From: Peter Korsgaard Date: Mon, 03 Aug 2020 13:43:53 +0200 Subject: [Buildroot] [PATCH v2] boot/grub2: Backport Boothole securify fixes In-Reply-To: <20200803080025.434603-1-stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com> (stefan's message of "Mon, 3 Aug 2020 10:00:25 +0200") References: <20200803080025.434603-1-stefan.sorensen@spectralink.com> Message-ID: <873654uf7q.fsf@dell.be.48ers.dk> List-Id: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: buildroot@busybox.net >>>>> "stefan" == stefan writes: > From: Stefan S?rensen > Details: https://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/grub-devel/2020-07/msg00034.html > Fixes the following security issues: > * CVE-2020-10713 > A flaw was found in grub2, prior to version 2.06. An attacker may > use the GRUB 2 flaw to hijack and tamper the GRUB verification > process. This flaw also allows the bypass of Secure Boot > protections. In order to load an untrusted or modified kernel, an > attacker would first need to establish access to the system such as > gaining physical access, obtain the ability to alter a pxe-boot > network, or have remote access to a networked system with root > access. With this access, an attacker could then craft a string to > cause a buffer overflow by injecting a malicious payload that leads > to arbitrary code execution within GRUB. The highest threat from > this vulnerability is to data confidentiality and integrity as well > as system availability. > * CVE-2020-14308 > In grub2 versions before 2.06 the grub memory allocator doesn't > check for possible arithmetic overflows on the requested allocation > size. This leads the function to return invalid memory allocations > which can be further used to cause possible integrity, > confidentiality and availability impacts during the boot process. > * CVE-2020-14309 > There's an issue with grub2 in all versions before 2.06 when > handling squashfs filesystems containing a symbolic link with name > length of UINT32 bytes in size. The name size leads to an > arithmetic overflow leading to a zero-size allocation further > causing a heap-based buffer overflow with attacker controlled data. > * CVE-2020-14310 > An integer overflow in read_section_from_string may lead to a heap > based buffer overflow. > * CVE-2020-14311 > An integer overflow in grub_ext2_read_link may lead to a heap-based > buffer overflow. > * CVE-2020-15706 > GRUB2 contains a race condition in grub_script_function_create() > leading to a use-after-free vulnerability which can be triggered by > redefining a function whilst the same function is already > executing, leading to arbitrary code execution and secure boot > restriction bypass > * CVE-2020-15707 > Integer overflows were discovered in the functions grub_cmd_initrd > and grub_initrd_init in the efilinux component of GRUB2, as shipped > in Debian, Red Hat, and Ubuntu (the functionality is not included > in GRUB2 upstream), leading to a heap-based buffer overflow. These > could be triggered by an extremely large number of arguments to the > initrd command on 32-bit architectures, or a crafted filesystem > with very large files on any architecture. An attacker could use > this to execute arbitrary code and bypass UEFI Secure Boot > restrictions. This issue affects GRUB2 version 2.04 and prior > versions. > Signed-off-by: Stefan S?rensen > --- > Changes since v1: > * Add Signed-off-by to patches Please use the -N option to git format-patch as pointed out by check-package: Applying: boot/grub2: Backport Boothole securify fixes boot/grub2/0002-yylex-Make-lexer-fatal-errors-actually-be-fatal.patch:4: generate your patches with 'git format-patch -N' Committed after fixing that up, thanks. -- Bye, Peter Korsgaard