From: Peter Korsgaard Date: Mon, 19 Dec 2016 22:45:26 +0100 Subject: [Buildroot] [PATCH 1/2] libupnp: add upstream security fix for CVE-2016-6255 In-Reply-To: <20161219223022.489e8546@free-electrons.com> (Thomas Petazzoni's message of "Mon, 19 Dec 2016 22:30:22 +0100") References: <20161219131324.19811-1-peter@korsgaard.com> <20161219223022.489e8546@free-electrons.com> Message-ID: <87eg13a8zt.fsf@dell.be.48ers.dk> List-Id: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: buildroot@busybox.net >>>>> "Thomas" == Thomas Petazzoni writes: > Hello, > On Mon, 19 Dec 2016 14:13:23 +0100, Peter Korsgaard wrote: >> If there's no registered handler for a POST request, the default behaviour >> is to write it to the filesystem. Several million deployed devices appear >> to have this behaviour, making it possible to (at least) store arbitrary >> data on them. Add a configure option that enables this behaviour, and change >> the default to just drop POSTs that aren't directly handled. >> >> Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard >> --- >> ...-unhandled-POSTs-to-write-to-the-filesyst.patch | 73 ++++++++++++++++++++++ >> package/libupnp/libupnp.mk | 2 + >> 2 files changed, 75 insertions(+) >> create mode 100644 package/libupnp/0001-Don-t-allow-unhandled-POSTs-to-write-to-the-filesyst.patch > I've applied both to master, thanks! > I have to say that these security issues are terrible. The first one > because the feature by itself is really silly and one may wonder why > someone would implement such a feature in the first place. The second > one because when you see what the URL parsing code looks like, no > wonder why there are some security bugs in it... Yeah, libupnp isn't really what I would best of class code :/ Thanks for applying the patches! -- Bye, Peter Korsgaard