Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-12.3 required=3.0 tests=BAYES_00,DKIMWL_WL_HIGH, DKIM_SIGNED,DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,INCLUDES_PATCH, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,NICE_REPLY_A,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9F3F6C433DF for ; Wed, 29 Jul 2020 12:25:06 +0000 (UTC) Received: from merlin.infradead.org (merlin.infradead.org [205.233.59.134]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 63E6A206D8 for ; Wed, 29 Jul 2020 12:25:06 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=lists.infradead.org header.i=@lists.infradead.org header.b="dQ7ql6PE" DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 63E6A206D8 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=arm.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; q=dns/txt; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=lists.infradead.org; s=merlin.20170209; h=Sender:Content-Type: Content-Transfer-Encoding:Cc:List-Subscribe:List-Help:List-Post:List-Archive: List-Unsubscribe:List-Id:In-Reply-To:MIME-Version:Date:Message-ID:From: References:To:Subject:Reply-To:Content-ID:Content-Description:Resent-Date: Resent-From:Resent-Sender:Resent-To:Resent-Cc:Resent-Message-ID:List-Owner; bh=GawwN3s3sOjsnLVbW/GpTOADrCDZrcVJF5xMvFzI5wQ=; b=dQ7ql6PEQrQr6+feIvQ3Z5QKu Zhwx9F4xvsHY218QGnFZxjwan8v6wdIyQ+1ghJOQqX3uURi5AMjrAdQ/VxbWaLIhL/LfBkz3zHDEN i3Kn4XGtOTCJXVtp4gtC0ie5WJG2MZBGOBkfGKOnF7i/U1gbOzm1gSFSqNgP1wDzUBMyr9zBfLVki RgrqCSVcxCAn7p31MVekOwWHpQ2pK5v7IxShxity+PACORrM+OtOTKJ18ZoF6S0tijDFBEbjZ1hcH d63ccVRdOMQfCzGIunf1VRVj2WxjiCh+114jR1nYUhYUQtC4lrp8mt2Q3olnHhpOfORdQVTk6NKXE 1lVZUdjmg==; Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=merlin.infradead.org) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1k0l7J-0004fO-HQ; Wed, 29 Jul 2020 12:23:29 +0000 Received: from foss.arm.com ([217.140.110.172]) by merlin.infradead.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1k0l7H-0004eg-5a for linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org; Wed, 29 Jul 2020 12:23:28 +0000 Received: from usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (unknown [10.121.207.14]) by usa-sjc-mx-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 8C3F51FB; Wed, 29 Jul 2020 05:23:25 -0700 (PDT) Received: from [10.37.12.83] (unknown [10.37.12.83]) by usa-sjc-imap-foss1.foss.arm.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 64B023F66E; Wed, 29 Jul 2020 05:23:23 -0700 (PDT) Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 2/4] arm64: cpufeature: Modify address authentication cpufeature to exact To: dave.martin@arm.com, amit.kachhap@arm.com References: <1594368010-4419-1-git-send-email-amit.kachhap@arm.com> <1594368010-4419-3-git-send-email-amit.kachhap@arm.com> <20200729103648.GC21941@arm.com> From: Suzuki K Poulose Message-ID: <66cc667d-7397-bbc7-bde1-c562964a7672@arm.com> Date: Wed, 29 Jul 2020 13:28:06 +0100 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20200729103648.GC21941@arm.com> Content-Language: en-US X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20200729_082327_329219_BE0C46E6 X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 35.22 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: mark.rutland@arm.com, keescook@chromium.org, catalin.marinas@arm.com, broonie@kernel.org, james.morse@arm.com, Vincenzo.Frascino@arm.com, will@kernel.org, linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii"; Format="flowed" Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org On 07/29/2020 11:36 AM, Dave Martin wrote: > On Fri, Jul 10, 2020 at 01:30:08PM +0530, Amit Daniel Kachhap wrote: >> The current address authentication cpufeature levels are set as LOWER_SAFE >> which is not compatible with the different configurations added for Armv8.3 >> ptrauth enhancements as the different levels have different behaviour and >> there is no tunable to enable the lower safe versions. This is rectified >> by setting those cpufeature type as EXACT. >> >> The current cpufeature framework also does not interfere in the booting of >> non-exact secondary cpus but rather marks them as tainted. As a workaround >> this is fixed by replacing the generic match handler with a new handler >> specific to ptrauth. >> >> After this change, if there is any variation in ptrauth configurations in >> secondary cpus from boot cpu then those mismatched cpus are parked in an >> infinite loop. >> >> Signed-off-by: Amit Daniel Kachhap >> [Suzuki: Introduce new matching function for address authentication] >> Suggested-by: Suzuki K Poulose >> --- >> Changes since v3: >> * Commit logs