From: Peter Korsgaard Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2021 08:17:50 +0100 Subject: [Buildroot] [PATCH] package/libopenssl: security bump to version 1.1.1j In-Reply-To: <20210216193134.5920-1-peter@korsgaard.com> (Peter Korsgaard's message of "Tue, 16 Feb 2021 20:31:34 +0100") References: <20210216193134.5920-1-peter@korsgaard.com> Message-ID: <87y2fn40yp.fsf@dell.be.48ers.dk> List-Id: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit To: buildroot@busybox.net >>>>> "Peter" == Peter Korsgaard writes: > Fixes the following security issues: > - CVE-2021-23841: Null pointer deref in X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() > The OpenSSL public API function X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() attempts to > create a unique hash value based on the issuer and serial number data > contained within an X509 certificate. However it fails to correctly > handle any errors that may occur while parsing the issuer field (which > might occur if the issuer field is maliciously constructed). This may > subsequently result in a NULL pointer deref and a crash leading to a > potential denial of service attack. > The function X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() is never directly called by > OpenSSL itself so applications are only vulnerable if they use this > function directly and they use it on certificates that may have been > obtained from untrusted sources. > - CVE-2021-23839: Incorrect SSLv2 rollback protection > OpenSSL 1.0.2 supports SSLv2. If a client attempts to negotiate SSLv2 > with a server that is configured to support both SSLv2 and more recent SSL > and TLS versions then a check is made for a version rollback attack when > unpadding an RSA signature. Clients that support SSL or TLS versions > greater than SSLv2 are supposed to use a special form of padding. A > server that supports greater than SSLv2 is supposed to reject connection > attempts from a client where this special form of padding is present, > because this indicates that a version rollback has occurred (i.e. both > client and server support greater than SSLv2, and yet this is the version > that is being requested). > The implementation of this padding check inverted the logic so that the > connection attempt is accepted if the padding is present, and rejected if > it is absent. This means that such as server will accept a connection if > a version rollback attack has occurred. Further the server will > erroneously reject a connection if a normal SSLv2 connection attempt is > made. > OpenSSL 1.1.1 does not have SSLv2 support and therefore is not vulnerable > to this issue. The underlying error is in the implementation of the > RSA_padding_check_SSLv23() function. This also affects the > RSA_SSLV23_PADDING padding mode used by various other functions. Although > 1.1.1 does not support SSLv2 the RSA_padding_check_SSLv23() function still > exists, as does the RSA_SSLV23_PADDING padding mode. Applications that > directly call that function or use that padding mode will encounter this > issue. However since there is no support for the SSLv2 protocol in 1.1.1 > this is considered a bug and not a security issue in that version. > - CVE-2021-23840: Integer overflow in CipherUpdate > Calls to EVP_CipherUpdate, EVP_EncryptUpdate and EVP_DecryptUpdate may > overflow the output length argument in some cases where the input length > is close to the maximum permissable length for an integer on the platform. > In such cases the return value from the function call will be 1 > (indicating success), but the output length value will be negative. This > could cause applications to behave incorrectly or crash. > For more details, see the advisory: > https://www.openssl.org/news/secadv/20210216.txt > Signed-off-by: Peter Korsgaard Committed, thanks. -- Bye, Peter Korsgaard