Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [112.213.38.117]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2BB26C433F5 for ; Thu, 12 May 2022 15:55:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: from boromir.ozlabs.org (localhost [IPv6:::1]) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 4KzbwJ3Xj9z3byG for ; Fri, 13 May 2022 01:55:44 +1000 (AEST) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key; unprotected) header.d=ibm.com header.i=@ibm.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=pp1 header.b=Lm96k1uV; dkim-atps=neutral Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=pass (sender SPF authorized) smtp.mailfrom=linux.ibm.com (client-ip=148.163.156.1; helo=mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com; envelope-from=jrey@linux.ibm.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key; unprotected) header.d=ibm.com header.i=@ibm.com header.a=rsa-sha256 header.s=pp1 header.b=Lm96k1uV; dkim-atps=neutral Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.156.1]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4KzbvQ3nrJz3bxS for ; Fri, 13 May 2022 01:54:57 +1000 (AEST) Received: from pps.filterd (m0098396.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.17.1.5/8.17.1.5) with ESMTP id 24CFHuLM015356 for ; Thu, 12 May 2022 15:54:55 GMT DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=ibm.com; h=message-id : date : subject : from : to : references : in-reply-to : content-type : content-transfer-encoding : mime-version; s=pp1; bh=rP7U77gOCx/479aihsLeRgd9FdtB/S/0SPR5fEzLdEM=; b=Lm96k1uVTRwOCXuDy1qLThA3hfrdTOlhAhmbPUE6WFdZX3rYcbXxYX+T89tmdMxWvoNF dBzTijRijOrkPiWnS7YbzyBH/kR+ggDspm937MFqQgICOOVmEKJvxd50E0WGfH5ylUeR FcgTR74QcPvpTWHX7MK97MldWtkOSFbY6pulgmbVJ0K7yrCViMA/i+UbffI3lSPdAVln 4k1T40j7VUWAcp/EDH1TuxN9HlRqGqbpfKIwJBXg+bjwHjXX0BV7YIBzIArkUiZ5bG94 BwDVhKVmOPFRjFgE3idLwza4vELVpXoZiYmQC6vI4sN2uR9NN0r6VJ6RCqz4qvgR+2Ky Ng== Received: from ppma05wdc.us.ibm.com (1b.90.2fa9.ip4.static.sl-reverse.com [169.47.144.27]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (PPS) with ESMTPS id 3g14rh8sv3-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Thu, 12 May 2022 15:54:54 +0000 Received: from pps.filterd (ppma05wdc.us.ibm.com [127.0.0.1]) by ppma05wdc.us.ibm.com (8.16.1.2/8.16.1.2) with SMTP id 24CFlRdR012678 for ; Thu, 12 May 2022 15:54:53 GMT Received: from b01cxnp23033.gho.pok.ibm.com (b01cxnp23033.gho.pok.ibm.com [9.57.198.28]) by ppma05wdc.us.ibm.com with ESMTP id 3fwgdaccny-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Thu, 12 May 2022 15:54:53 +0000 Received: from b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com (b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com [9.57.199.111]) by b01cxnp23033.gho.pok.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id 24CFsrTD44302660 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK) for ; Thu, 12 May 2022 15:54:53 GMT Received: from b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 11C74AC064 for ; Thu, 12 May 2022 15:54:53 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id D6FECAC062 for ; Thu, 12 May 2022 15:54:52 +0000 (GMT) Received: from [9.65.238.111] (unknown [9.65.238.111]) by b01ledav006.gho.pok.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS for ; Thu, 12 May 2022 15:54:52 +0000 (GMT) Message-ID: <5bf3bb06-5eae-e2b8-95cb-170b10c8d3e2@linux.ibm.com> Date: Thu, 12 May 2022 10:54:51 -0500 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X 10.15; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/91.6.0 Subject: Re: Security Working Group meeting - Wednesday May 11 - results Content-Language: en-US From: Joseph Reynolds To: openbmc References: <2c32e77e-9f57-36f7-52da-15fa2d4ff17a@linux.ibm.com> In-Reply-To: <2c32e77e-9f57-36f7-52da-15fa2d4ff17a@linux.ibm.