder to extend them without code duplication. >> >> Refactor the keyring specific measurement constructs to be generic and >> reusable in other measurement scenarios. >> >> Signed-off-by: Tushar Sugandhi > > I've got a few code cleanup suggestions to ima_match_rule_data() below > but the current patch is fine: > > Reviewed-by: Tyler Hicks > >> --- >> security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 6 ++-- >> security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 6 ++-- >> security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 6 ++-- >> security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 49 ++++++++++++++++++----------- >> 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h >> index 8e8b1e3cb847..e5622ce8cbb1 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h >> @@ -256,7 +256,7 @@ static inline void ima_process_queued_keys(void) {} >> int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, >> int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr, >> struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, >> - const char *keyring); >> + const char *func_data); >> int ima_must_measure(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func); >> int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, >> struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, >> @@ -268,7 +268,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file, >> struct ima_template_desc *template_desc); >> void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, >> const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, >> - int pcr, const char *keyring); >> + int pcr, const char *func_data); >> void ima_audit_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, >> const unsigned char *filename); >> int ima_alloc_init_template(struct ima_event_data *event_data, >> @@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ const char *ima_d_path(const struct path *path, char **pathbuf, char *filename); >> int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, >> enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr, >> struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, >> - const char *keyring); >> + const char *func_data); >> void ima_init_policy(void); >> void ima_update_policy(void); >> void ima_update_policy_flag(void); >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c >> index 4f39fb93f278..af218babd198 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c >> @@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, >> * @func: caller identifier >> * @pcr: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets pcr= >> * @template_desc: pointer filled in if matched measure policy sets template= >> - * @keyring: keyring name used to determine the action >> + * @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL. >> * >> * The policy is defined in terms of keypairs: >> * subj=, obj=, type=, func=, mask=, fsmagic= >> @@ -186,14 +186,14 @@ void ima_add_violation(struct file *file, const unsigned char *filename, >> int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, >> int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr, >> struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, >> - const char *keyring) >> + const char *func_data) >> { >> int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH; >> >> flags &= ima_policy_flag; >> >> return ima_match_policy(inode, cred, secid, func, mask, flags, pcr, >> - template_desc, keyring); >> + template_desc, func_data); >> } >> >> /* >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c >> index 68956e884403..e76ef4bfd0f4 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c >> @@ -786,13 +786,13 @@ int ima_post_load_data(char *buf, loff_t size, >> * @eventname: event name to be used for the buffer entry. >> * @func: IMA hook >> * @pcr: pcr to extend the measurement >> - * @keyring: keyring name to determine the action to be performed >> + * @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL. >> * >> * Based on policy, the buffer is measured into the ima log. >> */ >> void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, >> const char *eventname, enum ima_hooks func, >> - int pcr, const char *keyring) >> + int pcr, const char *func_data) >> { >> int ret = 0; >> const char *audit_cause = "ENOMEM"; >> @@ -831,7 +831,7 @@ void process_buffer_measurement(struct inode *inode, const void *buf, int size, >> if (func) { >> security_task_getsecid(current, &secid); >> action = ima_get_action(inode, current_cred(), secid, 0, func, >> - &pcr, &template, keyring); >> + &pcr, &template, func_data); >> if (!(action & IMA_MEASURE)) >> return; >> } >> diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c >> index 823a0c1379cb..25419c7ff50b 100644 >> --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c >> +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c >> @@ -453,30 +453,44 @@ int ima_lsm_policy_change(struct notifier_block *nb, unsigned long event, >> } >> >> /** >> - * ima_match_keyring - determine whether the keyring matches the measure rule >> - * @rule: a pointer to a rule >> - * @keyring: name of the keyring to match against the measure rule >> + * ima_match_rule_data - determine whether the given func_data matches >> + * the measure rule data >> + * @rule: IMA policy rule >> + * @func_data: data to match against the measure rule data >> * @cred: a pointer to a credentials structure for user validation >> * >> - * Returns true if keyring matches one in the rule, false otherwise. >> + * Returns true if func_data matches one in the rule, false otherwise. >> */ >> -static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, >> - const char *keyring, const struct cred *cred) >> +static bool ima_match_rule_data(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, >> + const char *func_data, >> + const struct cred *cred) >> { >> + const struct ima_rule_opt_list *opt_list = NULL; >> bool matched = false; >> size_t i; >> >> if ((rule->flags & IMA_UID) && !rule->uid_op(cred->uid, rule->uid)) >> return false; >> >> - if (!rule->keyrings) >> - return true; >> + switch (rule->func) { >> + case KEY_CHECK: >> + if (!rule->keyrings) >> + return true; >> + else >> + opt_list = rule->keyrings; > > You return if rule->keyrings is NULL so drop this else and simply make > the opt_list assignment. > Will do. >> + break; >> + default: >> + break; > > I would like to see the 'return false;' happen immediately here instead > of waiting for the opt_list check below. Will do. > >> + } >> >> - if (!keyring) >> + if (!func_data) >> + return false; >> + >> + if (!opt_list) >> return false; > > If you return false in the 'default:' case above, you can just remove this > entire conditional because you'll be assigning opt_list in all of the > valid cases of the switch statement. > Yup. Agreed. Will do. ~Tushar > Tyler > >> >> - for (i = 0; i < rule->keyrings->count; i++) { >> - if (!strcmp(rule->keyrings->items[i], keyring)) { >> + for (i = 0; i < opt_list->count; i++) { >> + if (!strcmp(opt_list->items[i], func_data)) { >> matched = true; >> break; >> } >> @@ -493,20 +507,20 @@ static bool ima_match_keyring(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, >> * @secid: the secid of the task to be validated >> * @func: LIM hook identifier >> * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) >> - * @keyring: keyring name to check in policy for KEY_CHECK func >> + * @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL. >> * >> * Returns true on rule match, false on failure. >> */ >> static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode, >> const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, >> enum ima_hooks func, int mask, >> - const char *keyring) >> + const char *func_data) >> { >> int i; >> >> if (func == KEY_CHECK) { >> return (rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && (rule->func == func) && >> - ima_match_keyring(rule, keyring, cred); >> + ima_match_rule_data(rule, func_data, cred); >> } >> if ((rule->flags & IMA_FUNC) && >> (rule->func != func && func != POST_SETATTR)) >> @@ -610,8 +624,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) >> * @mask: requested action (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND | MAY_EXEC) >> * @pcr: set the pcr to extend >> * @template_desc: the template that should be used for this rule >> - * @keyring: the keyring name, if given, to be used to check in the policy. >> - * keyring can be NULL if func is anything other than KEY_CHECK. >> + * @func_data: private data specific to @func, can be NULL. >> * >> * Measure decision based on func/mask/fsmagic and LSM(subj/obj/type) >> * conditions. >> @@ -623,7 +636,7 @@ static int get_subaction(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, enum ima_hooks func) >> int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, >> enum ima_hooks func, int mask, int flags, int *pcr, >> struct ima_template_desc **template_desc, >> - const char *keyring) >> + const char *func_data) >> { >> struct ima_rule_entry *entry; >> int action = 0, actmask = flags | (flags << 1); >> @@ -638,7 +651,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, const struct cred *cred, u32 secid, >> continue; >> >> if (!ima_match_rules(entry, inode, cred, secid, func, mask, >> - keyring)) >> + func_data)) >> continue; >> >> action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS; >> -- >> 2.17.1 >> -- dm-devel mailing list dm-devel@redhat.com https://www.redhat.com/mailman/listinfo/dm-devel