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[50.78.19.50]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id g203-20020a0dddd4000000b00592548b2c47sm3099335ywe.80.2023.09.26.10.13.28 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 bits=128/128); Tue, 26 Sep 2023 10:13:30 -0700 (PDT) Message-ID: <84b05acf-778b-4284-a032-4b1a8ba71398@gmail.com> Date: Tue, 26 Sep 2023 10:13:26 -0700 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: iwd@lists.linux.dev List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] handshake: include additional sha256 AKMs for PMKID generation Content-Language: en-US To: Bryce Johnson Cc: Denis Kenzior , "iwd@lists.linux.dev" References: <20230404203823.384260-1-prestwoj@gmail.com> <1d8a1939-93fe-12b6-5007-e6621dffa7f1@gmail.com> <05e63c78-5373-520c-15db-aa42cecd95b0@gmail.com> <3855c8ce-c2de-d1f3-e5d8-8c93610e4b22@gmail.com> <5789f7e4-793e-8e42-29d1-1a92696ec2f4@gmail.com> <82109cb9-3264-4b99-a6f7-e3d71da45270@gmail.com> <8ad9aec4-b72a-4838-aff4-cc52e6018dcf@gmail.com> <1f4a9aaa-6e7f-4f07-9ee3-87599b47eb3e@gmail.com> <14d625aa-b2a6-46ed-9410-802b2d587059@gmail.com> From: James Prestwood In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Hi Bryce, On 9/26/23 9:54 AM, Bryce Johnson wrote: > On Tue, Sep 26, 2023 at 9:52 AM James Prestwood wrote: >> >> Hi Bryce, >> >> On 9/26/23 8:16 AM, Bryce Johnson wrote: >>> Hi James and all, >>> Switched to my gmail account that works with the mailing list better... >>> >>>>> >>>>>> Yes without PMKSA support the client device/IWD will never "reassociate" >>>>>> after being deauthenticated so your right checking for the auth alg == 0 >>>>>> is not correct. >>>>>> >>>>>> After being disconnected IWD will do a full initial association, which >>>>>> for SAE means auth alg == 4. >>>>> >>>>> Just looking through the wireshark logs, just to double check you mean the Authentication Algorithm in the Authentication message (0x000b). I am seeing that as Authentication Algorithm: Simultaneous Authentication of Equals (SAE) (3) (0x03 00). So Auth Alg of 3? Or am I referencing the wrong thing? >>>> >>>> Yes sorry SAE is 3, I was mixing up what the kernel's enum value for SAE is. >>>> >>> >>> Still having issues with wifi certification around the PMKSA caching. >>> After finally convincing the person at the wifi alliance support >>> person where the spec didn't say PMKSA caching disabled needed to be >>> in open mode I got this back: >>> >>> "Thank you for sharing the PMKSA_caching information from the IEEE >>> Spec. It appears that it only describes the correct behavior of the >>> DUT with PMKSA caching but does not provide any information about >>> PMKSA caching for WPA3 SAE-H2E. >>> >>> However, according to Security R3 MRD v1.3 (May 2020), PMKSA Caching >>> is mandatory for all devices, which means your device must have the >>> PMKSA caching function. You can find more details in section 6.3.1, >>> 'SAE Hash-to-Element,' of the Security R3 MRD v1.3.pdf document, which >>> can be downloaded from the following link" >>> >>> Those lines are here: >>> 6.3.1 SAE Hash-to-Element >>> • Support for the SAE Hash-to-Element (H2E) technique defined in >>> 802.11 REVmd D3.0, including support for Rejected Groups, and back >>> compatibility with the SAE Hunting-and-Pecking technique >>> ▪ H2E support is required for all mandatory and optional SAE-based >>> WPA3 features that are supported by the device >>> o Note: PMKSA Caching is mandatory for all devices; FT-SAE is optional >>> • Support for BSS Membership Selector indication for H2E-only SAE, as >>> defined in 802.11 REVmd D3.0 >> >> Apparently WFA does require PMKSA for their own certification then. Not >> sure why exactly they require this. Without PMKSA the device has to do a >> full authentication when reassociationg so its not like its adding >> security in any way, its more of a convenience for faster reassociations >> (as I understand it at least). Its also WPA-Enterprise specific and many >> consumer devices only support WPA-Personal, so its odd they'd require >> this across the board. Maybe ask them this? (unless your device is >> intended to support WPA-Enterprise). Maybe they can disregard that >> requirement if the device is WPA-Personal only? > > Yeah from what I can tell it is just to save time reassoicating. > > We are just doing WPA-Personal (not just enterprise) but it looks like > it for WPA3-Personal as well and not just WPA3-Enterprise Its been a while since I looked at this and your right, both personal and enterprise can cache the PMK. Sorry for the confusion. > > Here were the previous lines to that: > > 6 Requirements > 6.1 Prerequisites > 6.1.1 Prerequisite certifications for WPA3-Personal or > WPA3-Enterprise Certification are listed below: > • Certification of supported physical layers: Wi-Fi CERTIFIED a, b, > g, n, ac or 6 (includes WPA2 Personal certification) > o Or any other PHY program once such becomes available. > • Protected Management Frames > • WPA2-Enterprise certification, for devices obtaining > WPA3-Enterprise certification > 6.1.2 Prerequisite certifications for Wi-Fi Enhanced Open are listed below: > • Certification of supported physical layers: Wi-Fi CERTIFIED a, b, > g, n, ac or 6 > o Or any other PHY program once such becomes available. > • Protected Management Frames > 6.2 Out-of-the-Box Requirements > An AP and STA that implements Operating Channel Validation shall > enable it out of box. > An AP and STA that implements Beacon Protection shall enable it out of box. > A STA that implements client privacy shall enable it out of box. > 6.3 Mandatory Features > In addition to the original WPA3-Personal mandatory requirements, > the following requirements are mandatory for the: > 6.3.1 SAE Hash-to-Element > etc.. > >> >>> • New MAC/PHY/Bands shall only support the SAE H2E method. >>> >>> I can provide a copy to the PDF if someone was interested. >>> >>> Honestly the wifi alliance has been pretty frustrating to work with >>> and takes 1-3 days to get anything back from them. Depending on the >>> followup response, for this product it looks like I might have to >>> revert back to wpa_supplicant and deal with some of the issues with >>> using that. I got spoiled with IWD ease of use (and it seemed to work >>> better in some situations). >>> >>> Products must be getting certificated using IWD right? Did I just >>> come across the wrong support person? >> >> I'm not sure about this. I know companies are definitely using IWD, >> whether or not they are getting it certified for a consumer device is >> another question. > > Yeah I see a lot of companies don't go through the effort to get it > certified, but it is a requirement for our projects. We had > previously done a similar product with wpa_supplicant. > >> >> I think, unfortunately (unless they change their requirements), your >> stuck using wpa_supplicant at this time if WFA requires PMKSA. >> Implementing PMKSA is on the IWD TODO but its not something that has >> been a priority. >> >> I will say, now knowing the WFA requires it, I think its even more >> valuable to implement as making IWD "certifiable" is only going to help >> the project. If I can make time for it, or prioritize it, I will. > > Understandable. It would be nice if the WFA would be proactive and > let the developers know instead of updating the spec and waiting for > tests to fail... > >> >> Thanks, >> James >> >>> >>> Bryce