cleanup. >> >> arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ >> 1 file changed, 47 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-) >> >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c >> index 9fae0efc80c1..8ac8c18f70c9 100644 >> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c >> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c >> @@ -210,9 +210,9 @@ static const struct arm64_ftr_bits ftr_id_aa64isar1[] = { >> ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_FCMA_SHIFT, 4, 0), >> ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_JSCVT_SHIFT, 4, 0), >> ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE_IF_IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH), >> - FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT, 4, 0), >> + FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64ISAR1_API_SHIFT, 4, 0), >> ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE_IF_IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH), >> - FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, 4, 0), >> + FTR_STRICT, FTR_EXACT, ID_AA64ISAR1_APA_SHIFT, 4, 0), >> ARM64_FTR_BITS(FTR_VISIBLE, FTR_STRICT, FTR_LOWER_SAFE, ID_AA64ISAR1_DPB_SHIFT, 4, 0), >> ARM64_FTR_END, >> }; >> @@ -1605,11 +1605,49 @@ static void cpu_clear_disr(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *__unused) >> #endif /* CONFIG_ARM64_RAS_EXTN */ >> >> #ifdef CONFIG_ARM64_PTR_AUTH >> -static bool has_address_auth(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, >> - int __unused) >> +static bool has_address_auth_cpucap(const struct arm64_cpu_capabilities *entry, int scope) >> { >> - return __system_matches_cap(ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH) || >> - __system_matches_cap(ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF); >> + int local_cpu_auth; >> + static int boot_cpu_auth_arch; >> + static int boot_cpu_auth_imp_def; > > I guess having static variables here is probably safe, provided that > calls to this function are strictly serialised with sufficiently > heavyweight synchronisation. > These are initialised with the primary boot CPU. And later on called from CPU bring up. So they are serialized, except when this_cpu_has_cap() could be called. But this is fine, as it is a read operation. > Might be worth a comment. > > Coming up with a cleaner approach using locks or atomics might be > overkill, but other folks might take a stronger view on this. > >> + >> + /* We don't expect to be called with SCOPE_SYSTEM */ >> + WARN_ON(scope == SCOPE_SYSTEM); >> + >> + local_cpu_auth = cpuid_feature_extract_field(__read_sysreg_by_encoding(entry->sys_reg), >> + entry->field_pos, entry->sign); >> + /* >> + * The ptr-auth feature levels are not intercompatible with >> + * lower levels. Hence we must match all the CPUs with that >> + * of the boot CPU. So cache the level of boot CPU and compare >> + * it against the secondary CPUs. >> + */ >> + if (scope & SCOPE_BOOT_CPU) { >> + if (entry->capability == ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF) { >> + boot_cpu_auth_imp_def = local_cpu_auth; >> + return boot_cpu_auth_imp_def >= entry->min_field_value; >> + } else if (entry->capability == ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH) { >> + boot_cpu_auth_arch = local_cpu_auth; >> + return boot_cpu_auth_arch >= entry->min_field_value; >> + } >> + } else if (scope & SCOPE_LOCAL_CPU) { >> + if (entry->capability == ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_IMP_DEF) { >> + return (local_cpu_auth >= entry->min_field_value) && >> + (local_cpu_auth == boot_cpu_auth_imp_def); >> + } >> + if (entry->capability == ARM64_HAS_ADDRESS_AUTH_ARCH) { >> + return (local_cpu_auth >= entry->min_field_value) && >> + (local_cpu_auth == boot_cpu_auth_arch); >> + } >> + } > > This looks complex. I guess this is something to do with the change to > FTR_EXACT, but won't the cpufeatures code do the right thing anyway with > mismatched features? Part of the issue is that the capability is SCOPE_BOOT_CPU. So, we need to verify the features on the secondary CPUs, making sure that they match the "level" as detected by the boot CPU. Otherwise, we could end up with mismatched CPUs, where all of them support different levels of AUTH. Also, implies that the checks are performed before the cpufeature gets updated with the secondary CPUs values. Any conflict implies the secondary CPU ends up parked. So, the "FTR_EXACT" change only has an impact of keeping the cpufeature infrastructure sanitised only in the absence of CONFIG_ARM64_PTRAUTH. Cheers Suzuki _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel