From: Peter Korsgaard Date: Fri, 28 Aug 2020 19:03:40 +0200 Subject: [Buildroot] [PATCH] package/chrony: security bump to version 3.5.1 In-Reply-To: <20200821205105.733-1-peter@korsgaard.com> (Peter Korsgaard's message of "Fri, 21 Aug 2020 22:51:04 +0200") References: <20200821205105.733-1-peter@korsgaard.com> Message-ID: <87d03ar9cj.fsf@dell.be.48ers.dk> List-Id: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: buildroot@busybox.net >>>>> "Peter" == Peter Korsgaard writes: > Fixes the following security issues: > CVE-2020-14367: Insecure writing of pidfile > ------------------------------------------- > When chronyd is configured to save the pidfile in a directory where the > chrony user has write permissions (e.g. /var/run/chrony - the default > since chrony-3.4), an attacker that compromised the chrony user account > could create a symbolic link at the location of the pidfile to make > chronyd starting with root privileges follow the symlink and write its > process ID to a file for which the chrony user doesn't have write > permissions, causing a denial of service, or data loss. > This issue was reported by Matthias Gerstner of SUSE. > For further details, see the oss-security posting: > https://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2020/08/21/1 > Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard Committed to 2020.02.x and 2020.05.x, thanks. -- Bye, Peter Korsgaard