Reply-To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) References: <5255D023.2030907@gmail.com> <1381356014.2050.28.camel@joe-AO722> <5255D2FD.6050705@gmail.com> <1381356861.2050.33.camel@joe-AO722> <5255D7D4.8050204@gmail.com> <1381358030.2050.36.camel@joe-AO722> <5255DBD8.30005@gmail.com> <1381360187.2050.44.camel@joe-AO722> <87pprck0q7.fsf@xmission.com> <52576E32.1050700@gmail.com> Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2013 20:34:01 -0700 In-Reply-To: <52576E32.1050700@gmail.com> (Ryan Mallon's message of "Fri, 11 Oct 2013 14:19:14 +1100") Message-ID: <87txgoh45y.fsf@xmission.com> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain Subject: [kernel-hardening] Re: [PATCH v3a] vsprintf: Check real user/group id for %pK To: Ryan Mallon Cc: Joe Perches , Andrew Morton , eldad@fogrefinery.com, Jiri Kosina , jgunthorpe@obsidianresearch.com, Dan Rosenberg , Kees Cook , Alexander Viro , George Spelvin , "kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com" , "linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" List-ID: Ryan Mallon writes: > On 11/10/13 13:20, Eric W. Biederman wrote: >> Joe Perches writes: >> >>> Some setuid binaries will allow reading of files which have read >>> permission by the real user id. This is problematic with files which >>> use %pK because the file access permission is checked at open() time, >>> but the kptr_restrict setting is checked at read() time. If a setuid >>> binary opens a %pK file as an unprivileged user, and then elevates >>> permissions before reading the file, then kernel pointer values may be >>> leaked. >>> >>> This happens for example with the setuid pppd application on Ubuntu >>> 12.04: >>> >>> $ head -1 /proc/kallsyms >>> 00000000 T startup_32 >>> >>> $ pppd file /proc/kallsyms >>> pppd: In file /proc/kallsyms: unrecognized option 'c1000000' >>> >>> This will only leak the pointer value from the first line, but other >>> setuid binaries may leak more information. >>> >>> Fix this by adding a check that in addition to the current process >>> having CAP_SYSLOG, that effective user and group ids are equal to the >>> real ids. If a setuid binary reads the contents of a file which uses >>> %pK then the pointer values will be printed as NULL if the real user >>> is unprivileged. >>> >>> Update the sysctl documentation to reflect the changes, and also >>> correct the documentation to state the kptr_restrict=0 is the default. >> >> Sigh. This is all wrong. The only correct thing to test is >> file->f_cred. Aka the capabilities of the program that opened the >> file. >> >> Which means that the interface to %pK in the case of kptr_restrict is >> broken as it has no way to be passed the information it needs to make >> a sensible decision. > > Would it make sense to add a struct file * to struct seq_file and set > that in seq_open? Then the capability check can be done against > seq->file. It would make most sense to do the capability check at open time, and cache the result. Doing it generically so that seq_printf could still use %pK doesn't sound wrong, but it does sound convoluted. Eric