Message-ID: <52875C1E.5030202@...1847...> Date: Sat, 16 Nov 2013 12:50:54 +0100 From: Andre Valentin MIME-Version: 1.0 References: <1383163946-24298-1-git-send-email-avalentin@...1847...> In-Reply-To: Subject: Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH] Floating: Add support for floating in TLS mode (upd.) List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable To: openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Hi! On 15.11.2013 16:49, Heikki Hannikainen wrote: > Nov 15 15:18:01 gw ovpn-udp[9964]: hessu/85.188.36.24.36:58640 MULTI: > Floated with HMAC authentication to a new client address: > [AF_INET]85.188.36.24.36:58640 > > In this case the client's source port changed, because the client is > behind a NAT device, and the client didn't have traffic within 60 > seconds (the NAT device's UDP session timeout). Without this patch > --float does not have any effect on the multi-client tls-server setup, > and after a 60-second break in traffic the session is dead (until > keepalive ping timeout and reconnection). I'd like to use a large > keepalive timer, since on mobile devices a 29-second keepalive tends > to drain the battery. That's why I'm using 60s ping from device, and 30s from gateway. This seems to work with most gateways. But I have a big ping-restart to prevent openvpn to go into expensive "reconnect mode". > > I think, however, there might be a problem with the patch: When a > packet is received from a srcip-srcport which does not belong to any > current client, it goes and scans through the whole client list, > calculating a HMAC for the packet contents using the HMAC key of each > and every client, effectively looking for a match in HMAC keys. An > attacker could transmit large packets with random source IP addresses > to a server which has a large number of clients (think 2000 or > something? how large client loads are people having, anyway?), and > cause extra CPU load, maybe enough to DOS the server with a smallish > packet rate. In April/May another developer also created a patch and made some performance tests. He got about 700k packets/sec. This seems fast good and would make an attack quite expensive. > > On the other hand, it is commonly quite easy to DOS servers by sheer > packet/data volume... but we shouldn't make it any easier with new > developments. If a normal connection would be pretended by a DOS attack, this is going to be more a problem because it eats more CPU, I think. [DH i.e.] > > The more elegant way would be to have a session ID in each data > packet, which would used to look up the client, and then a single HMAC > calculation would tell if the packet is from that client. No need for > scanning. That session ID could be used even for every packet instead > of looking at the client IP address+port at all initially (well, for > sending any following packets you'd use the peer's latest source > address). > > Putting a session ID in the data packet would require changing the > on-the-wire data packet format, and make the packets a bit larger. The > ID doesn't have to be very large, though, since it's not secret or > used for keying, just an integer large enough to index the maximum > number of VPN clients on a single server. This would require a new > protocol version, backward compatibility and all that work. I also thought about this. But if it is not backwards compatible, it won't be used. Perhaps as a second, more secure implementation would be a good idea when openvpn is multithreaded and can handle thousands of connections. BTW, the patch is not final. I'm just testing a enhanced version. It seems in this version is a seg fault problem. Andr=C3=A9