Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-7.0 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C982BC5B57D for ; Fri, 5 Jul 2019 07:05:14 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.gnu.org (lists.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9D49F21670 for ; Fri, 5 Jul 2019 07:05:14 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 9D49F21670 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=redhat.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Received: from localhost ([::1]:50036 helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.86_2) (envelope-from ) id 1hjIHR-0001Mm-JR for qemu-devel@archiver.kernel.org; Fri, 05 Jul 2019 03:05:13 -0400 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]:40674) by lists.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.86_2) (envelope-from ) id 1hjIFz-0000rz-Ol for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Fri, 05 Jul 2019 03:03:45 -0400 Received: from Debian-exim by eggs.gnu.org with spam-scanned (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1hjIFy-0001m9-D9 for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Fri, 05 Jul 2019 03:03:43 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:46186) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.0:DHE_RSA_AES_256_CBC_SHA1:32) (Exim 4.71) (envelope-from ) id 1hjIFy-0001lX-5J for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Fri, 05 Jul 2019 03:03:42 -0400 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx01.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.11]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mx1.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 64E8E3071D7E; Fri, 5 Jul 2019 07:03:38 +0000 (UTC) Received: from blackfin.pond.sub.org (ovpn-116-111.ams2.redhat.com [10.36.116.111]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E21D17DE22; Fri, 5 Jul 2019 07:03:37 +0000 (UTC) Received: by blackfin.pond.sub.org (Postfix, from userid 1000) id 695871132ABF; Fri, 5 Jul 2019 09:03:31 +0200 (CEST) From: Markus Armbruster To: Daniel P. =?utf-8?Q?Berrang=C3=A9?= References: <20190703135411.28436-1-berrange@redhat.com> Date: Fri, 05 Jul 2019 09:03:31 +0200 In-Reply-To: <20190703135411.28436-1-berrange@redhat.com> ("Daniel P. =?utf-8?Q?Berrang=C3=A9=22's?= message of "Wed, 3 Jul 2019 14:54:11 +0100") Message-ID: <8736jl6jzw.fsf@dusky.pond.sub.org> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/26.2 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.11 X-Greylist: Sender IP whitelisted, not delayed by milter-greylist-4.5.16 (mx1.redhat.com [10.5.110.47]); Fri, 05 Jul 2019 07:03:40 +0000 (UTC) X-detected-operating-system: by eggs.gnu.org: GNU/Linux 2.2.x-3.x [generic] X-Received-From: 209.132.183.28 Subject: Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH] doc: document that the monitor console is a privileged control interface X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.23 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Stefan Hajnoczi , P J P , qemu-devel@nongnu.org, "Dr . David Alan Gilbert" Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: "Qemu-devel" Daniel P. Berrang=C3=A9 writes: > A supposed exploit of QEMU was recently announced as CVE-2019-12928 > claiming that the monitor console was insecure because the "migrate" > comand enabled arbitrary command execution for a remote attacker. > > For this to be a flaw the user launching QEMU must have configured > the monitor in a way that allows for other userrs to access it. The > exploit report quoted use of the "tcp" character device backend for > QMP. > > This would indeed allow any network user to connect to QEMU and > execute arbitrary comamnds, however, this is not a flaw in QEMU. > It is the normal expected behaviour of the monitor console and the > commands it supports. Given a monitor connection, there are many > ways to access host filesystem content besides the migrate command. > > The reality is that the monitor console (whether QMP or HMP) is > considered a privileged interface to QEMU and as such must only > be made available to trusted users. IOW, making it available with > no authentication over TCP is simply a, very serious, user > configuration error not a security flaw in QEMU itself. https://xkcd.com/2166/ > The one thing this bogus security report highlights though is that > we have not clearly documented the security implications around the > use of the monitor. Add a few paragraphs of text to the security > docs explaining why the monitor is a privileged interface and making > a recommendation to only use the UNIX socket character device backend. Good idea. > Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrang=C3=A9 > --- > docs/security.texi | 36 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ > 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+) > > diff --git a/docs/security.texi b/docs/security.texi > index 927764f1e6..5bff01449d 100644 > --- a/docs/security.texi > +++ b/docs/security.texi > @@ -129,3 +129,39 @@ those resources that were granted to it. > system calls that are not needed by QEMU, thereby reducing the host kern= el > attack surface. > @end itemize > + > +@section Sensitive configurations > + > +There are aspects of QEMU that can have non-obvious security implications Is calling the implications "non-obvious" useful? One guy's "non-obvious" can be the next guy's "trivial"... > +which users & management applications must be aware of. > + > +@subsection Monitor console (QMP and HMP) > + > +The monitor console (whether used with QMP or HMP) provides an RPC inter= face "RPC" is unnecessary detail I find distracting (and not entirely fitting besides). Please scratch it. > +to dynamically control many aspects of QEMU's runtime operation. Many of= the > +commands exposed will instruct QEMU to access content on the host filesy= system > +and/or trigger spawning of external processes. > + > +For example, the @code{migrate} command allows for the spawning of arbit= rary > +processes for the purpose of tunnelling the migration data stream. The > +@code{blockdev-add} command instructs QEMU to open arbitrary files, expo= sing > +their content to the guest as a virtual disk. > + > +Unless QEMU is otherwise confined using technologies such as SELinux, Ap= pArmor, > +or Linux namespaces, the monitor console should be considered to have pr= ivileges > +equivalent to those of the user account QEMU is running under. > + > +It is further important to consider the security of the character device= backend > +over which the monitor console is exposed. It needs to have protection a= gainst > +malicious third parties which might try to make unauthorized connections= , or > +perform man-in-the-middle attacks. Many of the character device backends= do not > +satisfy this requirement and so must not be used for the monitor console. > + > +The general recommendation is that the monitor console should be exposed= over > +a UNIX domain socket backend to the local host only. Use of the TCP based > +character device backend is inappropriate unless configured to use both = TLS > +encryption and authorization control policy on client connections. > + > +In summary the monitor console is considered a privileged control interf= ace to > +QEMU and as such should only be made accessible to a trusted management > +application or user. With "RPC" scratched: Reviewed-by: Markus Armbruster