Return-Path: Received: from mail-pg1-f196.google.com (mail-pg1-f196.google.com [209.85.215.196]) by mail.openembedded.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C47B9794EC for ; Mon, 24 Sep 2018 22:14:04 +0000 (UTC) Received: by mail-pg1-f196.google.com with SMTP id r77-v6so4803047pgr.5 for ; Mon, 24 Sep 2018 15:14:06 -0700 (PDT) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20161025; h=subject:to:references:from:openpgp:autocrypt:message-id:date :user-agent:mime-version:in-reply-to:content-transfer-encoding :content-language; bh=agYrMHxcTG/NDP7JXeBCcwjew0fwozzjRiTe1I8LBiI=; b=PpWxpWsK4ZhUPPJYYSY+eit7/8O5NrvsKkp4ZlG7FMRLpWcPrGATgSSBbArVHZA+r1 0TXdbhtJ+YTUhyv+hf3b/8+07OVmt27olu1zlSA+7KOWwG4++UrhosOeH3E6HkMZROwl Noja7fjgIy6oD3iQ9zAjKAu5/e8s0k5D68lhpIwLN0kZSrmJs0N9LBfGo8w/jEw3Cv7L 5S4lZ7ynFcKO8j5DPzaq/H+rIHN1VR39gBcknMNl0AF2hFsEai8goAksP5m3yjVEqjKv vC1/PCao7VTFWyrlimSZbPyHAg3uwUyPib5kLJAlcyWjHju0gbDrGEe8SatAZWTHb2PI pUmQ== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20161025; h=x-gm-message-state:subject:to:references:from:openpgp:autocrypt :message-id:date:user-agent:mime-version:in-reply-to :content-transfer-encoding:content-language; bh=agYrMHxcTG/NDP7JXeBCcwjew0fwozzjRiTe1I8LBiI=; b=IDmXOr3YykreFIUuinz+jRsp37NqwyXqxo9skg326seXsxH2jdRHU0Nad/gzMmLxCj cQnXs2sBqV0YIEStYvBkMuotIaI9zC8V+GKhfzYMYpOGixApVceKP3ltTmB44POeimbQ BSCyNDH+84d9u/dL8jizVn3I/qeyesq5olRizQlDm6TrN3nj+4qy0b8QyEF9wG0gpzrk Z8u90OQhMbXKKr7olm3JGuMPOHIuRjMkiVVPhLnnmjPHq351XOJqd7cb1u+l6BTQk8TT Yw+a6OdM+goYJL4UzTS9JwnsYDfN1qhJHNs/rq9b96K40SXmagVKgIzED9dVqrYR9dGX SAnw== X-Gm-Message-State: ABuFfojlx39KYZ1y4vg1X1q9PocsOAaRM04RYW5CSEUgS95VbQArPC48 u4eh8ptw9idLibf/tT6hqxNGKcX/ X-Google-Smtp-Source: ACcGV627ACoUtjOOwQceCcXzBgJU8YgJk4VjaqNoeD0TMN83VVmVThTMq2s9kRkqS44AxvrByxWinQ== X-Received: by 2002:a62:d152:: with SMTP id t18-v6mr686424pfl.98.1537827245541; Mon, 24 Sep 2018 15:14:05 -0700 (PDT) Received: from ?IPv6:2601:202:4180:c33:6924:aad7:81c1:2e32? ([2601:202:4180:c33:6924:aad7:81c1:2e32]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id g11-v6sm322651pgi.90.2018.09.24.15.14.04 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 bits=128/128); Mon, 24 Sep 2018 15:14:04 -0700 (PDT) To: Sinan Kaya , openembedded-devel@lists.openembedded.org References: <20180924192102.25124-1-okaya@kernel.org> From: akuster808 Openpgp: preference=signencrypt Autocrypt: addr=akuster808@gmail.com; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata= xsFNBFnlUP4BEADpKf+FQdLykenQXKk8i6xJNxDow+ypFeVAy8iFJp7Dsev+BtwUFo8VG7hx Jmd71vHMw+coBetWC3lk+IKjX815Ox0puYXQVRRtI+yMCgd6ib3oGxoQ8tCMwhf9c9/aKjaz mP97lWgGHbiEVsDpjzmMZGlJ6pDVZzxykkJExKaosE46AcA8KvfhRQg5zRyYBtinzs8Zu8AP aquZVHNXxPwjKPaSEEYqQjFeiNgFTavV+AhM2dmPmGUWCX9RZisrqA4slGwEB0srMdFf12Zg mD35Y9jZ80qpu5LPtJCFcsaAlebqR+dg36pIpiRR+olhN1wmC6LYP1vw6uMEYBjkTa2Rnb6+ C4FDzCJD4UCrUvLMNeTW810DY0bjMMj3SfmSGSfQUssaaaTXCVlLGuGxyCr/kza1rHaXMKum Ek4EFj1fyn7AfkSLEHfJfY4sO1tpgigvs4eD/4ZSQEXSu/TjVvyKx4EvUbhlGMRyH2CPwD/H 