From: Peter Korsgaard Date: Tue, 12 Feb 2019 19:59:30 +0100 Subject: [Buildroot] [PATCH] openssh: add upstream security fixes In-Reply-To: (Baruch Siach's message of "Tue, 12 Feb 2019 14:13:04 +0200") References: Message-ID: <87va1ovnn1.fsf@dell.be.48ers.dk> List-Id: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: buildroot@busybox.net >>>>> "Baruch" == Baruch Siach writes: > CVE-2019-6109: Due to missing character encoding in the progress > display, a malicious server (or Man-in-The-Middle attacker) can employ > crafted object names to manipulate the client output, e.g., by using > ANSI control codes to hide additional files being transferred. This > affects refresh_progress_meter() in progressmeter.c. > CVE-2019-6111: Due to the scp implementation being derived from 1983 > rcp, the server chooses which files/directories are sent to the client. > However, the scp client only performs cursory validation of the object > name returned (only directory traversal attacks are prevented). A > malicious scp server (or Man-in-The-Middle attacker) can overwrite > arbitrary files in the scp client target directory. If recursive > operation (-r) is performed, the server can manipulate subdirectories as > well (for example, to overwrite the .ssh/authorized_keys file). > Signed-off-by: Baruch Siach Committed, thanks. -- Bye, Peter Korsgaard