From: why2jjj.linux@gmail.com (J Freyensee) Date: Tue, 13 Mar 2018 09:00:48 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v3 1/6] tpm-buf: create new functions for handling TPM buffers In-Reply-To: <1520877553.4522.25.camel@HansenPartnership.com> References: <1520720026.4495.11.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <1520720090.4495.12.camel@HansenPartnership.com> <277bd8a1-9e7f-f6e8-bede-5208f0456adf@gmail.com> <1520877553.4522.25.camel@HansenPartnership.com> Message-ID: <87c7bc38-2f43-9bb0-ac76-ebbc08ce4977@gmail.com> To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org On 3/12/18 10:59 AM, James Bottomley wrote: > On Mon, 2018-03-12 at 09:00 -0700, J Freyensee wrote: >>> +int tpm_buf_init(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 tag, u32 ordinal) >>> +{ >>> + int rc; >>> + >>> + rc = __tpm_buf_init(buf); >> >> Assuming that functions like tpm_buf_init() are the top-level API >> being defined in this patch, shouldn't it check if buf is valid >> before passing into the internal functions like __tpm_buf_init(buf) >> (maybe WARN()/BUG_ON()?).? Or does __tpm_buf_init(buf) do this check? > These are kernel internal APIs designed for on stack struct tpm_buf > usage, ok. > so I can't think of a viable threat model that would require > this type of checking ... do you have one? no, nothing particular in mind.? I just get a little nervous when I see variables being passed unchecked into internal functions starting with '__'. Regards, Jay > > James > -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html