Message-ID: <530F9C6F.2080808@tycho.nsa.gov> Date: Thu, 27 Feb 2014 15:13:35 -0500 From: Stephen Smalley MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Paul Moore , selinux@tycho.nsa.gov Subject: Re: [PATCH] selinux: put the mmap() DAC controls before the MAC controls References: <20140227143045.14242.66994.stgit@localhost> In-Reply-To: <20140227143045.14242.66994.stgit@localhost> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Cc: casey.schaufler@intel.com List-Id: "Security-Enhanced Linux \(SELinux\) mailing list" List-Post: List-Help: On 02/27/2014 09:30 AM, Paul Moore wrote: > It turns out that doing the SELinux MAC checks for mmap() before the > DAC checks was causing users and the SELinux policy folks headaches > as users were seeing a lot of SELinux AVC denials for the > memprotect:mmap_zero permission that would have also been denied by > the normal DAC capability checks (CAP_SYS_RAWIO). > > Example: > > # cat mmap_test.c > #include > #include > #include > #include > > int main(int argc, char *argv[]) > { > int rc; > void *mem; > > mem = mmap(0x0, 4096, > PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, > MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_FIXED, -1, 0); > if (mem == MAP_FAILED) > return errno; > printf("mem = %p\n", mem); > munmap(mem, 4096); > > return 0; > } > # gcc -g -O0 -o mmap_test mmap_test.c > # ./mmap_test > mem = (nil) > # ausearch -m AVC | grep mmap_zero > type=AVC msg=audit(...): avc: denied { mmap_zero } > for pid=1025 comm="mmap_test" > scontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 > tcontext=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 > tclass=memprotect > > This patch corrects things so that when the above example is run by a > user without CAP_SYS_RAWIO the SELinux AVC is no longer generated as > the DAC capability check fails before the SELinux permission check. > > Signed-off-by: Paul Moore Acked-by: Stephen Smalley > --- > security/selinux/hooks.c | 20 ++++++++------------ > 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c > index 57b0b49..e3664ae 100644 > --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c > +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c > @@ -3205,24 +3205,20 @@ error: > > static int selinux_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) > { > - int rc = 0; > - u32 sid = current_sid(); > + int rc; > + > + /* do DAC check on address space usage */ > + rc = cap_mmap_addr(addr); > + if (rc) > + return rc; > > - /* > - * notice that we are intentionally putting the SELinux check before > - * the secondary cap_file_mmap check. This is such a likely attempt > - * at bad behaviour/exploit that we always want to get the AVC, even > - * if DAC would have also denied the operation. > - */ > if (addr < CONFIG_LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR) { > + u32 sid = current_sid(); > rc = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_MEMPROTECT, > MEMPROTECT__MMAP_ZERO, NULL); > - if (rc) > - return rc; > } > > - /* do DAC check on address space usage */ > - return cap_mmap_addr(addr); > + return rc; > } > > static int selinux_mmap_file(struct file *file, unsigned long reqprot, > > _______________________________________________ > Selinux mailing list > Selinux@tycho.nsa.gov > To unsubscribe, send email to Selinux-leave@tycho.nsa.gov. > To get help, send an email containing "help" to Selinux-request@tycho.nsa.gov. > >