From: "cron2 (Code Review)" Date: Sat, 23 Aug 2025 16:01:58 +0000 In-Reply-To: References: Reply-To: gert@...1296..., arne-openvpn@...1227..., openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, frank@...2641..., max@...2606... Message-ID: <5c374002a1dfb9b99a32f5715d21121d05d7912a-HTML@...2715...> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Content-Disposition: inline Content-Type: multipart/alternative; boundary="vSEoO4m4qro="; charset=UTF-8 Subject: [Openvpn-devel] [M] Change in openvpn[master]: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , To: plaisthos Cc: MaxF , flichtenheld , openvpn-devel --vSEoO4m4qro= Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable cron2 has submitted this change. ( http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/10= 67?usp=3Demail ) Change subject: Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie = checks ...................................................................... Check message id/acked ids too when doing sessionid cookie checks This fixes that control packets on a floating client can trigger creating a new session in special circumstances: To trigger this circumstance a connection needs to - starts on IP A - successfully floats to IP B by data packet - then has a control packet from IP A before any data packet can trigger the float back to IP A and all of this needs to happen in the 60s time that hmac cookie is valid in the default configuration. In this scenario we would trigger a new connection as the HMAC session id would be valid. This patch adds checking also of the message-id and acked ids to discern packet from the initial three-way handshake where these ids are 0 or 1 from any later packet. This will now trigger (at verb 4 or higher) a messaged like: Packet (P_ACK_V1) with invalid or missing SID instead. Also remove a few duplicated free_tls_pre_decrypt_state in test_ssl. Reported-By: Walter Doekes Tested-By: Walter Doekes Change-Id: I6752dcd5aff3e5cea2b439366479e86751a1c403 Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe Acked-by: MaxF Message-Id: <20250819212214.16218-1-gert@...1296...> URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg32= 626.html Signed-off-by: Gert Doering --- M src/openvpn/mudp.c M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h M tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c 4 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/openvpn/mudp.c b/src/openvpn/mudp.c index 7259a4b..31134be 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/mudp.c +++ b/src/openvpn/mudp.c @@ -151,7 +151,8 @@ * need to contain the peer id */ struct gc_arena gc =3D gc_new(); - bool ret =3D check_session_id_hmac(state, from, hmac, handwindow); + bool pkt_is_ack =3D (verdict =3D=3D VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1); + bool ret =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(state, from, hmac, hand= window, pkt_is_ack); const char *peer =3D print_link_socket_actual(&m->top.c2.from, &gc= ); uint8_t pkt_firstbyte =3D *BPTR(&m->top.c2.buf); @@ -159,7 +160,8 @@ if (!ret) { - msg(D_MULTI_MEDIUM, "Packet (%s) with invalid or missing SID f= rom %s", + msg(D_MULTI_MEDIUM, "Packet (%s) with invalid or missing SID f= rom" + " %s or wrong packet id", packet_opcode_name(op), peer); } else diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c index b901f87..6ec05a7 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c @@ -496,8 +496,11 @@ } bool -check_session_id_hmac(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, const struct op= envpn_sockaddr *from, - hmac_ctx_t *hmac, int handwindow) +check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, + const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, + hmac_ctx_t *hmac, + int handwindow, + bool pkt_is_ack) { if (!from) { @@ -512,6 +515,36 @@ return false; } + /* Check if the packet ID of the packet or ACKED packet is <=3D 1 */ + for (int i =3D 0; i < ack.len; i++) + { + /* This packet ACKs a packet that has a higher packet id than the + * ones expected in the three-way handshake, consider it as invalid + * for the session */ + if (ack.packet_id[i] > 1) + { + return false; + } + } + + if (!pkt_is_ack) + { + packet_id_type message_id; + /* Extract the packet ID from the packet */ + if (!reliable_ack_read_packet_id(&buf, &message_id)) + { + return