Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org Received: from lists1p.gnu.org (lists1p.gnu.org [209.51.188.17]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 76A91C44532 for ; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 13:07:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: from localhost ([::1] helo=lists1p.gnu.org) by lists1p.gnu.org with esmtp (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1wmABk-0006Vo-N3; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 09:07:12 -0400 Received: from eggs.gnu.org ([2001:470:142:3::10]) by lists1p.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1wmABj-0006VU-68 for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 09:07:11 -0400 Received: from smtp-out1.suse.de ([2a07:de40:b251:101:10:150:64:1]) by eggs.gnu.org with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:128) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1wmABh-0003A4-CS for qemu-devel@nongnu.org; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 09:07:10 -0400 Received: from imap1.dmz-prg2.suse.org (unknown [10.150.64.97]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by smtp-out1.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AE25B7A521; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 13:07:06 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=suse.de; s=susede2_rsa; t=1784639226; h=from:from:reply-to:date:date:message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc: mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=o803PJ9l6njTp4Y8jgMyVF5/7oMPojEHx1uIz1lWvqI=; b=rgGJK+q33Ji3L0qK7ENTv8a9h6/XVPQPkK1AVoKQ1S+LHwyylgQmZM2w/kyVcEW/Ojfzjv SF3UyQxaii3wYzXs+5tOElaCQqeeiMNo1Z7/XB3ChP2AJthE0QvL0DkxEIM1N1lsU+rQoT or/GrmUmQcoAvqjDfhiEqCZgiKDHLIU= DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=suse.de; s=susede2_ed25519; t=1784639226; h=from:from:reply-to:date:date:message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc: mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=o803PJ9l6njTp4Y8jgMyVF5/7oMPojEHx1uIz1lWvqI=; b=FwdSnK8HATNrsGyEpUEvdrUpmAowHD3IFTTtALZoORcs4+HsyXBHD1X1DqqFyBcugbZQfj vQM1Kkl7ngzY0QCg== Authentication-Results: smtp-out1.suse.de; none DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=suse.de; s=susede2_rsa; t=1784639226; h=from:from:reply-to:date:date:message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc: mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=o803PJ9l6njTp4Y8jgMyVF5/7oMPojEHx1uIz1lWvqI=; b=rgGJK+q33Ji3L0qK7ENTv8a9h6/XVPQPkK1AVoKQ1S+LHwyylgQmZM2w/kyVcEW/Ojfzjv SF3UyQxaii3wYzXs+5tOElaCQqeeiMNo1Z7/XB3ChP2AJthE0QvL0DkxEIM1N1lsU+rQoT or/GrmUmQcoAvqjDfhiEqCZgiKDHLIU= DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=suse.de; s=susede2_ed25519; t=1784639226; h=from:from:reply-to:date:date:message-id:message-id:to:to:cc:cc: mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: content-transfer-encoding:content-transfer-encoding: in-reply-to:in-reply-to:references:references; bh=o803PJ9l6njTp4Y8jgMyVF5/7oMPojEHx1uIz1lWvqI=; b=FwdSnK8HATNrsGyEpUEvdrUpmAowHD3IFTTtALZoORcs4+HsyXBHD1X1DqqFyBcugbZQfj vQM1Kkl7ngzY0QCg== Received: from imap1.dmz-prg2.suse.org (localhost [127.0.0.1]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) by imap1.dmz-prg2.suse.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id E6143779AA; Tue, 21 Jul 2026 13:07:05 +0000 (UTC) Received: from dovecot-director2.suse.de ([2a07:de40:b281:106:10:150:64:167]) by imap1.dmz-prg2.suse.org with ESMTPSA id 7VdaKvluX2oYdAAAD6G6ig (envelope-from ); Tue, 21 Jul 2026 13:07:05 +0000 From: Fabiano Rosas To: =?utf-8?Q?Daniel_P=2E_Berrang=C3=A9?= Cc: qemu-devel@nongnu.org, Peter Xu , Pierrick Bouvier Subject: Re: [PATCH] docs: Add security considerations for migration In-Reply-To: References: <20260720182750.3029289-1-farosas@suse.de> Date: Tue, 21 Jul 2026 10:07:02 -0300 Message-ID: <87wluo330p.fsf@suse.de> MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spamd-Result: default: False [-4.30 / 50.00]; BAYES_HAM(-3.00)[100.00%]; NEURAL_HAM_LONG(-1.00)[-1.000]; NEURAL_HAM_SHORT(-0.20)[-1.000]; MIME_GOOD(-0.10)[text/plain]; ARC_NA(0.00)[]; MISSING_XM_UA(0.00)[]; RCVD_TLS_ALL(0.00)[]; MIME_TRACE(0.00)[0:+]; RCVD_VIA_SMTP_AUTH(0.00)[]; TO_DN_SOME(0.00)[]; FUZZY_RATELIMITED(0.00)[rspamd.com]; MID_RHS_MATCH_FROM(0.00)[]; DKIM_SIGNED(0.00)[suse.de:s=susede2_rsa,suse.de:s=susede2_ed25519]; FROM_HAS_DN(0.00)[]; RCPT_COUNT_THREE(0.00)[4]; FROM_EQ_ENVFROM(0.00)[]; TO_MATCH_ENVRCPT_ALL(0.00)[]; RCVD_COUNT_TWO(0.00)[2]; DBL_BLOCKED_OPENRESOLVER(0.00)[imap1.dmz-prg2.suse.org:helo, suse.de:email, suse.de:mid] Received-SPF: pass client-ip=2a07:de40:b251:101:10:150:64:1; envelope-from=farosas@suse.de; helo=smtp-out1.suse.de X-Spam_score_int: -20 X-Spam_score: -2.1 X-Spam_bar: -- X-Spam_report: (-2.1 / 5.0 requ) BAYES_00=-1.9, DKIM_SIGNED=0.1, DKIM_VALID=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_AU=-0.1, DKIM_VALID_EF=-0.1, SPF_HELO_NONE=0.001, SPF_PASS=-0.001 autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no X-Spam_action: no action X-BeenThere: qemu-devel@nongnu.