References: <20200415073017.22839-1-lstipakov@...277...> <1ed2462d-36bc-1393-a59f-133ba5788063@...1227...> From: Antonio Quartulli Message-ID: <744f7da6-263a-957b-1e38-a40addc9bc9b@...2181...> Date: Wed, 15 Apr 2020 18:45:00 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <1ed2462d-36bc-1393-a59f-133ba5788063@...1227...> Content-Language: en-US Subject: Re: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH v2] Fix illegal client float List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: Arne Schwabe , Lev Stipakov , openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Cc: Lev Stipakov Hi, On 15/04/2020 11:32, Arne Schwabe wrote: > Am 15.04.20 um 09:30 schrieb Lev Stipakov: >> From: Lev Stipakov >> >> There is a time frame between allocating peer-id and initializing data >> channel key, which is performed on receiving push request. >> >> If a "rogue" data channel packet arrives during that time frame from >> another address and with same peer-id, this would cause client to float >> to that new address. This is because: >> >> - tls_pre_decrypt() sets packet length to zero if >> data channel key has not been initialized, which leads to >> >> - openvpn_decrypt() returns true if packet length is zero, >> which leads to >> >> - process_incoming_link_part1() returns true, which >> calls multi_process_float(), which commits float >> >> Note that problem doesn't happen when data channel key >> is initialized, since in this case openvpn_decrypt() returns false. >> >> Fix illegal float by adding buffer length check before calling >> multi_process_float(). >> >> This should fix Trac #1272. >> >> Signed-off-by: Lev Stipakov >> --- >> v2: add comment explaning why nonzero check needed >> >> src/openvpn/multi.c | 3 ++- >> 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) >> >> diff --git a/src/openvpn/multi.c b/src/openvpn/multi.c >> index da0aeeba..37d2a6f2 100644 >> --- a/src/openvpn/multi.c >> +++ b/src/openvpn/multi.c >> @@ -2555,7 +2555,8 @@ multi_process_incoming_link(struct multi_context *m, struct multi_instance *inst >> orig_buf = c->c2.buf.data; >> if (process_incoming_link_part1(c, lsi, floated)) >> { >> - if (floated) >> + /* nonzero length means that we have a valid, decrypted packed */ >> + if (floated && c->c2.buf.len > 0) >> { >> multi_process_float(m, m->pending); >> } >> > Thanks! > > Acked-By: Arne Schwabe just went through the entire flow with Lev and David and this all makes a lot of sense now. Couldn't come up with a better fix for this issue. Acked-by: Antonio Quartulli -- Antonio Quartulli