false; + } + + /* similar check. Anything larger than 1 is not considered part of= the + * three-way handshake */ + if (message_id > 1) + { + return false; + } + } + + /* check adjacent timestamps too */ for (int offset =3D -2; offset <=3D 1; offset++) { diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h index 8fe4880..96cdd68 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h @@ -178,14 +178,20 @@ /** * Checks if a control packet has a correct HMAC server session id * + * This will also consider packets that have a packet id higher + * than 1 or ack packets higher than 1 to be invalid as they are + * not part of the initial three way handshake of OpenVPN and should + * not create a new connection. + * * @param state session information * @param from link_socket from the client * @param hmac the hmac context to use for the calculation * @param handwindow the quantisation of the current time + * @param pkt_is_ack the packet being checked is a P_ACK_V1 * @return the expected server session id */ -bool check_session_id_hmac(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, const stru= ct openvpn_sockaddr *from, - hmac_ctx_t *hmac, int handwindow); +bool check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, co= nst struct openvpn_sockaddr *from, + hmac_ctx_t *hmac, int handwindow, bool = pkt_is_ack); /* * Write a control channel authentication record. diff --git a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn= /test_pkt.c index 65b31e7..5122766 100644 --- a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c +++ b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c @@ -139,6 +139,27 @@ 0xc8, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00= , 0x00, 0xdd, 0x85, 0xdb, 0x53, 0x56, 0x23, 0xb0= , 0x2e }; +/* no tls-auth, P_ACK_V1, acks 0,1, and 2 */ +const uint8_t client_ack_123_none_random_id[] =3D { + 0x28, + 0xae, 0xb9, 0xaf, 0xe1, 0xf0, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xc8, + 0x03, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, + 0xdd, 0x85, 0xdb, 0x53, 0x56, 0x23, 0xb0, 0x2e +}; + +/* no tls-auth, P_CONTROL_V1, acks 0, msg-id 2 */ +const uint8_t client_control_none_random_id[] =3D { + 0x20, + 0xae, 0xb9, 0xaf, 0xe1, 0xf0, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xc8, + 0x01, + 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, + 0x02 +}; + + struct tls_auth_standalone init_tas_auth(int key_direction) { @@ -256,12 +277,10 @@ assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2); free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); - free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); /* The pre decrypt function should not modify the buffer, so calling it * again should have the same result */ verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf); assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2); - free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); /* and buf memory should be equal */ assert_memory_equal(BPTR(&buf), client_reset_v2_tls_auth, sizeof(clien= t_reset_v2_tls_auth)); @@ -279,7 +298,6 @@ assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_INVALID); free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); - free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); /* Wrong key direction gives a wrong hmac key and should not validate = */ free_key_ctx_bi(&tas.tls_wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi); free_tas(&tas); @@ -319,15 +337,12 @@ assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2); free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); - free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); buf_reset_len(&buf); buf_write(&buf, client_reset_v2_tls_crypt, sizeof(client_reset_v2_none= )); verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf); assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2); free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); - free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); - /* This is not a reset packet and should trigger the other response */ buf_reset_len(&buf); buf_write(&buf, client_ack_tls_auth_randomid, sizeof(client_ack_tls_au= th_randomid)); @@ -405,7 +420,7 @@ assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_CONTROL_V1); /* This is a valid packet but containing a random id instead of an