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: qemu development List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Sender: qemu-devel-bounces+qemu-devel=archiver.kernel.org@nongnu.org Daniel P. Berrang=C3=A9 writes: > On Mon, Jul 20, 2026 at 03:27:50PM -0300, Fabiano Rosas wrote: >> Add the security considerations that are unique to migration and that >> do not already fall into one of the other categories. Some aspects are >> better framed as security architecture considerations, so extend that >> section to mention TLS and clarify that disk images and guest network >> also need to be isolated from other processes, not just other guests. >>=20 >> Signed-off-by: Fabiano Rosas >> --- >> docs/system/security.rst | 22 ++++++++++++++++++---- >> 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) >>=20 >> diff --git a/docs/system/security.rst b/docs/system/security.rst >> index 52bbf0cc7a2..26c686718cf 100644 >> --- a/docs/system/security.rst >> +++ b/docs/system/security.rst >> @@ -133,6 +133,16 @@ an issue as a normal bug. >> that affect the level 0 QEMU process. While these bugs should be >> fixed, they will not be triaged as security flaws at this time. >>=20=20 >> +* **migration/snapshots**. Migration failures and snapshot load >> + failures are considered part of normal operation as long as the >> + source virtual machine and savevm file, respectively, are still >> + functional. Aborting the QEMU process at the migration/snapshot >> + destination is similarly not considered a security issue. The >> + migration stream is assumed to be secure as long as the design >> + principles described in the Architecture section are held, in >> + which case plain manipulation of the stream is not considered as >> + an attack vector. >> + >> * **low severity impact**. As a catch all rule, issues which >> are judged to have a "low" severity impact on the system will >> usually not justify handling as security bugs, nor assignment >> @@ -159,10 +169,11 @@ could allow malicious guests to gain code executio= n in QEMU. At this point the >> guest has escaped the virtual machine and is able to act in the context= of the >> QEMU process on the host. >>=20=20 >> -Guests often interact with other guests and share resources with them. = A >> -malicious guest must not gain control of other guests or access their d= ata. >> -Disk image files and network traffic must be protected from other guest= s unless >> -explicitly shared between them by the user. >> +Guests often interact with other guests and share resources with them. >> +A malicious guest must not gain control of other guests or access >> +their data. Disk image files and network traffic must be protected >> +from other guests, users and processes unless explicitly shared with >> +them by the user. >>=20=20 >> Principle of Least Privilege >> '''''''''''''''''''''''''''' >> @@ -223,6 +234,9 @@ Some Linux distros already ship with UNIX groups for= these devices by default. >> system calls that are not needed by QEMU, thereby reducing the host k= ernel >> attack surface. >>=20=20 >> +- Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol can be used to ensure hypervi= sor >> + authenticity and encryption of the live migration connection. > > I'd be a bit stronger > > - Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol should be used to ensure > hypervisor authenticity and encryption of the live migration > connection where the network is untrusted. > The tone of the "Isolation mechanisms" sections is a non-prescriptive one, so for consistency "can" is more fitting, IMO. The addition about untrusted networks already serves to indicate that there's no other option (untrusted network without TLS). I'll add that part in v2. > None the less,=20 > > Reviewed-by: Daniel P. Berrang=C3=A9 > Thank you, I appreciate your guidance in these matters, it's always very helpful. > > > With regards, > Daniel