From: Jeremy Maitin-Shepard <jbms@cmu.edu>
Subject: Re: [AppArmor 01/41] Pass struct vfsmount to the inode_create LSM hook
Date: Fri, 25 May 2007 14:13:25 -0400
Message-ID: <87bqg8py9m.fsf@jbms.ath.cx>
References: <267570.85171.qm@web36604.mail.mud.yahoo.com>
	<87fy5kpye6.fsf@jbms.ath.cx>
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Cc: Andreas Gruenbacher <agruen@suse.de>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
To: casey@schaufler-ca.com
In-Reply-To: <87fy5kpye6.fsf@jbms.ath.cx> (Jeremy Maitin-Shepard's message of
	"Fri\, 25 May 2007 14\:10\:41 -0400")
Sender: linux-fsdevel-owner@vger.kernel.org

Jeremy Maitin-Shepard <jbms@cmu.edu> writes:

> [snip]

> Well, my point was exactly that App Armor doesn't (as far as I know) do
> anything to enforce the argv[0] convention, nor would it in general
> prevent a confined program from making a symlink or hard link.  Even
> disregarding that, it seems very fragile in general to make an suid
> program (there would be no point in confining the execution of a
> non-suid program) perform essentially access control based on argv[0].

Note that by "confining the execution of a non-suid program", I mean
defining an App Armor profile that prevents the execution of a
particular non-suid program, unless of course the program file itself
contains secret information, which is irrelevant to this discussion.

-- 
Jeremy Maitin-Shepard