HMA= C id*/ - bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30); + bool valid =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from.dest, hmac,= 30, false); assert_false(valid); free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); @@ -436,7 +451,7 @@ verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf); assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1); - bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30); + bool valid =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from.dest, hmac,= 30, true); assert_true(valid); free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); @@ -445,6 +460,51 @@ hmac_ctx_free(hmac); } +static void +test_verify_hmac_none_out_of_range_ack(void **ut_state) +{ + hmac_ctx_t *hmac =3D session_id_hmac_init(); + + struct link_socket_actual from =3D { 0 }; + from.dest.addr.sa.sa_family =3D AF_INET; + + struct tls_auth_standalone tas =3D { 0 }; + struct tls_pre_decrypt_state state =3D { 0 }; + + struct buffer buf =3D alloc_buf(1024); + enum first_packet_verdict verdict; + + tas.tls_wrap.mode =3D TLS_WRAP_NONE; + + buf_reset_len(&buf); + buf_write(&buf, client_ack_123_none_random_id, sizeof(client_ack_123_n= one_random_id)); + + + verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf); + assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1); + + /* should fail because it acks 2 */ + bool valid =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from.dest, hmac,= 30, true); + assert_false(valid); + free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); + + /* Try test with the control with a too high message id now */ + buf_reset_len(&buf); + buf_write(&buf, client_control_none_random_id, sizeof(client_control_n= one_random_id)); + + verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf); + assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_CONTROL_V1); + + /* should fail because it has message id 2 */ + valid =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30, = true); + assert_false(valid); + + free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state); + free_buf(&buf); + hmac_ctx_cleanup(hmac); + hmac_ctx_free(hmac); +} + static hmac_ctx_t * init_static_hmac(void) { @@ -634,16 +694,20 @@ main(void) { openvpn_unit_test_setup(); - const struct CMUnitTest tests[] =3D { cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decryp= t_lite_none), - cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt_= lite_auth), - cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt_= lite_crypt), - cmocka_unit_test(test_parse_ack), - cmocka_unit_test(test_calc_session= _id_hmac_static), - cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_= none), - cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_= tls_auth), - cmocka_unit_test(test_generate_res= et_packet_plain), - cmocka_unit_test(test_generate_res= et_packet_tls_auth), - cmocka_unit_test(test_extract_cont= rol_message) }; + + const struct CMUnitTest tests[] =3D { + cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt_lite_none), + cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt_lite_auth), + cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt_lite_crypt), + cmocka_unit_test(test_parse_ack), + cmocka_unit_test(test_calc_session_id_hmac_static), + cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_none), + cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_tls_auth), + cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_none_out_of_range_ack), + cmocka_unit_test(test_generate_reset_packet_plain), + cmocka_unit_test(test_generate_reset_packet_tls_auth), + cmocka_unit_test(test_extract_control_message) + }; #if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL) OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms(); -- To view, visit http://gerrit.openvpn.net/c/openvpn/+/1067?usp=3Demail To unsubscribe, or for help writing mail filters, visit http://gerrit.openv= pn.net/settings Gerrit-Project: openvpn Gerrit-Branch: master Gerrit-Change-Id: I6752dcd5aff3e5cea2b439366479e86751a1c403 Gerrit-Change-Number: 1067 Gerrit-PatchSet: 7 Gerrit-Owner: plaisthos Gerrit-Reviewer: MaxF Gerrit-Reviewer: flichtenheld Gerrit-CC: openvpn-devel Gerrit-MessageType: merged --vSEoO4m4qro= Content-Type: text/html; charset="UTF-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

