Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.2 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BCB00C433E0 for ; Thu, 28 May 2020 12:50:42 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.xenproject.org (lists.xenproject.org [192.237.175.120]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 98DD8206F1 for ; Thu, 28 May 2020 12:50:42 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 98DD8206F1 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=suse.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org Received: from localhost ([127.0.0.1] helo=lists.xenproject.org) by lists.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1jeHzB-0005aJ-7T; Thu, 28 May 2020 12:50:13 +0000 Received: from all-amaz-eas1.inumbo.com ([34.197.232.57] helo=us1-amaz-eas2.inumbo.com) by lists.xenproject.org with esmtp (Exim 4.92) (envelope-from ) id 1jeHzA-0005aE-Iz for xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org; Thu, 28 May 2020 12:50:12 +0000 X-Inumbo-ID: c423aa72-a0e1-11ea-a7c5-12813bfff9fa Received: from mx2.suse.de (unknown [195.135.220.15]) by us1-amaz-eas2.inumbo.com (Halon) with ESMTPS id c423aa72-a0e1-11ea-a7c5-12813bfff9fa; Thu, 28 May 2020 12:50:11 +0000 (UTC) X-Virus-Scanned: by amavisd-new at test-mx.suse.de Received: from relay2.suse.de (unknown [195.135.220.254]) by mx2.suse.de (Postfix) with ESMTP id A44EBAA35; Thu, 28 May 2020 12:50:09 +0000 (UTC) Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 06/14] x86/shstk: Create shadow stacks To: Andrew Cooper References: <20200527191847.17207-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> <20200527191847.17207-7-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> From: Jan Beulich Message-ID: <8a02b933-3b7e-ded9-8bf3-a1c35f2ef7ae@suse.com> Date: Thu, 28 May 2020 14:50:08 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.1; WOW64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20200527191847.17207-7-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-BeenThere: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Xen developer discussion List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: Xen-devel , Wei Liu , =?UTF-8?Q?Roger_Pau_Monn=c3=a9?= Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xenproject.org Sender: "Xen-devel" On 27.05.2020 21:18, Andrew Cooper wrote: > --- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c > @@ -769,6 +769,30 @@ void load_system_tables(void) > tss->rsp1 = 0x8600111111111111ul; > tss->rsp2 = 0x8600111111111111ul; > > + /* Set up the shadow stack IST. */ > + if (cpu_has_xen_shstk) { > + volatile uint64_t *ist_ssp = this_cpu(tss_page).ist_ssp; > + > + /* > + * Used entries must point at the supervisor stack token. > + * Unused entries are poisoned. > + * > + * This IST Table may be live, and the NMI/#MC entries must > + * remain valid on every instruction boundary, hence the > + * volatile qualifier. > + */ Move this comment ahead of what it comments on, as we usually have it? > + ist_ssp[0] = 0x8600111111111111ul; > + ist_ssp[IST_MCE] = stack_top + (IST_MCE * IST_SHSTK_SIZE) - 8; > + ist_ssp[IST_NMI] = stack_top + (IST_NMI * IST_SHSTK_SIZE) - 8; > + ist_ssp[IST_DB] = stack_top + (IST_DB * IST_SHSTK_SIZE) - 8; > + ist_ssp[IST_DF] = stack_top + (IST_DF * IST_SHSTK_SIZE) - 8; Strictly speaking you want to introduce #define IST_SHSTK_SLOT 0 next to PRIMARY_SHSTK_SLOT and use ist_ssp[IST_MCE] = stack_top + (IST_SHSTK_SLOT * PAGE_SIZE) + (IST_MCE * IST_SHSTK_SIZE) - 8; etc here. It's getting longish, so I'm not going to insist. But if you go this route, then please also below / elsewhere. > --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm.c > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm.c > @@ -5994,12 +5994,33 @@ void memguard_unguard_range(void *p, unsigned long l) > > #endif > > +static void write_sss_token(unsigned long *ptr) > +{ > + /* > + * A supervisor shadow stack token is its own linear address, with the > + * busy bit (0) clear. > + */ > + *ptr = (unsigned long)ptr; > +} > + > void memguard_guard_stack(void *p) > { > - map_pages_to_xen((unsigned long)p, virt_to_mfn(p), 1, _PAGE_NONE); > + /* IST Shadow stacks. 4x 1k in stack page 0. */ > + if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK) ) > + { > + write_sss_token(p + (IST_MCE * IST_SHSTK_SIZE) - 8); > + write_sss_token(p + (IST_NMI * IST_SHSTK_SIZE) - 8); > + write_sss_token(p + (IST_DB * IST_SHSTK_SIZE) - 8); > + write_sss_token(p + (IST_DF * IST_SHSTK_SIZE) - 8); Up to now two successive memguard_guard_stack() were working fine. This will be no longer the case, just as an observation. > + } > + map_pages_to_xen((unsigned long)p, virt_to_mfn(p), 1, PAGE_HYPERVISOR_SHSTK); As already hinted at in reply to the previous patch, I think this wants to remain _PAGE_NONE when we don't use CET-SS. > + /* Primary Shadow Stack. 1x 4k in stack page 5. */ > p += PRIMARY_SHSTK_SLOT * PAGE_SIZE; > - map_pages_to_xen((unsigned long)p, virt_to_mfn(p), 1, _PAGE_NONE); > + if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK) ) > + write_sss_token(p + PAGE_SIZE - 8); > + > + map_pages_to_xen((unsigned long)p, virt_to_mfn(p), 1, PAGE_HYPERVISOR_SHSTK); > } > > void memguard_unguard_stack(void *p) Would this function perhaps better zap the tokens? Jan