Return-Path: Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=pass (sender SPF authorized) smtp.mailfrom=linux.ibm.com (client-ip=148.163.158.5; helo=mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com; envelope-from=jrey@linux.ibm.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.ibm.com Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.158.5]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 492Wbr11DgzDr7p for ; Thu, 16 Apr 2020 04:49:11 +1000 (AEST) Received: from pps.filterd (m0098421.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.42/8.16.0.42) with SMTP id 03FIYC3c015274 for ; Wed, 15 Apr 2020 14:49:08 -0400 Received: from ppma05wdc.us.ibm.com (1b.90.2fa9.ip4.static.sl-reverse.com [169.47.144.27]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 30dnmj7h14-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Wed, 15 Apr 2020 14:49:08 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (ppma05wdc.us.ibm.com [127.0.0.1]) by ppma05wdc.us.ibm.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id 03FIlrDm008174 for ; Wed, 15 Apr 2020 18:49:07 GMT Received: from b03cxnp08026.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03cxnp08026.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.18]) by ppma05wdc.us.ibm.com with ESMTP id 30b5h73yuy-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Wed, 15 Apr 2020 18:49:07 +0000 Received: from b03ledav003.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav003.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.234]) by b03cxnp08026.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id 03FIn6xg40567110 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK) for ; Wed, 15 Apr 2020 18:49:06 GMT Received: from b03ledav003.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9910E6A04D for ; Wed, 15 Apr 2020 18:49:06 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b03ledav003.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 48CFA6A047 for ; Wed, 15 Apr 2020 18:49:06 +0000 (GMT) Received: from demeter.roc.mn.charter.com (unknown [9.85.154.32]) by b03ledav003.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS for ; Wed, 15 Apr 2020 18:49:06 +0000 (GMT) Subject: Re: Security Working Group meeting - Wednesday April 15 - results From: Joseph Reynolds To: openbmc References: <09f2f613-76d4-c8fc-24a0-1b875fd492d4@linux.ibm.com> Message-ID: <59553b3a-d930-16cd-78a3-89f4322a75f0@linux.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2020 13:49:05 -0500 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.6.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <09f2f613-76d4-c8fc-24a0-1b875fd492d4@linux.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Language: en-US X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:6.0.138, 18.0.676 definitions=2020-04-15_06:2020-04-14, 2020-04-15 signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 mlxlogscore=999 lowpriorityscore=0 bulkscore=0 clxscore=1015 mlxscore=0 spamscore=0 suspectscore=0 impostorscore=0 malwarescore=0 priorityscore=1501 phishscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2003020000 definitions=main-2004150134 X-BeenThere: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Development list for OpenBMC List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2020 18:49:12 -0000 On 4/14/20 4:57 PM, Joseph Reynolds wrote: > This is a reminder of the OpenBMC Security Working Group meeting > scheduled for this Wednesday April 15 at 10:00am PDT. The meeting was held, and minutes are linked off the wiki page. A fourth agenda item was added.  A summary is below. - Joseph > > We'll discuss current development items, and anything else that comes up. > > The current topics: > > 1. Remove default private image signing key from openbmc The leading idea is to disable the recipe that signs the image, but leave the private signing key in the source tree.  Then someone who builds will get an unsigned image.  If they enable the image signing recipe or use it as an example, they will hopefully see the instructions that say to use their own key pair. Note that an unsigned image is a good starting point for build processes that use a separate image signing step, such as when the image is signed by a hardware security module (HSM).  One difficulty with this approach is that the public key needs to be put into the BMC's root file system. Followup in the email list or https://github.com/openbmc/openbmc/issues/3615 > > 2. Discuss issues from the “ipmi password storage” email thread. We pretty much re-hashed the ideas from the email thread with no conclusions. One more idea was added, that we can the BMC's TPM to hold the RMCP+ keys. > > 3. Which algorithm should sign OpenBMC images? The answer will vary between projects that are downstream from OpenBMC.  We'll keep the default as RSA-SHA256.  Going forward, the plan is: the OpenBMC release process will give visibility to this and other ciphers per: https://github.com/openbmc/openbmc/wiki/Security-working-group#security-end-of-release-checklist 4. Use the Yocto cvecheck vulnerability scan for OpenBMC repos No CVE checking is done at the project-level, but similar check are being done in projects that are downstream from OpenBMC. The idea is a nightly Jenkins job to generate a report of all the unfixed vulnerabilities, something like: bitbake -c cvecheck obmc-phosphor-image. > > Access, agenda, and notes are in the wiki: > > https://github.com/openbmc/openbmc/wiki/Security-working-group > > - Joseph