7DFF8tcVtJvCwUUW+zKtjxjSSLrhniNMXAOQJZ6CdaqCe4OyJQT5aRdr+FWbBRjpaRCCf5nf dTc88NMU9PrBT3vu0QJ5WNPO6MJpnb+d8iMNLZAz8tv8JMm2l+sMcNKSJ6lhX8peoBsfMVqc FgiykEO0fUt7DCbUYR5tLjM/3E5tHvTjMooVJyOxoufVLYtTtQARAQABzSFha3VzdGVyODA4 IDxha3VzdGVyODA4QGdtYWlsLmNvbT7CwX0EEwEIACcFAlnlUP4CGyMFCQlmAYAFCwkIBwIG FQgJCgsCBBYCAwECHgECF4AACgkQ7ou0mfRW5/kuhRAAlR2FTq5572jrX5nnPR7AqI2bvSVb vqGLlvv739WhghvagbC+tu05QguopAhWW1/DcHK2+QtfIoC9UZrSW4RaO0CCo5sPjqK7l1KT ngWX/rGjF6xTF2QN0U/btcpMyVN2CNtVLwsDF9e+GHKoUcnFkP+JP8vHGokN9k6E/c97hLaL IJPeKl8LZXc2Efk+MaW1NXkfDJdcp/p+voajbihSQO6OZ/o+x9d2I3ZybKfTZ71+ek5Hxzjz g6KkMOI7KJjlmBlrQFAtVbS+CFAKrwkYznE6ggkcmGv3N7DeUBTUR78hf+EZEAM+ajeLMtrG rXE00pIb+gLGYPZxba5pCdQ+qWUW38qi9UnIRPm6fq7Ypx1r6XwJvbgCOkhbxo3D4YUdyC0b FE9lgrg8htbc9in4j2+hVI6ALswNjLprzXdzdKrd+T3Egx36o3Z/qrYsW2o5/A5sVvvASVKi wRPuEKhEhfmiHUPLvuKqhMoymHaz3fg5D2Q8G0gSDkLgeEpAjiWqf4+AGLx+MSDai7DSOsmI t61kWxs7cFTB32UrB/TDoVNn3Fm88ZFQpA/bngikE9jgEm045mSY86fNlbFj2mcCd0Ha1i1n aYc97RpgfjNMWyHDVHOGrNg/hJjkGa5RsAXkfyBwltHRw0Hj4urUQ3rr8um8PLe43SezPwXA oRoyDxDOwU0EWeVQ/gEQALNHwj5VSPdnvXy1RXUuH+rclMx4x8zaqDyY0YqHfA7b/d8Y0VAt Y6YpzDeFTwD8A0Wfb7kZ2mlDIE6ODCB71uT/E3C6b+FiiN+lgzslznjUW+9l8ddDhRrC8HMG 37vrXF5h++PTXUKEKUlkDib1w093tu3mlJXUvIAzl8CEHkptF6Br0L9XxFwuWoNUfjT9IorQ 0SVIhvq5PhVAITXUD5fD7/N8B4TYegmHFRo1UaaKSnSHwlJJkzKpeWOH8QTYrP0RHxX86Obv IZuwbAo3F3oojcvLJt9NxWnbEmEALkleklLZnukgu7q5Wp1VDwhUbMFTLb6qmnBa/Xi30uOk 0l1TMHDbeQswvQDOZBAMukSRqyBetKxQ3iTfZ/3z1ubQRcVDbVlMDScSHQq0LK3F9yMOMM/6 0QPqJjl13xn/+Bn7WJiAIXXwzAV7uo6i0khFfjDtCDQ40aeffqOLxp1yMLkc3EKJGcQ5F6O2 ycEf4QXCYUbMXjxB0EJB8y7z+xOi5Mmd/pPlVmZ2gQK84NAL90p7n7jRlyf3gOUY+JOl4c5e UFiIhOzmuqNrvPOiZ02GXh6SGUU5y7IgSoIKvXSFgHAn2OG/tcspBmkyv6IuNVpmbmEgYn4I Rnt40UXVQkxTh0dENFhk2cjunMYozV/OqYCgmZLFSeJd8kAo4yn+yOtNABEBAAHCwWUEGAEI AA8FAlnlUP4CGwwFCQlmAYAACgkQ7ou0mfRW5/nNcg//R63cbOS6zLtvdnPub3Ssp1Ft8Wmv mni+kccuNApuDV7d63QckYxjAfUv2zYMLpbh87gVbLyCq9ASn552EbfRhTvHdk44CgbHBVcI ZBEdZWgRR5ViJakQSYHpP2e5AGNFnx9gSIuRTaa5rvZM+4xeoZ2vJiq93TtaYPr7UFNfK+c4 vv4C66lkt9l95/I10eSc3RqbOKZW47emlg4X3ygEoB9k2lPrpspyf6sUuSEi0WrlSxoLAr6p JG8rTUErYNeXe6JCdL31odDx1Dh5sdKIj2RicUYZNilxu9f1M7jZwf2ra1FGAlKj2ybqmgpZ EFteaiCinEYsvDyZyOiWHjAFI+RZIPQQL3AnVp4l7wYD3r9hnqYPww0slyMDcb9262RoFkHq dDwxPYarrNjWUpOzxB6bFxOgNRdCTgvQl8Ftk8a/yXB6vHeUSm1vPFCBxQPZytyfOLhEWm0J /mkVL0Z6iRK3p1LKnpLYCS4/esL2u7RrhPyCs2SsL58YcQF/g+PpeT9geZ+oyZ/4IQ+TWJoU PNHndk8VBTpzrmOaJxrebNL/W6C8JCmbLM11TAUMmHYi9JDytN8Au78hWpDbIdKwg1LeSxpw ZZD/OqOc0DBvHOpQhzkSrtR1lVlDV/+9E8J1T4uDhrGmZwYV+4xQetypHax8aAHisYbjXdVa 8CS2NxU= Message-ID: <55cc8cec-c2b6-e647-8d40-32c9fe6ac725@gmail.com> Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2018 15:14:03 -0700 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.9.1 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20180924192102.25124-1-okaya@kernel.org> Subject: Re: [sumo] [meta-networking] [PATCH v1] dnsmasq: CVE-2017-15107 X-BeenThere: openembedded-devel@lists.openembedded.