Return-Path: Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; spf=pass (mailfrom) smtp.mailfrom=linux.ibm.com (client-ip=148.163.156.1; helo=mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com; envelope-from=anoo@linux.ibm.com; receiver=) Authentication-Results: lists.ozlabs.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.ibm.com Received: from mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com [148.163.156.1]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by lists.ozlabs.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 45SKl96fDLzDqSm for ; Tue, 18 Jun 2019 04:40:04 +1000 (AEST) Received: from pps.filterd (m0098399.ppops.net [127.0.0.1]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com (8.16.0.27/8.16.0.27) with SMTP id x5HIb9oZ024020 for ; Mon, 17 Jun 2019 14:40:02 -0400 Received: from e35.co.us.ibm.com (e35.co.us.ibm.com [32.97.110.153]) by mx0a-001b2d01.pphosted.com with ESMTP id 2t6f0pb1xj-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NOT) for ; Mon, 17 Jun 2019 14:40:02 -0400 Received: from localhost by e35.co.us.ibm.com with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted for from ; Mon, 17 Jun 2019 19:40:01 +0100 Received: from b03cxnp07029.gho.boulder.ibm.com (9.17.130.16) by e35.co.us.ibm.com (192.168.1.135) with IBM ESMTP SMTP Gateway: Authorized Use Only! Violators will be prosecuted; (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256/256) Mon, 17 Jun 2019 19:39:59 +0100 Received: from b03ledav005.gho.boulder.ibm.com (b03ledav005.gho.boulder.ibm.com [9.17.130.236]) by b03cxnp07029.gho.boulder.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id x5HIdwgd9765262 (version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=OK); Mon, 17 Jun 2019 18:39:58 GMT Received: from b03ledav005.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 60BD7BE054; Mon, 17 Jun 2019 18:39:58 +0000 (GMT) Received: from b03ledav005.gho.boulder.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 34E4ABE051; Mon, 17 Jun 2019 18:39:58 +0000 (GMT) Received: from ltc.linux.ibm.com (unknown [9.16.170.189]) by b03ledav005.gho.boulder.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP; Mon, 17 Jun 2019 18:39:58 +0000 (GMT) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 13:41:30 -0500 From: Adriana Kobylak To: Joseph Reynolds Cc: Openbmc , openbmc , "Thomaiyar, Richard Marian" Subject: Re: Move away from default password In-Reply-To: <1ec23c9c-6fd1-1a37-150e-6ac7c950cc0d@linux.intel.com> References: <1164a9a82b2b59087059c59391e65d04@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <1ec23c9c-6fd1-1a37-150e-6ac7c950cc0d@linux.intel.com> X-Sender: anoo@linux.ibm.com User-Agent: Roundcube Webmail/1.0.1 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 19061718-0012-0000-0000-00001744F371 X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00011280; HX=3.00000242; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000286; SDB=6.01219376; UDB=6.00641380; IPR=6.01000518; MB=3.00027347; MTD=3.00000008; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2019-06-17 18:40:01 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 19061718-0013-0000-0000-000057B9E039 Message-Id: <67d4cc41211749ef9ff888a31d9e8615@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10434:, , definitions=2019-06-17_07:, , signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1015 lowpriorityscore=0 mlxscore=0 impostorscore=0 mlxlogscore=973 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1810050000 definitions=main-1906170165 X-BeenThere: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Development list for OpenBMC List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 17 Jun 2019 18:40:06 -0000 >> 1. Unique password per BMC. >> In this approach, there is a way to change the factory default >> password.  Example flow: assemble the BMC, test it, factory reset, >> generate unique password (such as `pwgen`), then use a new function >> “save factory default settings” which would save the current >> setting into a new “factory settings” flash partition. After that, >> a factory reset would reset to the factory installed password, not to >> the setting in the source code. How would this new "factory settings" flash partition be protected against being modified by an unauthorized or malicious user? >> Presumably the new factory default would be printed on a sticker, or >> something. >> Are there any other factory settings (settings unique to each device) >> that would benefit from being set like this? >> One downside to this approach is someone who orders 100 systems has to >> enter 100 unique passwords. >>