Return-Path: Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=pass (sender SPF authorized) smtp.mailfrom=linux.ibm.com (client-ip=148.163.158.5; helo=mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com; envelope-from=jrey@linux.ibm.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.ibm.com Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0b-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.158.5]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 49cqYB1rgszDqcn for ; Thu, 4 Jun 2020 12:31:58 +1000 (AEST) Received: from pps.filterd (m0098417.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.42/8.16.0.42) with SMTP id 05422vlc148334 for ; Wed, 3 Jun 2020 22:31:53 -0400 Received: from ppma03wdc.us.ibm.com (ba.79.3fa9.ip4.static.sl-reverse.com [169.63.121.186]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 31e7uxy5cg-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Wed, 03 Jun 2020 22:31:53 -0400 Received: from pps.filterd (ppma03wdc.us.ibm.com [127.0.0.1]) by ppma03wdc.us.ibm.com (8.16.0.42/8.16.0.42) with SMTP id 0542KtiZ006639 for ; Thu, 4 Jun 2020 02:31:52 GMT Received: from b03cxnp08026.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03cxnp08026.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.18]) by ppma03wdc.us.ibm.com with ESMTP id 31bf48tp79-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Thu, 04 Jun 2020 02:31:52 +0000 Received: from b03ledav001.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav001.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.232]) by b03cxnp08026.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id 0542VoKA29622640 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK) for ; Thu, 4 Jun 2020 02:31:50 GMT Received: from b03ledav001.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id A546A6E04C for ; Thu, 4 Jun 2020 02:31:51 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b03ledav001.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 474876E050 for ; Thu, 4 Jun 2020 02:31:51 +0000 (GMT) Received: from demeter.roc.mn.charter.com (unknown [9.85.172.239]) by b03ledav001.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS for ; Thu, 4 Jun 2020 02:31:51 +0000 (GMT) From: Joseph Reynolds Subject: New ServiceRep role and privilege To: openbmc Message-ID: <5bc3f00a-208d-e21f-9707-0a569c2d8971@linux.ibm.com> Date: Wed, 3 Jun 2020 21:31:48 -0500 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Language: en-US X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:6.0.216, 18.0.687 definitions=2020-06-03_13:2020-06-02, 2020-06-03 signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 adultscore=0 cotscore=-2147483648 malwarescore=0 mlxlogscore=935 spamscore=0 suspectscore=0 priorityscore=1501 phishscore=0 impostorscore=0 bulkscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 clxscore=1015 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2004280000 definitions=main-2006040012 X-BeenThere: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Development list for OpenBMC List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Thu, 04 Jun 2020 02:31:58 -0000 This is a proposal to add a new ServiceRep role and a new PerformService privilege to Redfish.  The motivation for this is given in the "Isolate service privileges" email, as archived [1]. To be clear: This email is asking the OpenBMC community for input before approaching Redfish with a formal proposal.  Would you be okay with the changes described here, or do we have more considerations? The proposal 1. Add a new PerformService privilege with description: Can perform service operations on components that this service manages. Reference: Update DSP2046 Redfish Resource and Schema Guide > PrivilegeRegistry > Property details. 2. Add a new ServiceRep role with the same privileges as Operator, plus the PerformService privilege. ServiceRep - Login, ConfigureComponents, ConfigureSelf, PerformService. Reference: DSP0266 Redfish Specification > Security Details > Privilege model and authorization. 3. Update the Administrator role to optionally have the PerformService privilege.  Make this an implementation decision based on use case: - As an Administrator of a system that does not have dedicated service personnel, I need the PerformService privilege so I don't have to create a service account just to perform service operations. - As the OEM of a system that has dedicated service agents, I need the Administrator to NOT have the PerformService privilege so they cannot interfere with the service personnel. 4. Change various operations to require the PerformService privilege.  For example, allow PATCH to an EthernetInterface MACAddress. 4a. Reference: DSP8010 Redfish Schema > EthernetInterface. Change the MACAddress.readonly property to false. 4b. Reference: DSP8011 > Redfish PrivilegeRegistry > EthernetInterface. Add a PropertyOverride to target MACAddress for the PATCH operation: require PerformService. Discussion points I believe this would be straightforward to implement in the BMCWeb Redfish server [2].  For point 3 above (optionally assigning the PerformService privileges), we can have an BMCWeb configuration option or image feature.  I believe we need both use cases. Note that ServiceRep may need the ConfigureManagers privilege depending on your service model.  Note also that a ServiceRep with the ConfigureUsers privilege is really an Administrator with additional powers, as discussed in the OpenBMC security working group minutes [3] from 2019-11-21 and 2020-03-04.  That may or may not be what you want.  All kinds of fun here, we could even make this configurable by the BMC admin. [4] To address how to protect against DSP2045 > "AccountService roles allow an escalation of privileges", see discussion in the "Isolate service privileges" email [1]. The proposal described here does not fit neatly into the existing Redfish model.  The PerformService privilege should optionally be assigned to the Administrator role, depending on the use case. Perhaps the Redfish spec could make that an implementation option. Otherwise using a custom Role and OemPrivileges (as shown in the DSP0266 > OEMSysAdminPriv example) would work.  We'll need to work that out with Redfish. The alternate proposal using a custom Role & OemPrivileges would be: - Custom ServiceRep role, as above. - OemPrivilegePerformService, as above. - But with no changes to the Redfish spec. - A configuration option that determines whether or not Administrator contains OemPrivilegePerformService. Is this the right way to think about alternate role and privilege schemes, or is using custom roles and OemPrivileges the way to go? - Joseph [1]: https://lists.ozlabs.org/pipermail/openbmc/2020-June/021927.html [2]: https://github.com/openbmc/bmcweb [3]: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1b7x9BaxsfcukQDqbvZsU2ehMq4xoJRQvLxxsDUWmAOI [4]: Just joking.  That's extra works we don't need.