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Using the OpenEmbedded metadata to build Distributions List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 24 Sep 2018 22:14:04 -0000 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Language: en-US Sinan, Changes for meta-openembedded should be sent to " openembedded-devel@lists.openembedded.org " I went ahead and pulled this in. On 09/24/2018 12:21 PM, Sinan Kaya wrote: > * CVE-2017-15107 > A vulnerability was found in Dnsmasq's implementation of DNSSEC. > Wildcard synthesized NSEC records could be improperly interpreted > to prove the non-existence of hostnames that actually exist. > > Affects dnsmasq <=3D 2.78 Thanks for adding the above. > > CVE: CVE-2017-15107 > Ref: https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2017-15107 > Signed-off-by: Sinan Kaya > --- > .../recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq_2.78.bb | 1 + > .../dnsmasq/files/CVE-2017-15107.patch | 262 ++++++++++++++++++= > 2 files changed, 263 insertions(+) > create mode 100644 meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/files/CVE-2= 017-15107.patch > > diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq_2.78.bb b/= meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq_2.78.bb > index 4d1dc6e69..d2465f82d 100644 > --- a/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq_2.78.bb > +++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/dnsmasq_2.78.bb > @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ require dnsmasq.inc > =20 > SRC_URI +=3D "\ > file://lua.patch \ > + file://CVE-2017-15107.patch \ > " > =20 > SRC_URI[dnsmasq-2.78.md5sum] =3D "3bb97f264c73853f802bf70610150788" > diff --git a/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/files/CVE-2017-151= 07.patch b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/files/CVE-2017-15107.p= atch > new file mode 100644 > index 000000000..da2af56cf > --- /dev/null > +++ b/meta-networking/recipes-support/dnsmasq/files/CVE-2017-15107.patc= h > @@ -0,0 +1,262 @@ > +From 5a56e1b78a753d3295564daddc9ce389cc69fd68 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001= > +From: Simon Kelley > +Date: Fri, 19 Jan 2018 12:26:08 +0000 > +Subject: [PATCH] DNSSEC fix for wildcard NSEC records. CVE-2017-15107 = applies. > + > +It's OK for NSEC records to be expanded from wildcards, > +but in that case, the proof of non-existence is only valid > +starting at the wildcard name, *. NOT the name expanded > +from the wildcard. Without this check it's possible for an > +attacker to craft an NSEC which wrongly proves non-existence > +in a domain which includes a wildcard for NSEC. > + > +Upstream-Status: Backport [http://thekelleys.org.uk/gitweb/?p=3Ddnsmas= q.git;a=3Dcommit;h=3D4fe6744a220eddd3f1749b40cac3dfc510787de6] Missing the CVE tag in the patch; CVE:=C2=A0 CVE-2017-15107 I just added it and have it in my test branch thanks Armin > +Signed-off-by: Sinan Kaya > +--- > + CHANGELOG | 44 +++++++++++++++++++ > + src/dnssec.c | 117 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----= - > + 2 files changed, 147 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) > + > +diff --git a/CHANGELOG b/CHANGELOG > +index 075fe1a6..5226dce8 100644 > +--- a/CHANGELOG > ++++ b/CHANGELOG > +@@ -1,3 +1,47 @@ > ++version 2.79 > ++ Fix parsing of CNAME arguments, which are confused by extra spaces. > ++ Thanks to Diego Aguirre for spotting the bug. > ++ > ++ Where available, use IP_UNICAST_IF or IPV6_UNICAST_IF to bind > ++ upstream servers to an interface, rather than SO_BINDTODEVICE. > ++ Thanks to Beniamino Galvani for the patch. > ++ > ++ Always return a SERVFAIL answer to DNS queries without the > ++ recursion desired bit set, UNLESS acting as an authoritative > ++ DNS server. This avoids a potential route to cache snooping. > ++ > ++ Add support for Ed25519 signatures in DNSSEC validation. > ++ > ++ No longer support RSA/MD5 signatures in DNSSEC validation, > ++ since these are not secure. This behaviour is mandated in > ++ RFC-6944. > ++ > ++ Fix incorrect error exit code from dhcp_release6 utility. > ++ Thanks Gaudenz Steinlin for the bug report. > ++ > ++ Use SIGINT (instead of overloading SIGHUP) to turn on DNSSEC > ++ time validation when --dnssec-no-timecheck is in use. > ++ Note that this is an incompatible change from earlier releases. > ++ > ++ Allow more than one --bridge-interface option to refer to an > ++ interface, so that we can use > ++ --bridge-interface=3Dint1,alias1 > ++ --bridge-interface=3Dint1,alias2 > ++ as an alternative to > ++ --bridge-interface=3Dint1,alias1,alias2 > ++ Thanks to Neil Jerram for work on this. > ++ > ++ Fix for DNSSEC with wildcard-derived NSEC records. > ++ It's OK for NSEC records to be expanded from wildcards, > ++ but in that case, the proof of non-existence is only valid > ++ starting at the wildcard name, *. NOT the name expanded > ++ from the wildcard. Without this check it's possible for an > ++ attacker to craft an NSEC which wrongly proves non-existence. > ++ Thanks to Ralph Dolmans for finding this, and co-ordinating=20 > ++ the vulnerability tracking and fix release. > ++ CVE-2017-15107 applies. > ++ > ++ > + version 2.78 > + Fix logic of appending "." to PXE basename. Thanks to = Chris > + Novakovic for the patch. > +diff --git a/src/dnssec.c b/src/dnssec.c > +index a74d01ab..1417be56 100644 > +--- a/src/dnssec.c > ++++ b/src/dnssec.c > +@@ -424,15 +424,17 @@ static void from_wire(char *name) > + static int count_labels(char *name) > + { > + int i; > +- > ++ char *p; > ++ =20 > + if (*name =3D=3D 0) > + return 0; > +=20 > +- for (i =3D 0; *name; name++) > +- if (*name =3D=3D '.') > ++ for (p =3D name, i =3D 0; *p; p++) > ++ if (*p =3D=3D '.') > + i++; > +=20 > +- return i+1; > ++ /* Don't count empty first label. */ > ++ return *name =3D=3D '.' ? i : i+1; > + } > +=20 > + /* Implement RFC1982 wrapped compare for 32-bit numbers */ > +@@ -1405,8 +1407,8 @@ static int hostname_cmp(const char *a, const cha= r *b) > + } > + } > +=20 > +-static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header, size_t= plen, unsigned char **nsecs, int nsec_count, > +- char *workspace1, char *workspace2, char *name, int type, int= *nons) > ++static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_header *header, size_t= plen, unsigned char **nsecs, unsigned char **labels, int nsec_count, > ++ char *workspace1_in, char *workspace2, char *name, int type, = int *nons) > + { > + int i, rc, rdlen; > + unsigned char *p, *psave; > +@@ -1419,6 +1421,9 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_h= eader *header, size_t plen, unsi > + /* Find NSEC record that proves name doesn't exist */ > + for (i =3D 0; i < nsec_count; i++) > + { > ++ char *workspace1 =3D workspace1_in; > ++ int sig_labels, name_labels; > ++ > + p =3D nsecs[i]; > + if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace1, 1, 10)) > + return 0; > +@@ -1427,7 +1432,27 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec(struct dns_= header *header, size_t plen, unsi > + psave =3D p; > + if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, workspace2, 1, 10)) > + return 0; > +- =20 > ++ > ++ /* If NSEC comes from wildcard expansion, use original wildcard= > ++ as name for computation. */ > ++ sig_labels =3D *labels[i]; > ++ name_labels =3D count_labels(workspace1); > ++ > ++ if (sig_labels < name_labels) > ++ { > ++ int k; > ++ for (k =3D name_labels - sig_labels; k !=3D 0; k--) > ++ { > ++ while (*workspace1 !=3D '.' && *workspace1 !=3D 0) > ++ workspace1++; > ++ if (k !=3D 1 && *workspace1 =3D=3D '.') > ++ workspace1++; > ++ } > ++ =20 > ++ workspace1--; > ++ *workspace1 =3D '*'; > ++ } > ++ =20 > + rc =3D hostname_cmp(workspace1, name); > + =20 > + if (rc =3D=3D 0) > +@@ -1825,24 +1850,26 @@ static int prove_non_existence_nsec3(struct dn= s_header *header, size_t plen, uns > +=20 > + static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header *header, size_t plen= , char *keyname, char *name, int qtype, int qclass, char *wildname, int *= nons) > + { > +- static unsigned char **nsecset =3D NULL; > +- static int nsecset_sz =3D 0; > ++ static unsigned char **nsecset =3D NULL, **rrsig_labels =3D NULL; > ++ static int nsecset_sz =3D 0, rrsig_labels_sz =3D 0; > + =20 > + int type_found =3D 0; > +- unsigned char *p =3D skip_questions(header, plen); > ++ unsigned char *auth_start, *p =3D skip_questions(header, plen); > + int type, class, rdlen, i, nsecs_found; > + =20 > + /* Move to NS section */ > + if (!p || !(p =3D skip_section(p, ntohs(header->ancount), header, p= len))) > + return 0; > ++ > ++ auth_start =3D p; > + =20 > + for (nsecs_found =3D 0, i =3D ntohs(header->nscount); i !=3D 0; i--= ) > + { > + unsigned char *pstart =3D p; > + =20 > +- if (!