cron2 submitted this change.

View Change

Check message id/acked ids too when doing ses=
sionid cookie checks

This fixes that control packets on a floating c= lient can trigger
creating a new session in special circumstances:
To trigger this circumstance a connection needs to

- starts on IP = A
- successfully floats to IP B by data packet
- then has a control p= acket from IP A before any
data packet can trigger the float back to I= P A

and all of this needs to happen in the 60s time
that hmac coo= kie is valid in the default
configuration.

In this scenario we wo= uld trigger a new connection as the HMAC
session id would be valid.
<= br>This patch adds checking also of the message-id and acked ids to
disc= ern packet from the initial three-way handshake where these
ids are 0 or= 1 from any later packet.

This will now trigger (at verb 4 or higher= ) a messaged like:

Packet (P_ACK_V1) with invalid or missing SID<= br>
instead.

Also remove a few duplicated free_tls_pre_decrypt_st= ate in test_ssl.

Reported-By: Walter Doekes <walter.openvpn@...2825...= 89...>
Tested-By: Walter Doekes <walter.openvpn@...2889...>
=
Change-Id: I6752dcd5aff3e5cea2b439366479e86751a1c403
Signed-off-by: = Arne Schwabe <arne@...1227...>
Acked-by: MaxF <max@...2606...&g= t;
Message-Id: <20250819212214.16218-1-gert@...1296...>
URL: ht= tps://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg32626.htm= l
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@...1296...>
---
M src/op= envpn/mudp.c
M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c
M src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h
M tes= ts/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c
4 files changed, 129 insertions(+), 24 = deletions(-)

diff --git a/src/openvpn/mudp.c b/src/openvpn/mudp.c
ind= ex 7259a4b..31134be 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/mudp.c<= br>+++ b/src/openvpn/mudp.c
@@ -151,7 +151,8 @@
* need to contain the peer id */
= struct gc_arena gc =3D gc_new();

- bool ret =3D check_session_id_hmac= (state, from, hmac, handwindow);
+ bool pkt_is_ack =3D (verdict =3D=3D VERDICT_VALID_ACK_= V1);
+ bool re= t =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(state, from, hmac, handwindow, pkt_is_a= ck);

const char *peer =3D print_= link_socket_actual(&m->top.c2.from, &gc);
= uint8_t pkt_firstbyte =3D *BPTR(&m->top.c2.buf);
= @@ -159,7 +160,8 @@

if (!ret)
{
= + msg(D_MULTI_MEDIUM, "Packet (%s) with invalid or missing = SID from"
+ = " %s or wrong packet id",
packet_opcode_name(op), peer);

= }
else
diff --git a/src/openvpn/= ssl_pkt.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c
index b901f87..6ec05a7 10= 0644
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.c
+++ b/src/= openvpn/ssl_pkt.c
@@ -496,8 +496,11 @@
}

bool
-check_session_id_hmac(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,= const struct openvpn_sockaddr *from,
- hmac_ctx_t *hmac, int handwindow)

+check_session_hmac_and_= pkt_id(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state,
+ const struct openvpn_= sockaddr *from,
+ = hmac_ctx_t *hmac,
+ int handwindow,
+ = bool pkt_is_ack)
{
if (!from)
{
@@ -512,6 +515,36 @@
= return false;
}

+ /* Check if the packet ID of= the packet or ACKED packet is <=3D 1 */

+ for (int i =3D 0; i < ack.len; i++)<= br>+ {
+ /* This packet ACKs a packet that= has a higher packet id than the
+ * ones expected in the three-way handshake, consider = it as invalid
+ = * for the session */
+ if (ack.packet_id[i] > 1)
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+=
+ if (!pkt_is_ack)
+ {
+ packet_id_type message_id;
+ /* Extract the p= acket ID from the packet */
+ if (!reliable_ack_read_packet_id(&buf, &message_id)= )
+ {+ return false;
+ }
+

+ /* similar check. Anything larger than 1 is= not considered part of the
+ * three-way handshake */
+ if (message_id > 1)
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+
+
/* check adjacent timestamps too */

for (int = offset =3D -2; offset <=3D 1; offset++)
{diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.hindex 8fe4880..96cdd68 100644
--- a/src/openvpn/ssl_= pkt.h
+++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_pkt.h
@@ -178,1= 4 +178,20 @@
/**
* Checks if a control p= acket has a correct HMAC server session id
*
+ * This will also consider packe= ts that have a packet id higher

+ * than 1 or ack packets higher than 1 to be invalid as they ar= e
+ * not part of the= initial three way handshake of OpenVPN and should
+ * not create a new connection.
+ *

* @param st= ate session information
* @param from li= nk_socket from the client
* @param hmac the hmac= context to use for the calculation
* @param handwindow = the quantisation of the current time
+ * @param pkt_is_ack the packet being checked is a P_= ACK_V1
* @return the expected server session= id
*/
- hmac_ctx_t *hmac, int handwindow);=
+bool check_session_hmac_an= d_pkt_id(struct tls_pre_decrypt_state *state, const struct openvpn_sockaddr= *from,
+ = hmac_ctx_t *hmac, int handwindow, bool pkt_is_ack);<= /span>

