Received: from lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (lindbergh.monkeyblade.net [23.128.96.19]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9797C1FB4 for ; Thu, 22 Jun 2023 08:00:51 +0000 (UTC) Received: from frasgout.his.huawei.com (frasgout.his.huawei.com [185.176.79.56]) by lindbergh.monkeyblade.net (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5ED3D1FDD; Thu, 22 Jun 2023 01:00:30 -0700 (PDT) Received: from lhrpeml500004.china.huawei.com (unknown [172.18.147.200]) by frasgout.his.huawei.com (SkyGuard) with ESMTP id 4Qmt5R5j9Vz6DB43; Thu, 22 Jun 2023 15:57:47 +0800 (CST) Received: from [10.123.123.126] (10.123.123.126) by lhrpeml500004.china.huawei.com (7.191.163.9) with Microsoft SMTP Server (version=TLS1_2, cipher=TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256) id 15.1.2507.27; Thu, 22 Jun 2023 09:00:26 +0100 Message-ID: <60e5f0ea-39fa-9f76-35bd-ec88fc489922@huawei.com> Date: Thu, 22 Jun 2023 11:00:25 +0300 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: netdev@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:91.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/91.4.1 Subject: Re: [PATCH v11 11/12] samples/landlock: Add network demo Content-Language: ru To: =?UTF-8?Q?Micka=c3=abl_Sala=c3=bcn?= , =?UTF-8?Q?G=c3=bcnther_Noack?= CC: , , , , , , References: <20230515161339.631577-1-konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com> <20230515161339.631577-12-konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com> <8c09fc5a-e3a5-4792-65a8-b84c6044128a@digikod.net> From: "Konstantin Meskhidze (A)" In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8"; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit X-Originating-IP: [10.123.123.126] X-ClientProxiedBy: lhrpeml500004.china.huawei.com (7.191.163.9) To lhrpeml500004.china.huawei.com (7.191.163.9) X-CFilter-Loop: Reflected X-Spam-Status: No, score=-4.3 required=5.0 tests=BAYES_00,NICE_REPLY_A, RCVD_IN_DNSWL_MED,RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H4,RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_WL,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS,T_SCC_BODY_TEXT_LINE autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.6 X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.6 (2021-04-09) on lindbergh.monkeyblade.net 6/19/2023 9:19 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет: > > On 19/06/2023 16:24, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote: >> >> >> 6/13/2023 11:38 PM, Mickaël Salaün пишет: >>> >>> On 13/06/2023 12:54, Konstantin Meskhidze (A) wrote: >>>> >>>> >>>> 6/6/2023 6:17 PM, Günther Noack пишет: >>>>> Hi Konstantin! >>>>> >>>>> Apologies if some of this was discussed before, in this case, >>>>> Mickaël's review overrules my opinions from the sidelines ;) >>>>> >>>>> On Tue, May 16, 2023 at 12:13:38AM +0800, Konstantin Meskhidze wrote: >>>>>> This commit adds network demo. It's possible to allow a sandboxer to >>>>>> bind/connect to a list of particular ports restricting network >>>>>> actions to the rest of ports. >>>>>> >>>>>> Signed-off-by: Konstantin Meskhidze >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> diff --git a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c >>>>>> index e2056c8b902c..b0250edb6ccb 100644 >>>>>> --- a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c >>>>>> +++ b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c >>>>> >>>>> ... >>>>> >>>>>> +static int populate_ruleset_net(const char *const env_var, const int ruleset_fd, >>>>>> + const __u64 allowed_access) >>>>>> +{ >>>>>> + int num_ports, i, ret = 1; >>>>> >>>>> I thought the convention was normally to set ret = 0 initially and to >>>>> override it in case of error, rather than the other way around? >>> >>> Which convention? In this case, by default the return code is an error. >>> >>> >>>>> >>>> Well, I just followed Mickaёl's way of logic here. > >>>> >>>>>> + char *env_port_name; >>>>>> + struct landlock_net_service_attr net_service = { >>>>>> + .allowed_access = allowed_access, >>>>>> + .port = 0, >>>>>> + }; >>>>>> + >>>>>> + env_port_name = getenv(env_var); >>>>>> + if (!env_port_name) >>>>>> + return 0; >>>>>> + env_port_name = strdup(env_port_name); >>>>>> + unsetenv(env_var); >>>>>> + num_ports = parse_port_num(env_port_name); >>>>>> + >>>>>> + if (num_ports == 1 && (strtok(env_port_name, ENV_PATH_TOKEN) == NULL)) { >>>>>> + ret = 0; >>>>>> + goto out_free_name; >>>>>> + } >>>>> >>>>> I don't understand why parse_port_num and strtok are necessary in this >>>>> program. The man-page for strsep(3) describes it as a replacement to >>>>> strtok(3) (in the HISTORY section), and it has a very short example >>>>> for how it is used. >>>>> >>>>> Wouldn't it work like this as well? >>>>> >>>>> while ((strport = strsep(&env_port_name, ":"))) { >>>>> net_service.port = atoi(strport); >>>>> /* etc */ >>>>> } >>>> >>>> Thanks for a tip. I think it's a better solution here. Now this >>>> commit is in Mickaёl's -next branch. I could send a one-commit patch later. >>>> Mickaёl, what do you think? >>> >>> I removed this series from -next because there is some issues (see the >>> bot's emails), but anyway, this doesn't mean these patches don't need to >>> be changed, they do. The goal of -next is to test more widely a patch >>> series and get more feedbacks, especially from bots. When this series >>> will be fully ready (and fuzzed with syzkaller), I'll push it