(p =3D skip_name(p, header, plen, 10))) > ++ if (!extract_name(header, plen, &p, daemon->workspacename, 1, 1= 0)) > + return 0; > +- =20 > ++ =20 > + GETSHORT(type, p);=20 > + GETSHORT(class, p); > + p +=3D 4; /* TTL */ > +@@ -1859,7 +1886,69 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_heade= r *header, size_t plen, char *key > + if (!expand_workspace(&nsecset, &nsecset_sz, nsecs_found)) > + return 0;=20 > + =20 > +- nsecset[nsecs_found++] =3D pstart; > ++ if (type =3D=3D T_NSEC) > ++ { > ++ /* If we're looking for NSECs, find the corresponding SIGs, to= =20 > ++ extract the labels value, which we need in case the NSECs > ++ are the result of wildcard expansion. > ++ Note that the NSEC may not have been validated yet > ++ so if there are multiple SIGs, make sure the label value > ++ is the same in all, to avoid be duped by a rogue one. > ++ If there are no SIGs, that's an error */ > ++ unsigned char *p1 =3D auth_start; > ++ int res, j, rdlen1, type1, class1; > ++ =20 > ++ if (!expand_workspace(&rrsig_labels, &rrsig_labels_sz, nsecs_f= ound)) > ++ return 0; > ++ =20 > ++ rrsig_labels[nsecs_found] =3D NULL; > ++ =20 > ++ for (j =3D ntohs(header->nscount); j !=3D 0; j--) > ++ { > ++ if (!(res =3D extract_name(header, plen, &p1, daemon->workspacena= me, 0, 10))) > ++ return 0; > ++ > ++ GETSHORT(type1, p1);=20 > ++ GETSHORT(class1, p1); > ++ p1 +=3D 4; /* TTL */ > ++ GETSHORT(rdlen1, p1); > ++ > ++ if (!CHECK_LEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen1)) > ++ return 0; > ++ =20 > ++ if (res =3D=3D 1 && class1 =3D=3D qclass && type1 =3D=3D T_RRSIG= ) > ++ { > ++ int type_covered; > ++ unsigned char *psav =3D p1; > ++ =20 > ++ if (rdlen < 18) > ++ return 0; /* bad packet */ > ++ > ++ GETSHORT(type_covered, p1); > ++ > ++ if (type_covered =3D=3D T_NSEC) > ++ { > ++ p1++; /* algo */ > ++ =20 > ++ /* labels field must be the same in every SIG we find. */ > ++ if (!rrsig_labels[nsecs_found]) > ++ rrsig_labels[nsecs_found] =3D p1; > ++ else if (*rrsig_labels[nsecs_found] !=3D *p1) /* algo */ > ++ return 0; > ++ } > ++ p1 =3D psav; > ++ } > ++ =20 > ++ if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p1, plen, rdlen1)) > ++ return 0; > ++ } > ++ > ++ /* Must have found at least one sig. */ > ++ if (!rrsig_labels[nsecs_found]) > ++ return 0; > ++ } > ++ > ++ nsecset[nsecs_found++] =3D pstart; =20 > + } > + =20 > + if (!ADD_RDLEN(header, p, plen, rdlen)) > +@@ -1867,7 +1956,7 @@ static int prove_non_existence(struct dns_header= *header, size_t plen, char *key > + } > + =20 > + if (type_found =3D=3D T_NSEC) > +- return prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecset, nsecs_foun= d, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, nons); > ++ return prove_non_existence_nsec(header, plen, nsecset, rrsig_labe= ls, nsecs_found, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, nons); > + else if (type_found =3D=3D T_NSEC3) > + return prove_non_existence_nsec3(header, plen, nsecset, nsecs_fou= nd, daemon->workspacename, keyname, name, qtype, wildname, nons); > + else > +--=20 > +2.19.0 > +