/*
* Write a control c= hannel authentication record.
diff --git a/tests/unit_tests= /openvpn/test_pkt.c b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c
i= ndex 65b31e7..5122766 100644
--- a/tests/unit_tests/openvpn= /test_pkt.c
+++ b/tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_pkt.c
@@ -139,6 +139,27 @@
= 0xc8, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xdd, 0x85,<= br> 0xdb, 0x53, 0x56, 0= x23, 0xb0, 0x2e };

+/* no tls-auth, P_ACK_V1, acks 0,1, and 2 */
+const uint8_t client_ack_123_none= _random_id[] =3D {

+ = 0x28,
+ 0xae, 0= xb9, 0xaf, 0xe1, 0xf0, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xc8,
+ 0x03,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02,
+ 0xdd, 0x85, 0xdb, 0x53, 0x56, 0x23, = 0xb0, 0x2e
+};=
+
+/* no tls-auth, P_CONTROL_V1, acks 0, msg-id = 2 */
+const uint8_t c= lient_control_none_random_id[] =3D {
+ 0x20,
+ 0xae, 0xb9, 0xaf, 0xe1, 0xf0, 0x1d, 0x79, 0xc8,
+ 0x01,
+ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
+ 0x02
+};
+
+ struct tls_auth_standalone
init_tas_auth(int key_d= irection)
{
@@ -256,12 +277,10 @@ assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2);
<= span> free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);

<= br>- free_tls_pre_decrypt_stat= e(&state);
/* The pre decrypt function should not = modify the buffer, so calling it
* again should have = the same result */
verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&a= mp;tas, &state, &from, &buf);
assert_int_e= qual(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2);
- free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);

/* and buf memory should be equal */
assert_memory_equal(BPTR(&buf), client_reset_v2_tls_auth, sizeo= f(client_reset_v2_tls_auth));
@@ -279,7 +298,6 @@ assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_INVALID);
= free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);

- free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&s= tate);
/* Wrong key direction gives a wrong hmac key a= nd should not validate */
free_key_ctx_bi(&tas.tls= _wrap.opt.key_ctx_bi);
free_tas(&tas);
<= span>@@ -319,15 +337,12 @@
assert_int_equal(verdict, V= ERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2);
free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&am= p;state);

- free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);
buf_= reset_len(&buf);
buf_write(&buf, client_reset_= v2_tls_crypt, sizeof(client_reset_v2_none));
verdict = =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &state, &from, &buf);=
assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_RESET_V2); free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);

- free_tls_pre_decrypt_st= ate(&state);
-

/* This is not a reset packet and should trigger the other= response */
buf_reset_len(&buf);
= buf_write(&buf, client_ack_tls_auth_randomid, sizeof(client_ack_tl= s_auth_randomid));
@@ -405,7 +420,7 @@
= assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_CONTROL_V1);

/* This is a valid packet but containing a random id inst= ead of an HMAC id*/
- = bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30= );
+ bool valid = =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30, fal= se);
assert_false(valid);

= free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);
@@ -436,= 7 +451,7 @@
verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas,= &state, &from, &buf);
assert_int_equal(ve= rdict, VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1);

- bool valid =3D check_session_id_hmac(&sta= te, &from.dest, hmac, 30);
+ bool valid =3D check_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &am= p;from.dest, hmac, 30, true);
assert_true(valid);

free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&state);<= /span>
@@ -445,6 +460,51 @@
hmac_ctx_free(hma= c);
}

+static void
+test_verify_hmac_none_out_of_range_ack(void **ut_state)=
+{
+ hmac_ctx_t *hmac =3D session_id_hmac_ini= t();
+
+ struct link_socket_actual from= =3D { 0 };