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 X-Proofpoint-GUID: lUP7BGjE7_ZIGPeZUh1LG6JoXdEzXQ1y X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: lUP7BGjE7_ZIGPeZUh1LG6JoXdEzXQ1y Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Proofpoint-UnRewURL: 0 URL was un-rewritten MIME-Version: 1.0 X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.205,Aquarius:18.0.858,Hydra:6.0.486,FMLib:17.11.64.514 definitions=2022-05-12_12,2022-05-12_01,2022-02-23_01 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 adultscore=0 spamscore=0 impostorscore=0 lowpriorityscore=0 malwarescore=0 mlxlogscore=725 mlxscore=0 suspectscore=0 bulkscore=0 phishscore=0 priorityscore=1501 clxscore=1011 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2202240000 definitions=main-2205120075 X-BeenThere: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Development list for OpenBMC List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: openbmc-bounces+openbmc=archiver.kernel.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "openbmc" On 5/10/22 9:51 PM, Joseph Reynolds wrote: > This is a reminder of the OpenBMC Security Working Group meeting > scheduled for this Wednesday May 11 at 10:00am PDT. > > We'll discuss the following items on the agenda > , > and anything else that comes up: Attended: (did not record attendance) 1 Dhananjay - progress on writing CVEs? DISCUSSION: James has credentials (as a CNA) to write CVEs for the OpenBMC project. TODO: Dhananjay and Joseph need to get credentials, then the response team to start working vulnerabilities through the new workflow, and approve the workflow. 2 Review D-Bus threat analysis is work in progress DISCUSSION: What bmc resources do we need to protect? Idea: Push the authority model bmcweb has into the D-Bus layer.  That is, currently services like ipmi and bmcweb perform authority checks, and then use their root authority to invoke the D-Bus APIs.  The idea is for BMCWeb to drop from root to the user who is requesting the operation, and use that user’s authority to invoke the D-Bus API.  The D-Bus layer sould have to be enhanced to support this.  (It currently requires root to perform most operations.) Protect interfaces which implement sensitive functions, for example mctp/pldm/spdm.  Or explain existing protection mechanisms.  For example: a bmc non-root user should not have the ability to run arbitrary spdm commands.  (The BMC should only ever use a subset of the commands.) TODO Nirav Shah: Document BMC/host interfaces in a way similar to https://github.com/openbmc/docs/blob/master/security/network-security-considerations.md as a way to get started with a model for what need to be protected. For example: Both bmcweb and the network IPMI service both have user management functions, that is, they can create new admin users.  They use the phosphor-user-manager D-Bus interface to do this, and user manager uses Linux functions (useradd and usermod commands, etc.)  This model would help us systematically identify interfaces which need to be protected. 3 What is the current status of bmc secure boot? DISCUSSION: Progress to  date: Uboot  merged,  secure booting the Linux kernel The design is under review here: https://gerrit.openbmc-project.xyz/c/openbmc/docs/+/26169 Some discussion here: https://lore.kernel.org/openbmc/20220131034147.106415-1-andrew@aj.id.au/ Some of the discussion related to system lifecycle (like how re-key the BMC, or how to temporarily disable secure boot).  TODO: describe use cases for system lifecycle. TODO: Follow up on design review. Ref: https://www.opencompute.org/blog/ocp-security-announces-version-10-specs-for-root-of-trust Use case example: Example: Always enable first stage secure booting with no way to disable it: hardware checking uboot spl.  How to use secure boot jumpers? -Joseph > Access, agenda and notes are in the wiki: > https://github.com/openbmc/openbmc/wiki/Security-working-group > > > - Joseph