From: Jarkko Sakkinen Date: Thu, 14 May 2020 01:12:27 +0000 Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 3/8] security: keys: trusted: fix TPM2 authorizations Message-Id: <664f00cf18c68e3f6316b50679b2fd56919d5aeb.camel@linux.intel.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="iso-8859-1" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable List-Id: References: <20200507231147.27025-1-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> <20200507231147.27025-4-James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> <00325dff8292a18212bbdaa3fd81cebee2a60bc2.camel@linux.intel.com> In-Reply-To: <00325dff8292a18212bbdaa3fd81cebee2a60bc2.camel@linux.intel.com> To: James Bottomley , linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Mimi Zohar , David Woodhouse , keyrings@vger.kernel.org, David Howells On Thu, 2020-05-14 at 04:11 +0300, Jarkko Sakkinen wrote: > On Thu, 2020-05-07 at 16:11 -0700, James Bottomley wrote: > > In TPM 1.2 an authorization was a 20 byte number. The spec actually > > recommended you to hash variable length passwords and use the sha1 > > hash as the authorization. Because the spec doesn't require this > > hashing, the current authorization for trusted keys is a 40 digit hex > > number. For TPM 2.0 the spec allows the passing in of variable length > > passwords and passphrases directly, so we should allow that in trusted > > keys for ease of use. Update the 'blobauth' parameter to take this > > into account, so we can now use plain text passwords for the keys. > >=20 > > so before > >=20 > > keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=F572d396fae9206628714fb2ce00f72= e94f2258f" > >=20 > > after we will accept both the old hex sha1 form as well as a new > > directly supplied password: > >=20 > > keyctl add trusted kmk "new 32 blobauth=3Dhello keyhandle=81000001" > >=20 > > Since a sha1 hex code must be exactly 40 bytes long and a direct > > password must be 20 or less, we use the length as the discriminator > > for which form is input. > >=20 > > Note this is both and enhancement and a potential bug fix. The TPM > > 2.0 spec requires us to strip leading zeros, meaning empyty > > authorization is a zero length HMAC whereas we're currently passing in > > 20 bytes of zeros. A lot of TPMs simply accept this as OK, but the > > Microsoft TPM emulator rejects it with TPM_RC_BAD_AUTH, so this patch > > makes the Microsoft TPM emulator work with trusted keys. > >=20 > > Fixes: 0fe5480303a1 ("keys, trusted: seal/unseal with TPM 2.0 chips") > > Signed-off-by: James Bottomley > > Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen >=20 > Have not checked yet the tail. Probably won't check before PR for v5.8 > is out. >=20 > Just wondering would it hurt to merge everything up until this patch? I.e. could land it also to the release. /Jarkko