to Linus >>> Torvalds. >>> >>> I'll review the remaining tests and sample code this week, but you can >>> still take into account the documentation review. >> >> Hi, Mickaёl. >> >> I have a few quetions? >> - Are you going to fix warnings for bots, meanwhile I run syzcaller? > > No, you need to fix that with the next series (except the Signed-off-by > warnings). Hi, Mickaёl. As I understand its possible to check bots warnings just after you push the next V12 series again into your -next branch??? > > What is your status on syzkaller? Do you need some help? I can write the > tests if it's too much. > Sorry. To be honest I'm busy with another project. I dont know how much time it will take for me to set up and run syzkaller. I need your help here please, how you do this, some roadmap. > >> - I will fix documentation and sandbox demo and sent patch v12? > > Yes please. Let me a few days to send more reviews. > Ok. Sure. >> >>> >>> >>>> >>>>> >>>>>> + >>>>>> + for (i = 0; i < num_ports; i++) { >>>>>> + net_service.port = atoi(strsep(&env_port_name, ENV_PATH_TOKEN)); >>>>> >>>>> Naming of ENV_PATH_TOKEN: >>>>> This usage is not related to paths, maybe rename the variable? >>>>> It's also technically not the token, but the delimiter. >>>>> >>>> What do you think of ENV_PORT_TOKEN or ENV_PORT_DELIMITER??? >>> >>> You can rename ENV_PATH_TOKEN to ENV_DELIMITER for the FS and network parts. >>> >> Ok. Got it. >>> >>>> >>>>>> + if (landlock_add_rule(ruleset_fd, LANDLOCK_RULE_NET_SERVICE, >>>>>> + &net_service, 0)) { >>>>>> + fprintf(stderr, >>>>>> + "Failed to update the ruleset with port \"%lld\": %s\n", >>>>>> + net_service.port, strerror(errno)); >>>>>> + goto out_free_name; >>>>>> + } >>>>>> + } >>>>>> + ret = 0; >>>>>> + >>>>>> +out_free_name: >>>>>> + free(env_port_name); >>>>>> + return ret; >>>>>> +} >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> fprintf(stderr, >>>>>> "Launch a command in a restricted environment.\n\n"); >>>>>> - fprintf(stderr, "Environment variables containing paths, " >>>>>> - "each separated by a colon:\n"); >>>>>> + fprintf(stderr, >>>>>> + "Environment variables containing paths and ports " >>>>>> + "each separated by a colon:\n"); >>>>>> fprintf(stderr, >>>>>> "* %s: list of paths allowed to be used in a read-only way.\n", >>>>>> ENV_FS_RO_NAME); >>>>>> fprintf(stderr, >>>>>> - "* %s: list of paths allowed to be used in a read-write way.\n", >>>>>> + "* %s: list of paths allowed to be used in a read-write way.\n\n", >>>>>> ENV_FS_RW_NAME); >>>>>> + fprintf(stderr, >>>>>> + "Environment variables containing ports are optional " >>>>>> + "and could be skipped.\n"); >>>>> >>>>> As it is, I believe the program does something different when I'm >>>>> setting these to the empty string (ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME=""), compared to >>>>> when I'm unsetting them? >>>>> >>>>> I think the case where we want to forbid all handle-able networking is >>>>> a legit and very common use case - it could be clearer in the >>>>> documentation how this is done with the tool. (And maybe the interface >>>>> could be something more explicit than setting the environment variable >>>>> to empty?) >>> >>> I'd like to keep it simple, and it should be seen as an example code, >>> not a full-feature sandboxer, but still a consistent and useful one. >>> What would you suggest? >>> >>> This sandboxer tool relies on environment variables for its >>> configuration. This is definitely not a good fit for all use cases, but >>> I think it is simple and flexible enough. One use case might be to >>> export a set of environment variables and simply call this tool. I'd >>> prefer to not deal with argument parsing, but maybe that was too >>> simplistic? We might want to revisit this approach but probably not with >>> this series. >>> >>> >>>>> >>>>> >>>>>> + /* Removes bind access attribute if not supported by a user. */ >>>>>> + env_port_name = getenv(ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME); >>>>>> + if (!env_port_name) { >>>>>> + ruleset_attr.handled_access_net &= >>>>>> + ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_TCP; >>>>>> + } >>>>>> + /* Removes connect access attribute if not supported by a user. */ >>>>>> + env_port_name = getenv(ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME); >>>>>> + if (!env_port_name) { >>>>>> + ruleset_attr.handled_access_net &= >>>>>> + ~LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP; >>>>>> + } >>>>> >>>>> This is the code where the program does not restrict network usage, >>>>> if the corresponding environment variable is not set. >>>> >>>> Yep. Right. >>>>> >>>>> It's slightly inconsistent with what this tool does for filesystem >>>>> paths. - If you don't specify any file paths, it will still restrict >>>>> file operations there, independent of whether that env variable was >>>>> set or not. (Apologies if it was discussed before.) >>>> >>>> Mickaёl wanted to make network ports optional here. >>>> Please check: >>>> >>>> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/179ac2ee-37ff-92da-c381-c2c716725045@digikod.net/ >>> >>> Right, the rationale is for compatibility with the previous version of >>> this tool. We should not break compatibility when possible. A comment >>> should explain the rationale though. >>> >>>> >>>> https://lore.kernel.org/linux-security-module/fe3bc928-14f8-5e2b-359e-9a87d6cf5b01@digikod.net/ >>>>> >>>>> —Günther >>>>> >>> . > .