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To: Kuniyuki Iwashima , "David S. Miller" , Eric Dumazet , Jakub Kicinski , Paolo Abeni Cc: Simon Horman , Kuniyuki Iwashima , Christian Heusel , =?UTF-8?Q?Andr=C3=A9_Almeida?= , netdev@vger.kernel.org References: <20250611202758.3075858-1-kuni1840@gmail.com> Content-Language: en-US, pl From: =?UTF-8?Q?Jacek_=C5=81uczak?= In-Reply-To: <20250611202758.3075858-1-kuni1840@gmail.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit On 6/11/25 10:27 PM, Kuniyuki Iwashima wrote: > From: Kuniyuki Iwashima > > Before the cited commit, the kernel unconditionally embedded SCM > credentials to skb for embryo sockets even when both the sender > and listener disabled SO_PASSCRED and SO_PASSPIDFD. > > Now, the credentials are added to skb only when configured by the > sender or the listener. > > However, as reported in the link below, it caused a regression for > some programs that assume credentials are included in every skb, > but sometimes not now. > > The only problematic scenario would be that a socket starts listening > before setting the option. Then, there will be 2 types of non-small > race window, where a client can send skb without credentials, which > the peer receives as an "invalid" message (and aborts the connection > it seems ?): > > Client Server > ------ ------ > s1.listen() <-- No SO_PASS{CRED,PIDFD} > s2.connect() > s2.send() <-- w/o cred > s1.setsockopt(SO_PASS{CRED,PIDFD}) > s2.send() <-- w/ cred > > or > > Client Server > ------ ------ > s1.listen() <-- No SO_PASS{CRED,PIDFD} > s2.connect() > s2.send() <-- w/o cred > s3, _ = s1.accept() <-- Inherit cred options > s2.send() <-- w/o cred but not set yet > > s3.setsockopt(SO_PASS{CRED,PIDFD}) > s2.send() <-- w/ cred > > It's unfortunate that buggy programs depend on the behaviour, > but let's restore the previous behaviour. > > Fixes: 3f84d577b79d ("af_unix: Inherit sk_flags at connect().") > Reported-by: Jacek Łuczak > Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/all/68d38b0b-1666-4974-85d4-15575789c8d4@gmail.com/ > Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima > --- > net/unix/af_unix.c | 3 ++- > 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) > > diff --git a/net/unix/af_unix.c b/net/unix/af_unix.c > index fd6b5e17f6c4..87439d7f965d 100644 > --- a/net/unix/af_unix.c > +++ b/net/unix/af_unix.c > @@ -1971,7 +1971,8 @@ static void unix_maybe_add_creds(struct sk_buff *skb, const struct sock *sk, > if (UNIXCB(skb).pid) > return; > > - if (unix_may_passcred(sk) || unix_may_passcred(other)) { > + if (unix_may_passcred(sk) || unix_may_passcred(other) || > + !other->sk_socket) { > UNIXCB(skb).pid = get_pid(task_tgid(current)); > current_uid_gid(&UNIXCB(skb).uid, &UNIXCB(skb).gid); > } Tested-by: Jacek Łuczak