From: Peter Korsgaard Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2020 22:48:51 +0200 Subject: [Buildroot] [PATCH 1/1] package/mbedtls: security bump to version 2.16.7 In-Reply-To: <20200713101242.250717-1-fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com> (Fabrice Fontaine's message of "Mon, 13 Jul 2020 12:12:42 +0200") References: <20200713101242.250717-1-fontaine.fabrice@gmail.com> Message-ID: <878sfcmw5o.fsf@dell.be.48ers.dk> List-Id: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: buildroot@busybox.net >>>>> "Fabrice" == Fabrice Fontaine writes: > - Fix a side channel vulnerability in modular exponentiation that could > reveal an RSA private key used in a secure enclave. > - Fix side channel in mbedtls_ecp_check_pub_priv() and > mbedtls_pk_parse_key() / mbedtls_pk_parse_keyfile() (when loading a > private key that didn't include the uncompressed public key), as well > as mbedtls_ecp_mul() / mbedtls_ecp_mul_restartable() when called with > a NULL f_rng argument. An attacker with access to precise enough > timing and memory access information (typically an untrusted operating > system attacking a secure enclave) could fully recover the ECC private > key. > - Fix issue in Lucky 13 counter-measure that could make it ineffective > when hardware accelerators were used (using one of the > MBEDTLS_SHAxxx_ALT macros). This would cause the original Lucky 13 > attack to be possible in those configurations, allowing an active > network attacker to recover plaintext after repeated timing > measurements under some conditions. > https://tls.mbed.org/tech-updates/security-advisories/mbedtls-security-advisory-2020-07 > Switch to github to get latest release > Signed-off-by: Fabrice Fontaine Committed to 2020.02.x and 2020.05.x, thanks. -- Bye, Peter Korsgaard