+ from= .dest.addr.sa.sa_family =3D AF_INET;
+
+ = struct tls_auth_standalone tas =3D { 0 };
+ struct tls_pre_decrypt_state state =3D { 0 };
+
+ struct buffer buf =3D alloc_buf(1024= );
+ enum first_pa= cket_verdict verdict;
+
+ tas.tls_wrap.= mode =3D TLS_WRAP_NONE;
+
+ buf_reset_l= en(&buf);
+ bu= f_write(&buf, client_ack_123_none_random_id, sizeof(client_ack_123_none= _random_id));
+
+
+ verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&ta= s, &state, &from, &buf);
+ assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_ACK_V1);
+
+ /* should fail because it acks 2 */
+ bool valid =3D check= _session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30, true);
+ assert_false(valid);<= /span>
+ free_tls_pre_dec= rypt_state(&state);
+
+ /* Try test= with the control with a too high message id now */
+ buf_reset_len(&buf);
+ buf_write(&buf, client_c= ontrol_none_random_id, sizeof(client_control_none_random_id));

+

+ verdict =3D tls_pre_decrypt_lite(&tas, &= ;state, &from, &buf);
+ assert_int_equal(verdict, VERDICT_VALID_CONTROL_V1);+
+ /* should fail because it has message id 2 = */
+ valid =3D che= ck_session_hmac_and_pkt_id(&state, &from.dest, hmac, 30, true);
+ assert_false(valid)= ;
+
+ free_tls_pre_decrypt_state(&s= tate);
+ free_buf(= &buf);
+ hmac_= ctx_cleanup(hmac);
+ = hmac_ctx_free(hmac);
+}
+
static hmac_ctx_t *

init_static_hmac(void)
<= span> {

@@ -634,16 +694,20 @@
main(void)
{
openvpn_unit_test_setup();- const struct CMUnitTest tes= ts[] =3D { cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt_lite_none),
- = cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt_lite_auth),
- cmocka_unit= _test(test_tls_decrypt_lite_crypt),
- cmocka_unit_test(test= _parse_ack),
- = cmocka_unit_test(test_calc_session_id_hmac_s= tatic),
- = cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_none),- = cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_tls_auth),
- cm= ocka_unit_test(test_generate_reset_packet_plain),
- cmocka_= unit_test(test_generate_reset_packet_tls_auth),
- cmocka_un= it_test(test_extract_control_message) };
+
+ const struct CMUnitTest tests[] =3D {
+ cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt_lite_none= ),
+ cmocka_un= it_test(test_tls_decrypt_lite_auth),
+ cmocka_unit_test(test_tls_decrypt_lite_crypt),
+ cmocka_unit_tes= t(test_parse_ack),
+ = cmocka_unit_test(test_calc_session_id_hmac_static),
+ cmocka_unit_test(test_verify= _hmac_none),
+ = cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_tls_auth),
+ cmocka_unit_test(test_verify_hmac_none_ou= t_of_range_ack),
+ = cmocka_unit_test(test_generate_reset_packet_plain),
+ cmocka_unit_test(test_generate= _reset_packet_tls_auth),
+ cmocka_unit_test(test_extract_control_message)
+ };


= #if defined(ENABLE_CRYPTO_OPENSSL)
OpenSSL_add_= all_algorithms();

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Gerrit-Project: openvpn
Gerrit-Branch: master
Gerrit-Change-Id: I6752dcd5aff3e5cea2b43936647= 9e86751a1c403
Gerrit-Change-Number: 1067
Gerrit-PatchSet: 7
Gerrit-Owner: plaisthos <arne-openvpn@...1711...= 27...>
Gerrit-Reviewer: MaxF <max@...2606...> <= /div>
Gerrit-Reviewer: flichtenheld <frank@...2716...= 1...>
Gerrit-CC: openvpn-devel <openvpn-devel@...1484...= ts.sourceforge.net>
Gerrit-MessageType: merged
--vSEoO4m4qro=--