From: Peter Korsgaard Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2019 14:30:40 +0200 Subject: [Buildroot] [PATCH] package/python-django: security bump to version 2.2.4 In-Reply-To: <20190801122241.31463-1-peter@korsgaard.com> (Peter Korsgaard's message of "Thu, 1 Aug 2019 14:22:41 +0200") References: <20190801122241.31463-1-peter@korsgaard.com> Message-ID: <87imqq66q7.fsf@dell.be.48ers.dk> List-Id: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: buildroot@busybox.net >>>>> "Peter" == Peter Korsgaard writes: > Fixes the following security issues: > CVE-2019-14232: Denial-of-service possibility in django.utils.text.Truncator > If django.utils.text.Truncator's chars() and words() methods were passed the > html=True argument, they were extremely slow to evaluate certain inputs due > to a catastrophic backtracking vulnerability in a regular expression. The > chars() and words() methods are used to implement the truncatechars_html and > truncatewords_html template filters, which were thus vulnerable. > The regular expressions used by Truncator have been simplified in order to > avoid potential backtracking issues. As a consequence, trailing punctuation > may now at times be included in the truncated output. > CVE-2019-14233: Denial-of-service possibility in strip_tags() > Due to the behavior of the underlying HTMLParser, > django.utils.html.strip_tags() would be extremely slow to evaluate certain > inputs containing large sequences of nested incomplete HTML entities. The > strip_tags() method is used to implement the corresponding striptags > template filter, which was thus also vulnerable. > strip_tags() now avoids recursive calls to HTMLParser when progress removing > tags, but necessarily incomplete HTML entities, stops being made. > Remember that absolutely NO guarantee is provided about the results of > strip_tags() being HTML safe. So NEVER mark safe the result of a > strip_tags() call without escaping it first, for example with > django.utils.html.escape(). > CVE-2019-14234: SQL injection possibility in key and index lookups for > JSONField/HStoreField > Key and index lookups for django.contrib.postgres.fields.JSONField and key > lookups for django.contrib.postgres.fields.HStoreField were subject to SQL > injection, using a suitably crafted dictionary, with dictionary expansion, > as the **kwargs passed to QuerySet.filter(). > CVE-2019-14235: Potential memory exhaustion in > django.utils.encoding.uri_to_iri() > If passed certain inputs, django.utils.encoding.uri_to_iri could lead to > significant memory usage due to excessive recursion when re-percent-encoding > invalid UTF-8 octet sequences. > uri_to_iri() now avoids recursion when re-percent-encoding invalid UTF-8 > octet sequences. > Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard I have instead bumped 2019.02.x and 2019.05.x to 2.1.11, which contains the same fixes. -- Bye, Peter Korsgaard