From: Peter Korsgaard Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2019 20:04:06 +0100 Subject: [Buildroot] [PATCH 2/2] package/runc: add upstream security fix for CVE-2019-5736 In-Reply-To: <20190212131504.28231-2-peter@korsgaard.com> (Peter Korsgaard's message of "Tue, 12 Feb 2019 14:15:04 +0100") References: <20190212131504.28231-1-peter@korsgaard.com> <20190212131504.28231-2-peter@korsgaard.com> Message-ID: <871s4cvnfd.fsf@dell.be.48ers.dk> List-Id: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: buildroot@busybox.net >>>>> "Peter" == Peter Korsgaard writes: > The vulnerability allows a malicious container to (with minimal user > interaction) overwrite the host runc binary and thus gain root-level > code execution on the host. The level of user interaction is being able > to run any command (it doesn't matter if the command is not > attacker-controlled) as root within a container in either of these > contexts: > * Creating a new container using an attacker-controlled image. > * Attaching (docker exec) into an existing container which the > attacker had previous write access to. > For more details, see the advisory: > https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2019/02/11/2 > The fix for this issue uses fexecve(3), which isn't available on uClibc, so > add a dependency on !uclibc to runc and propagate to the reverse > dependencies (containerd/docker-engine). > Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard Committed, thanks. -- Bye, Peter Korsgaard